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Preface
While behavioral economics successfully explains many commonly observed choice
patterns that remain puzzles within the neoclassical model, it poses its own chal-
lenges as well. This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters that tackle
such challenges in the domain of dynamic choice.
Dynamics are a crucial feature of many economic decision problems and a key
driver of their complexity. The term dynamic does not only refer to so-called
inter-temporal tradeoﬀs, i.e. a time-lag between choice and outcome that drives
costs and beneﬁts apart, but also to interactions between sequential decisions. A
choice in the present may both determine what options will become available in
future choices, as well as what desires will be evoked then.
A leading behavioral model of inter-temporal choice is hyperbolic discounting
(e.g. Laibson 1997), which induces time-inconsistency by allowing discount rates
to fade over time. Near future is discounted heavier relative to presence than dis-
tant future is discounted relative to near future. This inconsistency is well known
as present bias and captures a desire for immediate gratiﬁcation. It was noted
early on that such time-inconsistent behavior is crucially aﬀected by a decision
maker's awareness of own present bias (e.g. Strotz 1956). Decision makers who
understand that they repeatedly fail in achieving a long-run goal because of giving
in to immediate desires may want to tie their hands and self-commit. Moreover,
the attractiveness of a current option may depend on future choices, so that its
perceived attractiveness depends on anticipated actions. While the interaction
of present bias and anticipation mistakes, so called naïve present bias, helps un-
derstand many behavioral patterns in dynamic choice, it poses a challenge itself.
Naïveté was shown to aggravate the negative eﬀects of present bias in many do-
mains (e.g. DellaVigna & Malmendier 2004), but feedback abounds and should
easily allow for a correction of own anticipations. So how can naïveté with respect
vii
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to present bias persist in face of ample learning opportunity?
In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I tackle this question by characterizing po-
tential upsides of naïveté. As these apply to economically important domains,
such as health and education, this establishes a meaningful tradeoﬀ between so-
phistication and naïveté, as both can be beneﬁcial and harmful. Speciﬁcally, I
show that naïveté helps a decision maker partly overcome present bias in situa-
tions where sequential investments exhibit suﬃcient complementarity and cannot
be pre-committed. Intuitively, this is because a present biased decision maker in-
vests too little from a welfare point of view, and naïveté motivates to invest more
in case of complementarity.
The novel aspect of this investigation is the payoﬀ structure of the choice en-
vironment, i.e. the focus on complementarity respectively substitutability of in-
vestments. There, the underlying model of naïve present bias in form of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting directly applies and oﬀers interesting insights.
However, dynamic inconsistency can arise also in models that were not intended
to generate it in the ﬁrst place. Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979),
for example, is a static model of decision making under risk, i.e. it does not entail
any dynamics. Thanks to its success, however, it was applied in dynamic decision
making as well. As the Prospect Theory value function deﬁnes risk preferences
locally, i.e. relative to a reference point, dynamics are apt to interfere with them.
When reference point and state of world shift relative to one another, because
either of the two moves, or both move non-simultaneously, a shift into the gain
or loss domain occurs, where risk preferences are diﬀerent than at the kink.
Such a preference shift can induce inconsistency, which in turn can make decisions
sensitive to anticipation.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation, which is joint work with Maximilian Breu and Fe-
lix Peterhammer, investigates experimentally such Prospect Theory anticipation.
We ﬁxed reference points by inducing them, and found that almost half of our
participants planned a sequence of investment choices poorly, relative to a simple
benchmark of zero gain-loss-utility from never investing. This suggests a rather
poor understanding of own future Prospect Theory preferences in general. More-
over, almost a third of our participants undervalued a commitment option, which
suggests an under-appreciation of own reactions to domain shifts.
viii
In order to identify potential drivers of between-subject diﬀerences in antici-
pation quality, we conducted a Cognitive Reﬂection Test and a Big-5 personality
test, recorded planning times, calculated a stability measure of Prospect Theory
preferences, and collected self-reported demographics. We found that variation
in planning quality was captured well by these correlates, but commitment qual-
ity was not. Speciﬁcally, higher cognitive reﬂection, planning time, and stability
of Prospect Theory preferences improved planning quality, whereas more agree-
ableness and neuroticism impaired it. Our stability measure of Prospect The-
ory preferences is based on a separate elicitation of loss aversion and diminishing
sensitivity parameters in two subsequent weeks, and reveals inconsistency in the
parameter estimates for almost a third of our participants. While this could be
explained by inattention and the limited number of observations per subject, it
might also point toward an additional dynamic inconsistency of decision makers
with Prospect Theory preferences.
Another dynamic choice anomaly is the so called disposition eﬀect, which has
been studied extensively. It refers to a tendency of investors to sell winning assets
too early and keep losing assets too long. Originally, it was viewed as a mistake
as it is suboptimal with respect to taxation. Later, other potential rational ex-
planations, such as portfolio re-balancing or diﬀerences in transaction costs, were
disregarded. Behavioral economics, however, can rationalize the observed behavior
even twice: On the one hand, people may have a preference against realizing losses
and, therefore, defer it despite instrumental costs; On the other hand, they may
hold wrong believes about their assets, i.e. view their winners overly pessimistic
and their losers overly optimistic.
Both explanations are suitable to rationalize the disposition eﬀect, but they give
rise to completely diﬀerent welfare implications. If it is non-standard preferences
that generate the disposition eﬀect, investors are perfectly aware of the instru-
mental costs of their decisions and happy to bear them in order to achieve some
non-standard utility instead. If it is non-standard beliefs, however, investors may
exhibit the disposition eﬀect simply because they do not know any better. In the
former case, behavior is individually rational. In the latter case, decision makers
would adjust their behaviors if they had more accurate beliefs of the situation.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation, which is joint work with Johannes Maier, exper-
ix
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imentally tests these two behavioral explanations of the disposition eﬀect against
one another. In order to do so, we decompose the disposition eﬀect into four dif-
ferent mistakes relative to the standard model. Speciﬁcally, we view ﬁrst-order
violations as mistakes and distinguish them according to the action, i.e. keeping
the own asset or switching, and according to the domain, i.e. gains or losses.
Testing the explanations against each other becomes possible because they make
diﬀerent predictions for the speciﬁc error patterns: The leading preference based
explanation, realization utility, predicts keep violations in losses and switch vio-
lations in gains, but not the opposite violations; The most prominent mechanical
belief bias, belief in mean reversion, predicts all violations equally; and motivated
beliefs predict only keep violations, but no switch violations. It is important to
notice that usual measures of the disposition eﬀect confound error propensities and
error frequencies. However, a speciﬁc error can happen with a high propensity, e.g.
whenever it is possible, but still be observed only infrequently, e.g. when it is very
often simply not possible.
Doing such a decomposition required a laboratory experiment, as it requires to
control for the true return process as well as for the information. Main features
of our design are that only binary choices were allowed, i.e. portfolio building
was precluded, and that several periods had to be observed before investment
decision could be made. The former feature is necessary to establish a rational
benchmark by ﬁrst-order violations, the latter allows to disentangle gains from
good news respectively losses from bad news, which is necessary for distinguishing
preference-based and belief-based models based on subjects' investment choices
alone.
We found much higher propensities for keep violations than for switch violations,
both in gains and in losses, which is consistent only with the motivated beliefs ex-
planation, not with the mechanic beliefs or non-standard preferences explanations.
In a robustness treatment, we explicitly asked for our participants' beliefs in each
investment decision, and found that they behaved mostly in line with their stated
beliefs, but these were often non-Bayesian. This supports the view that our partic-
ipants were rather not aware of instrumental consequences when they committed
ﬁrst-order violations, instead of being aware and actually wanting to commit them.
x
1. Motivation by Naïveté
1.1. Introduction
Many decisions, both minor and major ones, entail a conﬂict of interest between
people's long-run goals and their desire for immediate gratiﬁcation. Such present
bias induces time-inconsistent decisions and has drawn considerable attention in
the economics literature (e.g. Strotz 1956, Pollak 1968, Laibson 1997).
In path-dependent decision sequences, current choices aﬀect a distant outcome
not only directly, but also indirectly via their eﬀects on subsequent decisions. In
such situations, behavioral consequences of present bias are crucially driven by the
decision makers' awareness of their bias's persistence, their so called sophistication
or (partial) naïveté. Here, the appeal of a current choice heavily relies on the
(potentially wrong) anticipation of its implications for future choices which, in
turn, depends on the anticipation of own future preferences, in particular of own
future present bias.
Such anticipation mistakes have been shown to harm decision makers in many
economically relevant situations. Intuitively, naïveté with respect to present bias is
overoptimism with respect to one's own future self-control and, hence, lets decision
makers take up ineﬀective or even exploitative commitments. This poses the puzzle
how naïveté can persist in face of ample learning opportunities.
I argue that many important inter-temporal decisions do not easily allow for
any commitment at all, such as investments in education or health, and show that
in such situations naïveté can actually help decision makers to partly overcome
their present bias. Speciﬁcally, I characterize necessary and suﬃcient conditions
of the reward structure of a choice environment for naïveté to be beneﬁcial. The
key driver of the potential beneﬁts of naïveté is complementary of the investments
in their joint reward determination.
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For example, education decisions are highly path-dependent and jointly deter-
mine the distant reward of a better or worse job regarding pay, status, job-security,
career prospects, et cetera. Moreover, investments in education are likely to be
complementary with respect to the described outcomes, as success in one stage is
typically a prerequisite for entering precisely those paths that are most conducive
to a later career: One has to excel at school to be admitted to a prestigious college,
where one has to stand out to become part of the Master's program, and so on;
shirking in an early stage leads to a lower education path where subsequent eﬀort
pays oﬀ less.
Therefore, present biased school graduates will determine their choice of college
and ﬁeld of study not only by weighing their current desire for leisure against the
distant reward from current eﬀort, but also consider their future desire for exerting
further eﬀort. As naifs are overoptimistic with respect to own future eﬀort, they
believe to seize all opportunities that their current eﬀorts will bring about and,
hence, regard current investments as attractive. On the other hand, sophisticates
correctly predict to be just as lazy tomorrow as they are today, such that creating
future opportunities seems less worthwhile to them.
This example naturally extends to subsequent work decisions, as a higher ca-
reer path oﬀers more opportunities to excel with one's eﬀort. For instance, a
surgeon not only earns a much higher wage per hour than a nurse, but also faces
much stronger career incentives, as becoming head physician is a disproportion-
ately more dramatic step in status than becoming head nurse. Yet, becoming the
former instead of the latter requires a substantially higher upfront investment in
education.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the
most closely related literature, Section 1.3 introduces the model, Section 1.4 pro-
vides the main analyses and results, and Section 1.5 concludes. All proofs are
relegated to Appendix A.1, and Appendix A.2 provides a cross-validation for the
leading example.
2
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1.2. Literature
The importance of the anticipation of own time inconsistency for determining a
decision maker's course of action has been pointed out in the literature on hy-
perbolic discounting right from the start (Strotz 1956, Pollak 1968). The ﬁrst,
however, who explicitly contrasted the diﬀerential implications of full sophistica-
tion versus full naïveté were O'Donoghue & Rabin (1999) shortly after the revival
of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model of Phelps & Pollak (1968) by Laibson
(1997).
O'Donoghue & Rabin (1999) investigate the timing of a single action without
pre-commitment and ﬁnd that choices and welfare of decision makers crucially
depend on the payoﬀ-structure of the decision at hand. For immediate costs and
delayed rewards, naïveté aggravates procrastination, i.e. the delay of a costly
task against one's own long-run self's best interest; for immediate rewards and
delayed costs, naïveté alleviates preproperation, i.e. the immediate consumption
of a reward when it is in one's own long-run self's best interest to wait. From a
hypothetical self-zero's point of view, both procrastination and preproperation are
suboptimal timings of an action and reduce the decision maker's welfare. Hence,
naïveté is harmful in the immediate costs case, but beneﬁcial in the immediate
rewards case.
Subsequent investigations paid particular attention to the eﬀects of naïveté and
sophistication in models with multiple actions and commitment devices. Speciﬁ-
cally, they studied the design of (potentially exploitative) commitment devices for
naïve present biased decision makers by fully rational ﬁrms. In such setups, the
beneﬁt of naïveté on timing in immediate rewards situations vanishes and naïveté
becomes unambiguously harmful. These investigations span a wide range of in-
teresting and important applications: DellaVigna & Malmendier (2004) show that
naïve present biased decision makers can be exploited in market settings, e.g. in
the health club and credit card industries; Eliaz & Spiegler (2006) ﬁnd that unbi-
ased principals are able to exploit naïve present biased agents, e.g. in the cable TV
and casino gambling industries; Heidhues & K®szegi (2010) show that banks can
exploit naïve present biased consumers by oﬀering credit contracts which induce
over-borrowing, mostly for credit cards and mortgages.
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However, many economically relevant inter-temporal decisions do not easily al-
low for (external) commitments, e.g. investments in education and health. There,
the eﬀects of naïveté are much more intriguing.
Carrillo & Mariotti (2000) investigate how strategic ignorance of costless infor-
mation can help overcome present bias in situations where immediate consumption
exerts an initially unknown negative externality on future utility. As decision mak-
ers over-consume due to their present bias, they may choose to remain uninformed,
as overestimation of the externality reduces harmful over-consumption. Hence, in
this immediate consumption and delayed costs model, pessimism in a risky envi-
ronment helps overcome present bias. Bénabou & Tirole (2002) investigate how
motivation by over-conﬁdence can help overcome present bias when an unknown
own ability determines the delayed reward of an immediate investment. In this
model, decision makers can manipulate their beliefs and choose how to inform
themselves.
In both models, decision makers hold wrong beliefs about their environment, i.e.
about the consequences of their choices. In Carrillo & Mariotti (2000), decision
makers sustain overly pessimistic beliefs with respect to the externality of their
actions and in Bénabou & Tirole (2002), decision makers sustain overly optimistic,
possibly manipulated beliefs with respect to their own abilities. In my model,
decision makers are perfectly aware of the consequences of their choices, but fail
to predict their own future preferences and, hence, their future decisions.
The most closely related paper to my investigation is Herweg & Müller (2011).
They investigate how present bias and naïveté aﬀect choices and welfare in a model
where the sum of two sequential eﬀorts determines a delayed reward. They ﬁnd
that present biased decision makers under-invest relative to the time-consistent
benchmark and that a higher stage one investment implies a lower stage two in-
vestment, higher overall investment, and a better eﬀort smoothing (conditional on
the overall eﬀort level). Therefore, the welfare eﬀect of naïveté solely depends on
its eﬀect on stage one investment: Naïveté induces higher welfare (compared to
sophistication) if and only if it induces a higher stage one investment.
However, they do not provide a characterization for when stage one investment
does increase in naïveté.1 They do provide a numerical example where more na-
1Their Proposition 3 states a suﬃcient criterion for sophistication to be beneﬁcial, but this
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ïveté induces higher stage one investment and, hence, higher welfare. This is an
important contribution because they are the ﬁrst to do so in an immediate costs
and delayed rewards setting. However, the example relies on piecewise deﬁned
functions that do not meet the model assumptions. Therefore, it is not instructive
for the identiﬁcation of a general pattern.
I use a slightly diﬀerent model speciﬁcation that allows for more general utility
functions, and derive a necessary and suﬃcient characterization for stage one in-
vestment to increase in naïveté in my Proposition 1, which helps to ﬁll this gap
in the literature. Speciﬁcally, I allow for complementarity of investments, which
is not only a key driver of the eﬀects of naïveté, but also broadens the potential
applications of the model.
1.3. Model
In this section, I introduce the model and its underlying assumptions for the
immediate costs and delayed rewards case. The model can be deﬁned analogously
for the reverse case of immediate rewards and delayed costs.
Suppose a present biased decision maker decides in each of two subsequent pe-
riods how much to invest in a project, e.g. how much eﬀort to exert in school and
university, and both periods' investments jointly determine a distant reward, e.g.
wage and prestige of a later career. Let x and y denote (the immediate costs of)
stage one and two investments, respectively, and u(., .) the (instantaneous) utility
function of these investments.2 Figure 1.3.1 illustrates the time structure of the
payoﬀs.
criterion is in fact impossible to meet within their own assumptions. Speciﬁcally, it demands
g′′′(.) ≤ 0 globally for a function g(.) that is globally strictly increasing and strictly concave,
which jointly implies that g′′(.) converges to zero, which can happen monotonically only for
g′′′(.) > 0. A necessary criterion is not oﬀered.
2Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all results hold true for strictly convex cost functions as
well, but notation becomes slightly cluttered.
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t=1
Investment x
t=2
Investment y
t=3
Reward u(x,y)
Figure 1.3.1.: Time Structure of the model.
I impose the usual smoothness, monotonicity, and curvature assumptions on the
utility function.
Assumption 1.
(i) The utility function is continuously diﬀerentiable up to order three.
(ii) Utility u(., .) is non-negative, strictly increasing, and strictly concave.
A big class of utility functions that satisfy Assumption 1 are the Cobb-Douglas
functions of homogeneity smaller one.
Example (Cobb-Douglas).
All utility functions u(x, y) := αxµyν with α, µ, ν > 0 and µ + ν < 1 satisfy
Assumption 1.
Notice that Cobb-Douglas functions of homogeneity equal one do not satisfy
Assumption 1, because they are not strictly concave. In fact, cutting a function
of homogeneity equal one through the origin always yields a straight line. Appendix
A.2 provides a detailed test of Assumption 1 for the Cobb-Douglas functions of
homogeneity smaller one and demonstrates linearity of the Cobb-Douglas functions
of homogeneity equal one.
I model present bias as quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Phelps & Pollak 1968,
Laibson 1997), i.e. perceived inter-temporal utility Ut at time t of a future stream
of instantaneous utilities (us)s≥t is deﬁned as follows.
Ut := ut + β
∑
s>t
δs−tus
Here, δ < 1 captures the usual time-consistent discounting and β < 1 captures
the decision maker's desire for immediate gratiﬁcation. As β discounts all future
periods equally, relative to the present, and as presence shifts in the course of time,
6
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β induces a time inconsistency. For simplicity and as is common in ﬁnite horizon
applications of this model, I set the exponential discount factor δ = 1 and focus
on the eﬀects of present bias β < 1 alone.
Naïveté with respect to present bias is deﬁned as a misperception of how much
present bias one will exhibit in the future. Following O'Donoghue & Rabin (2001),
I denote a decision maker's anticipated degree of present bias as βˆ, with β ≤ βˆ ≤ 1.
As βˆ = β corresponds to full sophistication and βˆ = 1 to full naïveté, I refer to βˆ
as a decision maker's degree of naïveté.
Further, and most crucially, I assume that no (external) commitments are avail-
able.3
Assumption 2.
Stage two investment y cannot be pre-commited in stage one.
Clearly, this precludes all applications where commitments are readily available,
such as the classical consumption-savings problem. However, many economically
important inter-temporal decisions do not easily allow for commitment, such as
education and health decisions, and, therefore, remain within the scope of this
investigation.
As is common in the (above cited) literature, I assume the natural rational-
ity condition that all agents follow perception-perfect strategies, i.e. they choose
their stage one and two investments as to maximize their perceived inter-temporal
utilities U1 and U2, respectively, given their anticipation of own future behavior.
Crucially, they anticipate at stage one to maximize a (possibly distorted) utility
Uˆ2 at stage two which reﬂects not their actual present bias, but their (potentially
wrong) anticipation of future present bias.
U1 = −x − βy +βu(x, y)
U2 = −y +βu(x, y)
Uˆ2 = −y +βˆu(x, y)
3Or alternatively, that all available commitments are perceived as non-beneﬁcial and, therefore,
never taken up.
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1.4. Analysis
In this section, I analyze the eﬀects of (partial) naïveté on investment choices
and welfare of present biased decision makers. A crucial driver of these eﬀects is
complementarity, respectively substitutability, of the utility function.
Deﬁnition 1 (Complementarity).
For a joint utility function u(x, y) of both periods' investments x and y, respectively,
investments are called
(i) complements iﬀ ux,y(., .) > 0;
(ii) independent iﬀ ux,y(., .) = 0;
(iii) substitutes iﬀ ux,y(., .) < 0.
Intuitively, investments are complements iﬀ an increase in one period's invest-
ment raises the marginal beneﬁt of the other period's investment, and they are
substitutes iﬀ an increase in one period's investment diminishes the marginal ben-
eﬁt of the other period's investment.
Solving for the perception-perfect strategy and the (potentially deviating) be-
havior of the decision maker requires backwards induction. The decision maker
anticipates at stage one to solve the following maximization problem at stage two.
max
y
Uˆ2= max
y
−y + βˆu(x, y)
FOC : −1 + βˆuy(x, y) != 0
The second order condition holds by strict concavity of u(., .). Hence, the im-
plicit function theorem is applicable and yields the existence of an anticipated
reaction function g(x, βˆ) of how much a decision maker believes to invest at stage
two conditional on stage one investment x and the degree of naïveté βˆ.
∃ g s.t. − 1 + βˆuy(x, g(x, βˆ)) = 0 (1.1)
I will frequently treat βˆ as a parameter of the anticipated reaction function and,
hence, use the shorthand gˆ(x) := g(x, βˆ). The implicit function theorem implies
8
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the diﬀerentiability of g(.,.) with respect to both x and βˆ, and I denote these
partial derivatives as gˆx(.) and gˆβˆ(.), respectively. Strict monotonicity everywhere
implies that gˆ exists not only locally, but globally.
The actual reaction function corresponds to gˆ for βˆ = β and is independent of the
decision maker's anticipation. That is, conditional on the ﬁrst period investment,
naïveté does not aﬀect stage two behavior anymore. However, it is crucial in
determining stage one investment. In slight abuse of notation, I denote this actual
reaction function as g.
The following ﬁrst result is a direct implication of the implicit function theorem.
Lemma 1 (Reaction Function Monotonicity).
sgn(gˆx) = sgn(ux,y); in particular,
(i) complementarity of investments implies a strict increase of (both anticipated
and actual) stage two investment in stage one investment;
(ii) ux,y = 0 implies independence of stage two investment from stage one invest-
ment;
(iii) substitutability of investments implies a strict decrease of stage two invest-
ment in stage one investment.
The next result shows that overoptimism with respect to future investment is a
universal feature of naïveté that holds independently of complementarity.
Lemma 2 (Overoptimism).
(i) (Partially) naïve decision makers are overoptimistic with respect to their
stage two investment, i.e. gˆ > g for all βˆ > β.
(ii) Overoptimism strictly increases in the degree of naïveté, i.e. gˆ strictly in-
creases in its parameter βˆ.
For speciﬁc functions, the (implicit) perceived reaction function gˆ can be de-
rived explicitly. I do so for the Cobb-Douglas case and cross-validate the above
statements.
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Example (Cobb-Douglas, continued).
For Cobb-Douglas utility functions, investments are complements. The perceived
reaction function for stage two investment and its partial derivatives read as fol-
lows.
gˆ(x) =
(
βˆαν
) 1
1−ν
x
µ
1−ν
gˆx(x) =
(
βˆαν
) 1
1−ν µ
1− ν x
µ+ν−1
1−ν
gˆβˆ(x) = βˆ
ν
1−ν (αν)
1
1−ν
1
1− ν x
µ
1−ν
The implications of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are immediately evident.
Unfortunately, deriving the decision maker's stage one investment x is consid-
erably harder. It requires to solve the following maximization problem.
max
x
− x− βgˆ(x) + βu(x, gˆ(x))
FOC :− 1− βgˆx(x) + βux(x, gˆ(x)) + βuy(x, gˆ(x))gˆx(x) != 0 (1.2)
SOC : + β [ux,x(x, gˆ(x)) + ux,y(x, gˆ(x))gˆx(x)] + β
(
1
βˆ
− 1
)
gˆx,x(x)
!
< 0 (1.3)
In case of full naïveté, i.e. for βˆ = 1, the rightmost term of (1.3) vanishes
and the second order condition holds by Assumption 1 (strict concavity of u(., .)).
For the general case of β ≤ βˆ < 1, a suﬃcient condition for (1.3) to hold can
be derived easily in the form of a positive upper bound for gˆx,x, which is usually
strictly negative. To be on the safe side, I impose it as an assumption.
Assumption 3.
The second order condition (1.3) holds for all β ≤ βˆ ≤ 1, i.e.
gˆx,x(x) <
−βˆ
1− βˆ
detHu(x, gˆ(x))
uy,y(x, gˆ(x))
> 0.4
4By calculating the second derivative gˆx,x of the perceived reaction function, Assumption 3 can
be restated as follows.
|∇u|THuy |∇u| <
βˆ
1− βˆ u
2
y,ydetHu
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The above ﬁrst order condition (1.2) implicitly characterizes the perceived op-
timal stage one investment x, which is, therefore, actually undertaken by the
decision maker. The following main result characterizes how stage one investment
x is aﬀected by naïveté βˆ.
Proposition 1 (Stage One Investment).
Let xβˆ denote the change of stage one investment x in naïveté βˆ. Then,
sgn(xβˆ) = sgn(gˆx,βˆ(x)).
In particular, stage one investment x increases in naïveté βˆ if and only if gˆx,βˆ(x) >
0, and decreases if and only if gˆx,βˆ(x) < 0.
5
Whether stage one investment x increases or decreases in the degree of naïveté
βˆ is fully determined by the sign of gˆx,βˆ. This cross-derivative of gˆ characterizes
the change in slope of the anticipated reaction function gˆ with respect to changes
in naïveté. Intuitively, this describes the sensitivity with respect to naïveté of
decision makers' anticipations of the intensity of their own stage two reactions to
stage one investment. Note again that the intensity of the actual stage two reaction
is independent of anticipation respectively naïveté. The sign of this reaction is
implied by Lemma 1. Speciﬁcally, the change of stage two investment in naïveté
is of same sign as the change of stage one investment in naïveté for complements,
and of opposite sign for substitutes.
By Deﬁnition 1, the marginal beneﬁt of stage one investment increases in stage
two investment for complements, and decreases in stage two investment for substi-
It is immediately evident that negative semi-deﬁniteness of the Hessian of uy would be a
suﬃcient criterion for Assumption 3 to hold. However, only complementary utility functions
satisfy uy,x,x < 0, but they violate detHuy > 0. Therefore, this criterion would not just be
demanding, but in fact impossible to meet.
5This result is slightly more complicated for strictly convex cost functions c(.):
sgn(xβˆ) = sgn(cx,x(gˆ(x))gˆx(x)gˆβˆ(x) + cx(gˆ(x))gˆx,βˆ(x)).
According to Lemma 1 and 2, the sign of the left term on the right-hand side is positive
for complements and negative for substitutes. Hence, only either necessary or suﬃcient
conditions hold. Precisely, gˆx,βˆ > 0 is suﬃcient for stage one investment to increase in βˆ for
complements and necessary for substitutes, and gˆx,βˆ < 0 is necessary for stage one investment
to decrease in βˆ for complements and suﬃcient for substitutes.
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tutes. Bearing this in mind, the intuition of Proposition 1 becomes straightforward:
The stronger a reaction in stage two the decision maker anticipates, the more at-
tractive is an early investment in case of complements, and the less attractive it is
in case of substitutes. Clearly, the strength of the anticipated reaction is captured
in the steepness of the anticipated reaction function gˆ. For complements, gˆ has a
positive slope and, hence, becomes steeper in βˆ iﬀ gˆx,βˆ > 0; For substitutes, gˆ has
a negative slope and, hence, becomes steeper in βˆ iﬀ gˆx,βˆ < 0.
The implicit function theorem allows to rephrase Proposition 1 in terms of higher
order derivatives of u(., .).
Corollary 1 (Suﬃcient Complementarity and Suﬃcient Substitutability).
(i) For complementary utility functions u(., .), stage one investment x increases
in naïveté βˆ iﬀ both stages investments are suﬃciently complementary
in the sense that −uy,y,y
uy,y
>
−uy,x,y
uy,x
.
(ii) For substitutable utility functions u(., .), stage one investment x decreases in
naïveté βˆ iﬀ both stages investments are suﬃciently substitutable in the
sense that −uy,y,y
uy,y
>
−uy,x,y
uy,x
.
To get an intuition for the suﬃciency notion in Corollary 1, we have to think of
uy,y as (local) measure of concavity and of uy,x as (local) measure of complemen-
tarity respectively substitutability. Then, uy,y,y measures the fading of concavity,
and uy,x,y the fading of complementarity respectively substitutability with respect
to an increase in y.6 Hence, the fraction −uy,y,y
uy,y
can be interpreted as relative fad-
ing of concavity, and the fraction −uy,x,y
uy,x
can be interpreted as relative fading of
complementarity respectively substitutability of u(., .) with respect to stage two
investment y.
Put together, suﬃciency in the above sense means that complementarity re-
spectively substitutability fades at a lower rate than concavity of u(., .). That
6Note that concavity and complementarity respectively substitutability have to fade, i.e. uy,y
and uy,x have to converge to zero, as global strict monotonicity of u(., .) (Assumption 1)
would be violated otherwise.
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is, suﬃcient does not refer to the actual level of complementarity respectively
substitutability, but to its relative rate of deterioration. By Corollary 1, such suﬃ-
ciency implies an increase of stage one investment x in naïveté βˆ for complements,
and a decrease for substitutes.
Cobb-Douglas functions of homogeneity smaller one are suﬃciently complemen-
tary in this sense.
Example (Cobb-Douglas, continued).
For Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the cross derivative of the perceived reaction
function for stage two investment reads as follows.
gˆx,βˆ(x) = βˆ
ν
1−ν (αν)
1
1−ν
µ
(1− ν)2x
µ+ν−1
1−ν > 0.
Proposition 1 implies that stage one investment x is strictly increasing in naïveté
βˆ. We can cross-validate this ﬁnding by calculating x explicitly.
x =
(
βˆ
ν
1−ν
1− βˆν
1− ν
) 1−ν
1−ν−µ
µ
1−ν
1−ν−µα
1
1−ν−µν
ν
1−ν−µβ
1−ν
1−ν−µ
In fact, xβˆ > 0 for all βˆ < 1. Hence, stage one investment x is strictly increasing
in naïveté βˆ everywhere up until full naïveté.
The increase or decrease of stage one investment in naïveté is important for the
determination of the welfare eﬀects of naïveté. Following O'Donoghue & Rabin
(1999), I conduct welfare comparisons based on the inter-temporal utility U0 of a
hypothetical stage zero, which is meant to reﬂect long-run preferences, i.e. W :=
U0 = β (−x− y + u(x, y)).
Proposition 2 (Welfare Implications).
Starting at full sophistication, i.e. βˆ = β, the marginal welfare-change of an
introduction of naïveté is of same sign as the change of stage one investment in
naïveté, i.e. sgn( ∂
∂βˆ
W ) = sgn(xβˆ).
For xβˆ > 0, this welfare result holds in general only locally at full sophistication.
This is because the sign of ∂
∂βˆ
W depends on the product of xβˆ with the sum of a
13
1. Motivation by Naïveté
strictly positive term and the ﬁrst order condition (1.2) of the fully sophisticated.
Due to the second order condition (1.3), the latter turns negative for an increase
in x, such that the sign of the sum becomes indeterminate when βˆ (and thereby x)
increases. So in case of xβˆ > 0, it is a priori unclear whether full naïveté or only
some partial degree of naïveté yields the highest welfare for the decision maker.
However, for xβˆ < 0, the welfare result always holds globally. This is because
an increase in naïveté induces a decrease of x and, hence, turns the ﬁrst order
condition (1.2) of the fully sophisticated positive, such that the sign of the sum
persists. In this case, full sophistication is optimal.
For Cobb-Douglas utility functions of homogeneity smaller one, welfare does in
fact increase globally in naïveté, up to βˆ = 1.
Example (Cobb-Douglas, continued).
For Cobb-Douglas utility functions, welfare reads as follows.
W = (αµµνν)
1
1−ν−µ β
(1−ν)(ν+µ)−µν
(1−ν)(1−ν−µ) f(βˆ)
µ
1−ν−µ
[
1− µβ 1−2ν1−ν f(βˆ)− νβ
]
with f(βˆ) := βˆ
ν
1−ν 1−βˆν
1−ν . As is shown in Appendix A.2,
∂
∂βˆ
W > 0 for all βˆ < 1.
Hence, starting at βˆ = β, self-zero welfare strictly increases in naïveté βˆ up until
full naïveté.
1.5. Conclusion
This article investigates the eﬀects of complementarity of investments on choices
and welfare of partially naïve present biased decision makers in a model with
two uncommitted investment stages and a delayed reward stage. The main result
shows that both stages' investments increase in naïveté iﬀ they are suﬃciently
complementary in the sense that complementarity of the utility function fades
slower than concavity. As present biased decision makers under-invest relative to
their long-run preferences, such naïveté-induced investment increases are always
at least marginally beneﬁcial to them.
Shedding light on the upsides of naïveté is instructive when it comes to the
puzzle of its persistence, despite ample opportunity to learn. The literature has
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focused mostly on the negative welfare eﬀects of naïveté, such as procrastination,
over-borrowing, or exploitation by subscriptions and other long-term contracts.
As naïveté is very costly in these contexts, decision makers should face strong
incentives to learn about it and become sophisticated, eventually. Accounting
for the above investigated upsides of naïveté as well broadens the perspective, as
a tradeoﬀ between sophistication and naïveté arises. Sophistication, on the one
hand, is beneﬁcial in committed choices, because naïve decision makers pick up
ineﬀective or even harmful commitments. Naïveté, on the other hand, is beneﬁcial
in situations of uncommitted investments with complementarity.
While it is hard to judge which of the two situations is more relevant today,
the mechanism in my model could have arguably been dominant in the past and
might, therefore, still aﬀect us evolutionary. Whereas credit cards, installment
plans, and health clubs are all rather recent inventions, most of our ancestors were
farmers for many millennia, and farming is an almost prototypical example for a
complementary multi-stage investment: Farmers have to seed, irrigate, dung, weed,
and harvest before they can eventually eat, and shirking on one task diminishes
returns from all the others.
A potential contemporary application of the above ﬁndings could be incentive
contracts for naïve present biased agents when performance is not continuously
measured or rewarded. For example, bonus contracts for sales people often depend
on annual revenues, and observed sales patterns tend to be seasonal with strong
year-end eﬀects. Even though this could be driven by demand seasonality, it could
also reﬂect naïve present bias of the sales force: Maybe they believe each month
to generate a lot of revenue in the next, and hence relax until December. In this
case, inducing complementarity between the various months' revenues in the bonus
determination might help the sales force in partly overcoming their present bias in
earlier months.
Another potential application is the measurement of naïveté in the laboratory.
Existing methods (e.g. Hey & Lotito 2009) usually rely on the discrepancy between
an early plan and a later decision. However, providing incentives both for early
planning and later decisions is tricky. Moreover, cognitive dissonance, tastes for
consistency, and limited memory can confound the ﬁndings. My model allows
to identify naïveté without explicitly asking for plans by observing a sequence of
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investment decisions that jointly determine a distant reward, e.g. in a real-eﬀort
task. Both β and βˆ could easily be backed out from a three-period investment
game with complementary payoﬀ function when the following three assumptions
are imposed: First, utility is approximately linear in the experiment's (monetary)
payoﬀ; Second, time-consistent discounting is almost irrelevant for the time-span
of the experiment; Third, costs of eﬀort are linear. More complex designs could
potentially allow to relax some or all of these assumptions.
Last but not least, my model naturally extends to the case of immediate rewards
and delayed costs, which applies for example to joyful but health-hazardous be-
haviors. Again, complementarity is plausible, as each little peccadillo is likely to
raise the marginal cost of the next. The occasional cigarette, drink, or junk food
will probably aﬀect future health only marginally, but it may well increase the
marginal cost of subsequent sins, as stamina deteriorates. Here, overoptimism
with respect to future self control leads to underestimation of the negative eﬀects
of current consumption and thereby induces the naif to increase over-consumption
relative to the sophisticate.
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2. Anticipation of Prospect
Theory Preferences in
Dynamic Choice -
Experimental Evidence∗
2.1. Introduction
In dynamic risky choices, Prospect Theory preferences can induce time inconsis-
tency. For a ﬁxed reference point, Prospect Theory decision makers may play a
sequence of lotteries in a way that is not equivalent to the ex ante most preferable
compound lottery. In other words, they may fail to follow through their most
preferred ex ante plan of sequential risk taking. This can be driven both by dimin-
ishing sensitivity or probability weighting: The resolution of an early lottery puts
the decision maker into the gain or loss domain, where risk preferences are diﬀer-
ent than at the reference point, and it reduces the number of overall end-states,
which non-linearly aﬀects their probability weights (Barberis 2012).1 Failing to
anticipate such preference shifts can harm decision makers, e.g. when they plan
to gamble just a little, but end up gambling heavily after a ﬁrst loss (Andrade &
Iyer 2009).
When anticipated correctly, however, Prospect Theory preferences may serve
decision makers as an internal commitment device. If they can choose their future
∗This chapter is joint work with Maximilian Breu (University of Munich) and Felix Peterhammer
(University of Regensburg).
1Similarly, a change of the reference point relative to the current state induces diﬀerent risk
preferences.
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reference points upfront, e.g. by setting a goal, they may employ their loss aversion
as a punishment, e.g. for not meeting the goal, and thereby commit against self-
control problems (Koch & Nafziger 2011).
Hence, anticipation of own Prospect Theory preferences as well as own reactions
to domain shifts can distort dynamic risky choices. In order to inform the literature
on dynamic Prospect Theory applications about how accurate an anticipation is
to be expected from decision makers, we conducted a laboratory experiment.
Our participants had to make a complete contingent plan for a 4-stage invest-
ment game identical to the one in Imas (2016), and to actually play the game
subsequently. Planning and playing were split into diﬀerent sub-sessions that took
place one week apart from each other in order to rule out cognitive dissonance or
other preferences for consistency as drivers of choices in the actual play. Therefore,
we view the actual investment decisions in the playing stage as purely instrumental
for ﬁnal (Prospect Theory) utility. Moreover, we elicited a (positive or negative)
valuation for commitment to the plan. In both weeks, loss aversion and diminish-
ing sensitivity parameters were elicited in a separate task according to the method
of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt & L'Haridon (2008).2
We assess our participants' anticipations of their Prospect Theory preferences
based on the quality of their investment plans, which is measured as a certainty
equivalent relative to never investing, i.e. relative to the benchmark of zero gain-
loss-utility. Furthermore, we assess our participants' anticipations of their reac-
tions to domain shifts based on the quality of their commitment choices, which
is measured as a certainty equivalent of the original plan relative to the actually
pursued investment scheme. These certainty equivalents are calculated based on
the separately elicited loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity parameters. As
actual investment decisions could be observed only in the realized contingencies of
the plan, only a lower bound for the value of commitment, i.e. only underpayment
for commitment, is identiﬁed.
We found that 19 of 43 participants in our main sample planned poorly relative
2This method does not allow for identiﬁcation of probability weighting functions. As probability
weighting is not necessary to induce inconsistencies and less common in applications than loss
aversion and diminishing sensitivity, we abstracted away from it in this article.
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to the benchmark of zero gain-loss-utility3, and 14 under-appreciated the value
of commitment. The average certainty equivalent of the poor plans was EUR -
0.99, which amounted to more than 15% of the total endowment of EUR 6.40. The
average under-valuation of the commitment was by EUR 1.80, based on deviations
in the realized contingencies alone. Both errors appeared to be unrelated in our
sample.
In order to identify drivers of these anticipation mistakes, we elicited various cor-
relates: A Cognitive Reﬂection Test score, time spent on planning, time-stability
of Prospect Theory preferences between weeks 1 and 2, and self-reported char-
acteristics (age, gender, mathgrade, Likert scores of all Big-5 personality traits).
Cognitive reﬂection, planning time, stability of risk preferences, agreeableness, and
neuroticism jointly capture 60% of the variation in planning quality. The former
three improve plan quality, the latter two impair it. However, only very little
variation in commitment quality is captured by the correlates.
Overall, our ﬁndings suggest that our subjects' anticipations of their Prospect
Theory preferences as well as of their reactions to domain shifts was often inac-
curate. However, the positive impact of cognitive reﬂection and planning time
suggests that higher stakes may help improve anticipation quality.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides an
overview of the related literature, Section 2.3 introduces our experimental design
and summarizes the conduct, Section 2.4 presents our analyses and ﬁndings, and
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2. Literature
Our investigation of naïveté with respect to Prospect Theory preferences forms a
link between the literatures on anticipation mistakes and dynamic Prospect Theory
applications.
Anticipation is well known for aﬀecting choices in dynamic contexts when prefer-
ences are time-inconsistent. Loewenstein, O'Donoghue & Rabin (2003) show that
3Overall, 64 subjects participated in the experiment. However, 21 had to be excluded from the
anticipation analyses because their Prospect Theory parameters could not be estimated with
suﬃcient precision.
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projection bias, an under-appreciation of own taste changes, distorts consumption-
savings patterns and durable goods purchases, and contributes to the forma-
tion of addictions. It was experimentally identiﬁed also for taste changes based
on hunger (Read & van Leeuwen 1998) and weather (Conlin, O'Donoghue &
Vogelsang 2007, Busse et al. 2015, Buchheim & Kolaska 2017).
Another prominent example of anticipation mistakes is naïveté with respect to
present bias, i.e. the underestimation of ones future desire for immediate grati-
ﬁcation. The importance of anticipation for present biased decision makers was
noted early on in this literature (Strotz 1956, Pollak 1968). O'Donoghue & Rabin
(1999) show that naïveté with respect to present bias aggravates procrastination,
i.e. the delay of a costly task when early execution would be beneﬁcial. Moreover,
it gives rise to exploitation by rational ﬁrms, which was shown in market set-
tings (DellaVigna & Malmendier 2004, DellaVigna & Malmendier 2006) and for
incentive contracts (Eliaz & Spiegler 2006) as well as credit contracts (Heidhues
& K®szegi 2010).
Due to an abundance of ﬁeld evidence on naïve present bias (as described in
the above cited articles), its clean identiﬁcation in the laboratory received less
attention. Hey & Lotito (2009) identiﬁed it by observing choice inconsistencies
between a sequence of lotteries and their equivalent compound lottery, and found
almost no sophisticates.4
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1992) is
a static model and, hence, agnostic about anticipation. However, thanks to its
success in explaining risky choice behaviors, it was applied to dynamic choice en-
vironments as well. There, Barberis (2012) shows that Prospect Theory can induce
inconsistencies. For example, casino gamblers with Prospect Theory preferences
have diﬃculties in sticking to their initial plans and may, therefore, have a demand
for self-commitment, such as leaving their credit card at home. Andrade & Iyer
(2009) provide experimental evidence that people do not follow through their plans
for sequential bets, but tend to increase bets after losses relative to their initial
plans. Conversely, Koch & Nafziger (2011) showed that loss aversion itself may
4Besides naïves, they identiﬁed so called resolute subjects who mistakenly abstained from the
commitment, but still followed through their initial plans while suﬀering a cost from their
taste changes.
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serve as a commitment against self-control problems if future reference points can
be deliberately chosen upfront, e.g. by setting a goal. In both applications, antici-
pation of own future feelings of gain and loss, respectively of their consequences for
subsequent risky choices, drives decision making: It determines whether someone
feels a need for commitment when gambling, and whether someone understands
the eﬀectiveness of goal-setting.
Further dynamic applications of Prospect Theory are stock trading and adver-
tisement. There, it helps explain the equity premium puzzle and the disposition
eﬀect (Benartzi & Thaler 1995, Barberis & Xiong 2009), as well as why bait-and-
switch strategies and other misleading advertisements are eﬀective (Heidhues &
K®szegi 2014, Rosato 2016, Karle & Schumacher 2017). These applications assume
perfect anticipation of future loss aversion.
However, experiments on labor contracts ﬁnd suggestive evidence for naïveté
with respect to loss aversion. Imas, Sadoﬀ & Samek (2015) and de Quidt (2017)
ﬁnd that loss averse workers do not only exert higher eﬀort under penalty contracts
than under equivalent bonus contracts, but are more likely to pick them up and
forgo higher outside options for them. Even though loss aversion can explain higher
eﬀort under loss contracts, it predicts a demand for compensation of exposure to
the risk of a loss, which was not oﬀered in the experiments. Our experiment
provides additional evidence on anticipation mistakes with respect to Prospect
Theory preferences.
The related question of anticipation of reference point changes was experimen-
tally investigated based on the endowment eﬀect. Loewenstein & Adler (1995)
show that many people underestimate the magnitude of the endowment eﬀect
both in themselves and in others, which is conﬁrmed by vanBoven, Loewenstein &
Dunning (2003). However, as the endowment eﬀect is explained by loss aversion
in riskless choice (Tversky & Kahneman 1991), it is not clear how these ﬁndings
translate to risky choice behaviors.
2.3. Experimental Design and Conduct
Our experiment consisted of a Prospect Theory parameter elicitation task (PTPE),
an investment game (IG), and of measurements of potential correlates. Each sub-
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ject had to show up for two sub-sessions that took place one week apart from each
other.
In week 1, we asked our participants for a complete contingent plan for the
investment game, elicited their willingness to pay for committing to the plan,
conducted a Cognitive Reﬂection Test (CRT) and a short Big Five personality test,
and elicited their loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity parameters. In week 2,
we elicited these Prospect Theory parameters again, played the investment game,
and conducted a brief survey required by the lab. The time-line is depicted in
Figure 2.3.1.
Plan IG
Commit IG
CRT
Big 5
PTPE
PTPE
Play IG
Survey
Week 1 Week 2
Figure 2.3.1.: Time-line of the experiment
The experiment was conducted in the Regensburg Economic Science Lab (RESL)
in November 2016. We did 3 sessions with a total of 66 participants, 64 of whom
showed up for both sub-sessions. Subjects were recruited from the RESL sub-
ject pool and were mostly students of the University of Regensburg from various
backgrounds.
The ﬁrst sub-session took on average 110 minutes, the second one 50 minutes.
Our subjects earned on average EUR 28.28, including a show-up fee of EUR 5.00
per week. All payments were made at the end of the second sub-session in week 2.
The experiment was programmed in z-tree version 3.4.7 (Fischbacher 2007) and
organized via ORSEE (Greiner 2015).
2.3.1. Prospect Theory Parameter Elicitation
We elicited loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity according to the method of
Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt & L'Haridon (2008), which relies on cognitively simple
choices and requires only few observations. We abstract from probability weight-
ing, because it is the least commonly applied feature of Prospect Theory and not
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necessary to generate dynamic inconsistencies. Moreover, this parameter elici-
tation method is not suited for estimating weighting functions due to a lack of
variation in probabilities.
In line with the usual Prospect Theory notation, we write (x, p; y) for a binary
prospect that yields payoﬀ x with probability p and payoﬀ y with probability 1−p,
relative to a reference point. We assume that the reference point in our experiment
is induced by the endowment and stays constant throughout. As usual, a binary
prospect (x, p; y) is called a gain prospect if x > y ≥ 0, a loss prospect if x < y ≤ 0,
and a mixed prospect if x > 0 > y, where the ordering of x and y is without loss
of generality.
Throughout this article, we assume the usual power form of the Prospect Theory
value function v(.),
v(x) =
{
xα, for x > 0
−λ(−x)β, for x ≤ 0
where α and β denote the curvature parameters of diminishing sensitivity in gains
respectively losses, and λ the loss aversion parameter. Then, prospects P :=
(x, p; y) are evaluated as follows.
U(P ) = pv(x) + (1− p)v(y)
The parameters α, β, and λ are estimated based on simple choice data of the
following three types: certainty equivalents EG for gain prospects G, certainty
equivalents EL for loss prospects L, and oﬀsetting loss equivalents EM for mixed
prospects M . The method requires that one winning probability pG is ﬁxed for
all gain prospects G, also applied as probability for the positive payoﬀ in the mixed
prospects M , and equals 1− pL for the losing probability pL of all loss prospects
L. Together, these assumptions imply that the introduced equivalents satisfy the
following equations.
EαG = pGx
α + (1− pG)yα
−λ(−EL)β = −λpL(−x)β − λ(1− pL)(−y)β
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0 = pGx
α − λpL(−EM)β
We speciﬁed pG = pL = 0.5 throughout in order to reduce the cognitive bur-
den compared to asymmetric gambles, and elicited all equivalents by a bisection
method with 7 iterations.5
We elicited certainty equivalents for 7 gain prospects (4 in week 1), 7 loss
prospects (4 in week 1), and 5 mixed prospects (3 in week 1), which yields 20
observations per subject in total. In each week, we started the elicitation with
gain lotteries, continued with loss lotteries, and ﬁnished with mixed lotteries. Ab-
dellaoui, Bleichrodt & L'Haridon (2008) found that this order is the easiest for the
participants. Table B.1.1 in the appendix lists all lotteries we used.
We deviated from Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt & L'Haridon (2008) in the choice
of lottery payoﬀs. They used substantial money amounts (multiples of EUR
1, 000), because they argued that for small amounts utility is approximately lin-
ear (Wakker & Deneﬀe 1996). We used amounts in the range of EUR 1.20 to
EUR 7.80, instead. The reasoning behind our design choice is twofold. First, we
assess our participants' behaviors in the investment game based on these sepa-
rately elicited Prospect Theory parameters and, therefore, used similar stakes to
ensure comparability between the tasks. Second, the choice of a power form for
the value function actually implies that curvature is biggest over small amounts.
The expressed concern that utility is approximately linear for small stakes applies
to subjects of Expected Utility type rather than to subjects of Prospect Theory
type.
To prevent diversiﬁcation and hedging, only one of all 20 lottery choices was
actually played out. All inferences rely on the standard assumption of narrow
bracketing, i.e. that subjects treated all decisions separately instead of viewing
their choices as one big compound lottery. As the task was split across weeks,
5See also Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt & L'Haridon (2008) for a discussion of these two design fea-
tures. The advantage of a bisection method is that participants have to make only binary
choices between a risky prospect and a safe payment. In the ﬁrst iteration of the certainty
equivalent elicitation, the safe payment is set to the expected value of the prospect. Suc-
cessively, the safe payment is increased after choices of the risky option, and decreased after
choices of the safe payment. In the ﬁrst iteration of the loss equivalent elicitation, the loss is
set to minus the gain while the safe payment remains zero throughout. Successively, the loss
is increased after choices of the risky option, and decreased after choices of the safe option.
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the risk was resolved only in week 2. In order to avoid expectational spillovers to
other parts of the experiment, the resolution was deferred to the very end of the
experiment.6
2.3.2. Investment Game
The centerpiece of our experiment was a 4-round investment game borrowed from
Gneezy & Potters (1997) and Imas (2016). Our subjects had to make complete
contingent investment plans and could stochastically commit to them in week 1,
and had to actually play the game in week 2. Eliciting plan, play, and commitment
choices allows us to assess the quality of these choices, both by comparing them
to one another and by evaluating them by means of separately elicited Prospect
Theory parameters. This, in turn, allows us to classify our subjects as sophisticated
respectively naïve.
The investment game consisted of a sequence of 4 identical decisions of how
much to invest into a risky asset. Subjects received an endowment of EUR 1.60
per round and choices were tied to a EUR 0.20 grid. Following Imas (2016), the
risky asset returned seven times the invested amount with probability 1/6, and
zero otherwise. A subject's ﬁnal payoﬀ was the sum of investment returns and
non-invested money. Hence, the risky asset yielded a higher expected return than
the safe outside option. Each lottery was realized before the next decision, so that
subjects were aware of their own investment record in each choice.7
In week 1, subjects had to make complete contingent plans for this investment
game.8 They ﬁlled in the game-tree line by line and each contingency's proceed-
ings were displayed on screen. Subjects were aware that their plans were going to
be implemented stochastically and how the exact probability of implementation
would be determined in the subsequent commitment task. They knew that playing
the investment game in week 2 could not be avoided.
We elicited our subjects' willingness to pay for commitment and determined the
6We pre-determined to play out the most attractive gain lottery (G6) to favor our participants.
Of course, this was unknown to them.
7The randomization was facilitated by a die roll of a randomly selected participant per round,
and subjects chose their individual success number (1-6) for themselves.
8Hence, the exact procedure of the game was explained in week 1 already. Understanding was
ensured by three control questions.
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probability of plan implementation via a choice list. In each line of the list, subjects
had to choose between plan implementation plus some (positive or negative) money
amount, and non-implementation. As all subjects had to both plan and play
the investment game, the term implementation refers to which of the two choice-
sequences became payoﬀ-relevant.9 The money amounts ranged from EUR -4.80
to EUR +4.80 in increasing order. Each line was drawn with equal probability, so
that the share of choices in favor of plan implementation reﬂected its probability.
Multiple switching was precluded by an error message, so that the unique switching
point can be viewed as willingness to pay for commitment respectively ﬂexibility.10
Whether plan or play became payoﬀ-relevant was determined by a computer
randomization at the very end of the experiment. In case of plan implementa-
tion, the winning-and-losing history of the actual play was applied to the week 1
investment plan.
A key diﬀerence between our experiment and the planning treatment in Imas
(2016) is the one week gap between the stages, which reduced anchoring and related
costs of deviations from the plan, such as cognitive dissonance, and allows us to
view week 2 investment choices as purely instrumental for Prospect Theory utility.
Furthermore, the separate elicitation of Prospect Theory parameters allows for a
more detailed assessment of the observed choices.
As it was only a mild complication from what we needed anyway, we also con-
ducted the realization treatment of Imas (2016) for the sake of replication. The
analysis of this replication task is deferred to the appendix.
2.3.3. Correlates Elicitation
As our experiment classiﬁes participants as naïve respectively sophisticated with
respect to their Prospect Theory preferences, it is natural to ask for drivers of such
anticipation diﬀerences. On that behalf, we elicited potential correlates that might
capture some of the observed variation. These comprise a Cognitive Reﬂection Test
(Frederick 2005), a short Big Five personality test (Schupp & Gerlitz 2014), and
a brief survey which was also required by the laboratory.
9Only either plan or play could be paid out in order to preclude diversiﬁcation and hedging.
10Subjects could ﬁx plan respectively play implementation deterministically by never switching,
but not avoid playing the game in week 2 when doing so.
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The Cognitive Reﬂection Test (CRT) consisted of three short questions that
involved basic calculations. Each question lent itself to an intuitive, but incorrect
answer and required some reﬂection for uncovering the correct solution.11 The CRT
score counts the number of correct answers (0-3), each of which was incentivized
by EUR 0.50.
The short Big Five personality test consisted of 16 self-assessments of how much
a personal statement applied, rated on a 7-points Likert scale. It tested for the
personality traits of openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and
neuroticism (OCEAN). Participation was rewarded with a ﬂat payment of EUR
2.00.
2.4. Results
We measure naïveté with respect to Prospect Theory preferences and domain shifts
based on the separately elicited Prospect Theory parameters. Hence, we present
the result from the parameter elicitation ﬁrst, and then proceed to the naïveté
analysis.
2.4.1. Prospect Theory Parameters
We estimated loss aversion λ and diminishing sensitivity α and β in gains and
losses, respectively, according to the usual power-speciﬁcation introduced in Sec-
tion 2.3.1. We followed the overall approach of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt & L'Haridon
(2008) in using a non-linear least squares estimation, but deviated slightly in its
speciﬁcation. Instead of estimating gain and loss curvatures α and β separately
based on the certainty equivalents of the gain respectively loss lotteries alone, and
instead of calculating loss aversion parameters λ deterministically for each mixed
lottery and taking their median, we used all observations to estimate all parame-
ters simultaneously. In particular, we fed the information from the mixed lottery
choices also into the estimation of the curvature parameters.
11The most prominent example, which was also included in our experiment, is A bat and a ball
cost EUR 1.10. The bat costs EUR 1.00 more than the ball. How much is the bat? The
intuitive impulse-answer is EUR 1.00, whereas the correct answer is EUR 1.05. No time limit
was imposed, but response times were tracked.
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We distinguish 2× 2 main speciﬁcations: estimating the parameters jointly for
both weeks together or separately per week, and estimating the parameters for all
participants pooled together or for each participant individually.
For each subject, we collected 20 observations of certainty and loss equivalents
of the lotteries listed in Table B.1.1 in the appendix. Let E jointly denote the
elicited certainty equivalents EG and EL of the gain and loss prospects, respectively,
and the elicited loss equivalents EM of the mixed prospects. Further, let 1j for
j ∈ {G,L,M} denote the indicator function for an observation being a gain, loss,
or mixed prospect observation. Given that we set all probabilities to p = 0.5, our
regression equation reads as follows.
E =1G0.5
1
α (xα + yα)
1
α − 1L0.5
1
β ((−x)β + (−y)β) 1β − 1M
(
xα
λ
) 1
β
In the joint estimation for both weeks together, the regression uses all obser-
vations. In the estimations of both weeks separately, the sample is restricted
accordingly. The results of the pooled regressions over all participants together
are summarized in Table 2.4.1 for both weeks jointly and in Table 2.4.2 for both
weeks separately.
Table 2.4.1.: Pooled estimation, both weeks jointly
Coeﬃcient Std.Error t.value p.value
α 1.455 0.035 42.07 2.311×10−243
β 1.447 0.034 42.16 4.250×10−244
λ 1.511 0.102 14.78 8.985×10−46
In the pooled regressions, we do not ﬁnd the usual S-shape of the value function,
but an inverse S-shape, as our curvature parameters are bigger than 1, not smaller.
However, the individual regressions reveal a lot of heterogeneity with respect to the
curvature and loss aversion parameters, and show that S-shaped value functions are
more common than inverse S-shaped ones. The results of the individual regressions
per subject are summarized in Table 2.4.3 for both weeks jointly and in Table
2.4.4 for both weeks separately. The complete list of all participants' individual
estimates is deferred to Table B.1.2 in the appendix.
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Table 2.4.2.: Pooled estimation, both weeks separately
Coeﬃcient Std.Error t.value p.value
α1 1.358 0.075 18.06 4.401×10−65
β1 1.455 0.083 17.63 1.980×10−62
λ1 1.228 0.147 8.331 2.049×10−16
α2 1.497 0.041 36.43 9.872×10−200
β2 1.424 0.038 37.28 2.658×10−206
λ2 1.749 0.157 11.12 1.732×10−27
Table 2.4.3.: Distribution of individual estimates, both weeks jointly
Min 25% Median 75% Max Average
α 0.57 0.82 0.93 1.09 3.66 1.02
(0.00) (0.08) (0.13) (0.19) (1.55) (0.17)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00]
β 0.30 0.93 0.99 1.10 2.02 1.02
(0.00) (0.09) (0.13) (0.20) (0.36) (0.15)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
λ 0.62 0.93 1.12 1.81 1800 30.05
(0.00) (0.14) (0.25) (0.45) (5800) (90.88)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.76] [0.04]
Notes: Standard errors in parantheses, p-values in
square brackets.
Even though we decided to collect more data-points than suggested in Abdel-
laoui, Bleichrodt & L'Haridon (2008), some of the individual level estimates do
not ﬁt satisfactory.12 We decided to exclude these subjects in order not to corrupt
the validity of further analyses.
When deciding which subjects to exclude, one could either apply a (strict) cri-
terion on the overall model ﬁt, or a (more lenient) criterion on each individual
parameter estimate. As our further analyses heavily rely on individual parameter
estimates, we did the latter. Given that we estimated the 6 individual level pa-
rameters based on 20 observations per subject only, we decided to apply the usual
minimum requirement for signiﬁcance of p < 0.1 as threshold per parameter. This
12Potentially, this is driven by our choice of smaller stakes.
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Table 2.4.4.: Distribution of individual estimates, both weeks separately
Min 25% Median 75% Max Average
α1 0.48 0.78 0.99 1.20 2.79 1.04
(0.00) (0.15) (0.24) (0.38) (1.64) (0.29)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.14] [0.02]
β1 0.42 0.93 1.04 1.37 3.03 1.17
(0.00) (0.17) (0.28) (0.46) (1.18) (0.33)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.12] [0.02]
λ1 0.40 0.83 1.13 2.06 71.99 2.69
(0.00) (0.22) (0.40) (0.84) (377.74) (6.92)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.14] [0.85] [0.10]
α2 0.51 0.82 0.95 1.08 6.94 1.16
(0.00) (0.09) (0.15) (0.20) (4.81) (0.31)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.17] [0.01]
β2 0.25 0.88 0.96 1.04 1.86 0.96
(0.00) (0.10) (0.14) (0.19) (0.42) (0.16)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.06] [0.00]
λ2 0.60 0.96 1.13 1.90 1.5× 106 2.4× 104
(0.00) (0.15) (0.29) (0.83) (1.5× 107) (2.4× 105)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.92] [0.08]
Notes: Standard errors in parantheses, p-values in
square brackets.
leads to an exclusion of 21 of our 64 subjects. Notice that this threshold is almost
never binding for the curvature estimates α and β, and that no subject is excluded
based on a curvature parameter alone.13
2.4.2. Stability of Prospect Theory Preferences
Before proceeding to the actual naïveté analysis, we investigate the time-stability
of our Prospect Theory parameter estimates. We do so because we expect stability
of own Prospect Theory preferences to be a driver of the quality of anticipation.
Intuitively, predicting a moving target seems particularly hard.
Testing for the time-stability of all participants' Prospect Theory parameters
13In fact, only in 6 of 256 estimated curvature parameters, the p-value exceeds 0.1, and it never
exceeds 0.2.
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cannot be done by standard tests for coeﬃcient (in-)equality, such as the Wald
Test. The reason is that these tests do not allow for a meaningful comparison
between subjects, i.e. between diﬀerent samples. They test for statistically sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences between coeﬃcients while neglecting their magnitudes. When
investigating a single sample, strictness respectively lenience of such a test can
be calibrated by choice of the conﬁdence level. In our case, however, applying
the same test (i.e. the same conﬁdence level) to all subjects would result in re-
jecting stability for the subjects with the most precise estimates due to miniscule
diﬀerences in their point estimates, but not rejecting stability for subjects with
completely diﬀerent point estimates, as long as they are suﬃciently noisy.
Clearly, we need to use a notion of stability that reﬂects consistency of behav-
iors. In particular, we would not regard a subject with a very precise parameter
diﬀerence of ε as inconsistent, as very small parameter diﬀerences do not translate
into any behavioral diﬀerences. Also, we would not regard a subject as consistent
if there was too much noise in their estimates, because a lot of noise essentially
means that a subject does not behave consistently even within one week.
Hence, we designed our own test for consistency by asking how much probability
weight of any week's estimate falls within a ﬁxed band around the joint estimate
for both weeks together. We impose the usual normality assumption and set
the band for each of the three parameters α, β, and λ as the length of the 95%
conﬁdence interval of their respective pooled estimation.14 This allows to account
for diﬀerent levels of noise in diﬀerent parameters. Using the same bandwidth for
all subjects guarantees that they are classiﬁed on an equal footing, whereas setting
the mid-point of the band to each individual's estimate warrants that we test for
consistency with oneself, rather than the population average.
We reject stability if there is at least one parameter estimate with less than
5% probability weight within this band. So if we reject stability, there exists a
parameter with a 95% chance of both weeks' estimates to be more than 1.96 times
the standard error of the pooled estimation apart from each other. That is, our
test is lenient in the sense that we reject stability only if there is a very high
chance for a behaviorally meaningful parameter diﬀerence. Furthermore, we use
the minimum probability weight within this band of all 6 parameter estimates as
14I.e., at +/- 1.96 times the standard error of the pooled estimation.
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a continuous measure of stability.15
We classify 11 of the 43 subjects in our main speciﬁcation as non-stable. The
non-stable subjects exhibited 1.9 violations of the above stability criterion on av-
erage, with an average minimum probability weight within the band of 1.6%. The
stable subjects, in comparison, had an average minimum weight of 23.7%. Table
B.1.3 in the appendix reports the exact probability weights per parameter for all
subjects as well as the resulting minimum weights and stability classiﬁcations.
A discussion of the ﬁnding that a quarter of our subjects did not exhibit time-
stable Prospect Theory preferences is deferred to Section 2.5.
2.4.3. Naïveté with respect to Prospect Theory
We assess the quality of our subjects' anticipations of their future risky choice
behaviors by establishing two measures of naïveté: the quality of the investment
plan and the quality of the commitment decision. The former is a measure of
anticipation of Prospect Theory preferences in general, whereas the latter measures
the anticipation of own reactions to domains shifts.
To assess the quality of our subjects' complete contingent plans, we interpret
them as compound lotteries and calculate their certainty equivalents based on the
individual Prospect Theory parameters. We use week 2 parameters, because they
reﬂect preferences at the time at which the lottery is played. A plan is classiﬁed
as decent if it has a non-negative certainty equivalent, and as poor otherwise.
Clearly, this threshold is conservative as any subject could achieve zero utility by
never investing, regardless of their individual Prospect Theory value function.16
To assess the quality of our subjects' commitment decisions, we compare their
plan and play. In order not to assess the quality of the actual play based on out-
come luck, we have to deﬁne an ex ante measure for the expected utility of play.
We do so by viewing our subjects' play as the implementation of an alternated
plan. As we can observe our subjects' behaviors only in the realized contingen-
cies, we have to impose an assumption on their counter-factual play in all other
15The order of Prospect Theory parameter elicitation and investment game was reversed between
weeks 1 and 2, so our stability measure could be aﬀected by order eﬀects.
16Computing a counter-factually optimal plan would be too demanding, as there are 915 possible
plans per subject. The zero utility plan of never investing, however, is easily conceivable.
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contingencies. The most agnostic way of doing so is to assume that they would
have stuck to their initial plans in all non-realized contingencies. This allows to
assess whether a subject paid too little for commitment, but not whether they
paid too much, because the assumption artiﬁcially limits the potential beneﬁts
of commitment. We classify a commitment decision as poor if the utility of the
original week 1 plan exceeds the utility of the actual play. In this case, the certain
money amount that equates utilities of committed plan and play is a continuous
measure of underpayment for commitment.17
Table B.1.4 in the appendix summarizes all subjects' certainty equivalents of
their plans relative to a utility of zero (from not investing) and, accordingly,
whether a subject was a decent planner. Furthermore, it reports the diﬀerence be-
tween willingness to pay for commitment and its counter-factual minimum value
(which is the certainty equivalent relative to the actual play) and, accordingly,
whether a subject paid too little for commitment. Table 2.4.5 provides the most
important summary statistics for our main sample.
Table 2.4.5.: Planning and commitment quality.
Commitment
Decent Poor Total ∅ CE Plan
Plan Decent 14 10 24 0.52
Plan Poor 15 4 19 -0.99
Total 29 14 43 -0.15
Notes: Number of subjects per quality combination,
CE in EUR, restricted to main sample (43 of 64).
Almost 45% of our main sample were poor planners in the sense that their plans
yielded lower expected utility than never investing, based on own loss aversion and
diminishing sensitivity in week 2. On average, the certainty equivalent of these
poor plans was EUR 0.99 below the initial endowment. That is, these subjects
would have been equally well oﬀ when paying a Euro for walking away from the
17In the calculation of this certainty equivalent, all payoﬀs are reduced by the willingness to pay
for commitment (respectively increased by the willingness to accept).
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experiment rather than having implemented their own plans.
Almost 33% of the main sample paid too little for commitment (respectively
demanded too much), given their Prospect Theory parameters and their actual
play of the investment game. Moreover, poor committers were not only slightly
oﬀ, but paid on average EUR 1.80 too little.18
2.4.4. Drivers of Naïveté
We collected a rich set of correlates in order to tackle the question of what drives
the above characterized naïveté. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁned a stability measure of
Prospect Theory preferences in Subsection 2.4.2 (ranging from 0 to 1), counted
correct answers to the Cognitive Reﬂection Test (0 to 3), recorded planning dura-
tion (in minutes), asked for age, gender, and math-grade, and measured all Big-5
personality dimensions (on a Likert scale).
Stability of Prospect Theory preferences, correct CRT answers, and planning
duration jointly capture 33% of overall variation in plan-quality (measured as
certainty equivalent), and they are all individually signiﬁcant. Self-reported char-
acteristics (age, gender, math-grade) jointly capture 11% of the variation, but only
gender is signiﬁcant. Big-5 personality traits capture an amazing 46% of the varia-
tion, but only agreeableness and neuroticism are signiﬁcant. In fact, the two alone
still capture 45%.
Combining these categories reveals that PT stability, CRT score, planning time,
agreeableness, and neuroticism jointly capture 60% of overall variation in plan
quality, and no other correlate (combination) contributes much in addition or is
even signiﬁcant when added to that combination. Table 2.4.6 summarizes the
regression results.
The quantitative interpretation is straight forward, as the dependent variable is
measured in money. In particular, increasing PT stability from 0 to 1 increases
the value of the plan, relative to never investing, by EUR 0.94, answering one
18Our subjects could commit deterministically to their plans by never switching in the choice
list, and 11 of 64 subjects did so. As our assessment of commitment quality only accounts
for underpayment, this does not aﬀect our results. However, 3 subjects did deterministically
commit to their play, and 2 of them are included in our main sample. Excluding them reduces
the average underpay to EUR 1.30.
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Table 2.4.6.: Regression of Plan quality on Correlates
Coeﬃcient Std.Error t.value p.value
Intercept -0.1877 0.4756 -0.39 0.6954
PT stable 0.9428 0.4532 2.08 0.0445
CRT 0.2291 0.1110 2.06 0.0462
Time 0.1024 0.0410 2.50 0.0170
Agreeableness -0.1003 0.0305 -3.29 0.0022
Neuroticism -0.1108 0.0283 -3.91 0.0004
Notes: Main sample (43 observations), R2 = 0.6014. PT
stable as deﬁned in Subsection 2.4.2 (0-1), CRT as number
of correct answers (0-3), Time in minutes, Agreeableness
and Neuroticism in Likert points.
additional CRT question correct increases it by EUR 0.23, and spending another
minute on planning by EUR 0.10. On the downside, an additional Likert point in a
Big-5 question on agreeableness (normalized, such that higher values reﬂect higher
agreeableness) reduces the plan value by EUR 0.10, and an additional Likert point
on more neuroticism does so by EUR 0.11.
The ﬁrst three eﬀects seem intuitive. Being more consistent in one's own
Prospect Theory preferences makes it easier to predict future tastes and, hence, to
plan accordingly. Scoring higher on the CRT suggests a more thorough handling of
cognitive tasks, in particular of our planning stage. More time spent on planning
probably reﬂects higher eﬀort, which should improve plan quality as well.
The eﬀects of the personality dimensions, however, are less clear. Neuroticism
points toward a higher vulnerability in general, so more neurotic subjects may face
smaller upsides and bigger downsides from the investment game in general. The
negative eﬀect of neuroticism on plan quality suggests that the neurotic subjects
did not suﬃciently account for this vulnerability in their planning decisions. Agree-
ableness is foremost a social trait, so its eﬀect on individual planning capability
remains opaque.19
19A potential channel could be a distaste for non-interactive tasks in general and an accordingly
lower experience or eﬀort level for such tasks.
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A similar analysis of the various correlates' eﬀects on the quality of commitment
is inconclusive. The main takeaway from the observed commitment decisions is
that they do not signiﬁcantly correlate with plan quality.
2.5. Conclusion
This article experimentally investigates quality of anticipation of Prospect Theory
preferences in general and of reactions to shifts into the gain or loss domain in
particular. Almost half of our subjects were poor planners in a sequential invest-
ment game which points to a wrong anticipation of own future Prospect Theory
preferences in general. Almost a third of our subjects undervalued a commitment
option, which points to an under-appreciation of own reactions to domain shifts.
Our measures of anticipation quality rely on separately elicited loss aversion
and diminishing sensitivity parameters. We interpret our data as if these parame-
ters reﬂected true preferences, and deviations thereof in the investment game were
mistakes. However, the opposite interpretation that decisions in the investment
game reﬂected true preferences does not qualitatively change the results. Then,
the measured inconsistencies between investment game and Prospect Theory pa-
rameter elicitation task imply a mistake in the latter, which was incentivized as
well. Furthermore, inconsistencies between the tasks can never be rationalized
by hedging, as their payoﬀs were determined via independent randomization. If
none of the tasks reﬂected true preferences, the mistake would be even larger than
suggested.
Besides cognitive ability and planning eﬀort, our measure of Prospect Theory
preferences' time-stability between weeks 1 and 2 was a strong positive predictor
for plan quality, i.e. of risk preference anticipation. This measure may capture
either an awareness of immediate risk preferences when confronted with a risky
tradeoﬀ, or simply the attention paid to the experiment. However, it may also
point to actual changes in the underlying loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity.
This interpretation poses the question whether Prospect Theory, which is a de-
scriptive model of behavior, does actually reﬂect non-standard preferences, which
is a common view and also assumed in our article. Alternatively, Prospect Theory
could reﬂect impulses or heuristics that are driven by current moods, emotions,
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and depletion, i.e. some type of self-control problem. This, of course, would give
rise to a diﬀerent scope of commitment than just avoiding own reactions to domain
shifts.
Surprisingly, plan quality was no predictor of commitment decisions whatso-
ever. In particular, some subjects paid a lot to commit themselves to poor plans.
This at least suggests that overpayment for commitment could have been an issue
for some subjects, but unfortunately it cannot be identiﬁed with our measure of
commitment quality.
An interesting question for future research is how preferences and the quality
of their anticipation correlate, e.g. whether more loss averse people are also more
naïve.20 Our data cannot address this question, because the Prospect Theory pa-
rameters directly enter our naïveté measure, such that all observed correlations
mechanically reﬂect its calculation. Another interesting question is whether antic-
ipation mistakes with respect to Prospect Theory preferences give rise to exploita-
tion by rational ﬁrms, similar to what has been shown for naïveté with respect to
present bias.
20The question of correlation between preference and anticipation is still open for present bias
as well, as far as the authors know.
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3. Decomposing the Disposition
Eﬀect∗
3.1. Introduction
The disposition eﬀect, deﬁned as investors' general disposition to sell winners too
early and hold losers too long (Shefrin & Statman 1985), has become one of the
most important and persistent empirical puzzles on ﬁnancial markets. Although
the eﬀect is typically seen as a mistake (e.g., because momentum causes prices
to drift over short and medium time horizons), the literature has solely identiﬁed
it through a positive diﬀerence between the proportion of gains realized and the
proportion of losses realized (Odean 1998). While this empirical measure shows
that investors tend to realize gains more readily than losses, it remains unclear
whether and to what extent gains are realized too soon and losses too late
without a rational benchmark postulating what should be done. Surprisingly, such
a benchmark has never been provided despite its immense potential to inform us
not only about the nature of the disposition eﬀect, but also about the validity of
various theoretical approaches (preference or belief-based) that were proposed as
explanations.
In this paper, we propose a novel experimental design that generates such a
rational benchmark for investment decisions. We use this benchmark to iden-
tify whether and to what extent disposition-prone behavior is caused by actual
mistakes, and to what extent this mistaken behavior occurs in the loss and gain
domain, respectively. In a second step, we use this information to discriminate
between various theoretical models that were proposed to explain the disposition
∗This chapter is joint work with Johannes Maier (University of Munich).
39
3. Decomposing the Disposition Eﬀect
eﬀect. In particular, we speak to the long-standing debate whether such behavior
roots in non-standard preferences or non-standard beliefs. Importantly, our exper-
imental design allows us to discriminate solely based on individuals' choices, which
directly implies that the distinction between preferences and beliefs as underlying
cause is behaviorally relevant.
Our experimental design is distinct from previous ones in several respects, but
three of them appear to be crucial. First, we require subjects to make binary
choices between investing in one out of two risky assets and not investing. This
binary nature of investments allows us to derive an individual-speciﬁc rational
benchmark based on the property of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. Although
such binary choices are somewhat artiﬁcial and preclude the use of ﬁeld data,
they are essential in identifying the extent of erroneous disposition eﬀects in gains
and losses separately (see Shefrin & Statman's verbal deﬁnition above). Second,
subjects can trade at two points in time only, with several periods in between.
This feature allows us to separate gains from good news and losses from bad news,
which is a pre-requisite for distinguishing preference-based and belief-based expla-
nations solely based on observed behavior. Third, we use a (staircase) strategy
method. Although this adds to the complexity of our design, it allows us to de-
rive subject-based measures, which would have required a myriad of participants
otherwise. Since theoretical models usually explain the disposition eﬀect with
individual biases, it is exactly these subject-based measures that speak to the
theoretical predictions.
Our analysis decomposes the disposition eﬀect along two dimensions. First, we
split it into separate eﬀects for gains and losses. This ﬁrst decomposition yields
a novel domain-speciﬁc measure of an erroneous disposition eﬀect, which resem-
bles its common interpretation much closer than the usual aggregate measure.
However, since it still represents an aggregate measure within each domain, an
important caveat remains: aggregate measures are too crude to draw conclusions
about the prevalence of decision errors. The reason is that there are two types of
potential errors investors could make, namely the error to realize when they should
not (switch violations) and the error to keep an asset when they should realize it
(keep violations). In both domains, one of these errors contributes to the aggregate
measure of the disposition eﬀect, while the other one counteracts it. Hence, both
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errors may prevail, but cancel each other in the aggregate and thus appear non-
existent. It may also be the case that certain errors are more prevalent than others
in a given domain, but the aggregate measure shows the opposite, simply because
the frequency with which certain errors can be made systematically diﬀers.1 To
address this problem, we further decompose the erroneous disposition eﬀect within
each domain according to the two types of errors that investors can make. This
second decomposition yields novel domain-speciﬁc measures of subjects' propensi-
ties to make each speciﬁc error, given it is possible. Since theoretical models make
predictions exactly along these lines, it is these error propensities that are essential
in informing us about underlying mechanisms driving the disposition eﬀect.
With respect to these error propensities, we ﬁnd that subjects are considerably
more prone to make keep rather than switch violations. These propensities are
not aﬀected by the domain in which the violation occurs, i.e., whether violations
occur in gains or losses. This result is consistent with belief-based explanations,
but inconsistent with prominent preference-based explanations such as realization
utility (Barberis & Xiong 2009, Barberis & Xiong 2012).2 As mentioned above,
these observed error propensities may or may not induce a disposition eﬀect in the
aggregate, depending on the frequencies with which the violations are possible. In
our experiment, keep violations are often possible in losses, but rarely in gains. In
contrast, switch violations are often possible in gains, but rarely in losses. Hence,
we should observe a disposition eﬀect in losses as both the error propensities and
frequencies work in the same direction. However, frequencies and propensities
work in opposite directions in gains, so that it depends on their relative strength
whether we observe a disposition eﬀect in gains. Indeed, we ﬁnd a disposition
eﬀect at the aggregate level only in losses.
1For instance, it may be the case that subjects' propensity for keep violations is larger than
for switch violations in losses and vice versa in gains, but we still observe the opposite
of a disposition eﬀect, simply because switch violations are more often possible than keep
violations in losses and vice versa in gains. Of course, the ﬂip-side is also possible: We may
observe a disposition eﬀect, but subjects' propensity for switch violations is larger than for
keep violations in losses and vice versa in gains.
2We further distinguish between motivated and mechanical belief distortions. In particular, our
propensity results above as well as the result that subjects behave mostly rational at initial
asset purchase are both consistent with models of motivated belief choice (Brunnermeier &
Parker 2005, König & Maier 2017), but inconsistent with a mechanical distortion through an
irrational belief in mean reversion (Odean 1998).
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While our experimental design allows to discriminate between potential theoret-
ical explanations based on choice behavior alone, we cross-validated our ﬁndings
with a robustness treatment where subjects had to state their beliefs as well.
There, we ﬁnd that these stated beliefs diverge from the Bayesian belief, and that
subjects' choices are aligned with their subjective beliefs rather than the Bayesian.
This is true for observed ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance violations in particular,
which implies that neither keep nor switch violations are typically perceived as
such. Therefore, not only subjects' choice behaviors, but also their stated beliefs
are consistent with a belief-based explanation, but inconsistent with a preference-
based explanation of the disposition eﬀect.3
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces
our benchmark and predictions, Section 3.3 describes the design and conduct of
the experiment, Section 3.4 presents our results, and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2. Benchmark and Predictions
The disposition eﬀect was introduced by Shefrin & Statman (1985) as a tendency
to hold on to losing assets too long and to sell winning assets too soon.4 In
empirical studies, it is usually measured as a diﬀerence between the proportion
of gains realized (PGR) and the proportion of losses realized (PLR). Interpreting
this statistic as a measure of error imposes the implicit benchmark that losses
should be realized at least as readily as gains. This benchmark reﬂects both the
original tax argument as well as momentum in asset prices. Moreover, rational
explanations for selling winners rather than losers were tested and refused by
Odean (1998), namely portfolio re-balancing, diﬀerences in transaction costs, and
subsequent performance of kept versus sold assets.
While being intuitive, this implicit benchmark is clearly crude. A more detailed
3Notice that subjects' stated beliefs are closer to the Bayesian belief at initial investment deci-
sions than at later choices, which is again consistent with a motivated but inconsistent with
a mechanical belief distortion.
4Ever since, the disposition eﬀect was conﬁrmed by multiple studies in various domains, e.g.
in retail brokerage accounts (Odean 1998, Ben-David & Hirshleifer 2012, Kaustia 2010),
professionally managed funds (Frazzini 2006), housing markets (Genesove & Mayer 2001),
and in laboratory experiments (Weber & Camerer 1998, Weber & Welfens 2008, Jiao 2017,
Fischbacher, Hoﬀmann & Schudy 2017, Kuhnen, Rudorf & Weber 2017).
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benchmark would distinguish assets that should be kept from assets that should
be sold separately for gains and losses. Doing so requires relative performance
measures. Intuitively, a stock that went up 1% in a strong bull market is a winner,
but still under-performed, whereas a stock that went down 1% in a strong bear
market is a loser, but still out-performed the market. Methodologically, however,
it requires a forward-looking measure of expected relative performance, which is
hardly obtainable in the ﬁeld.5
Therefore, we conducted a laboratory experiment where we controlled both the
objective return processes of our experimental assets and the information structure.
Our experiment is designed in a way that allows for a speciﬁc benchmark on the
individual choice level. Surprisingly, this is achieved not by a complication of
previous designs, but by the simpliﬁcations of imposing binary choices over assets,
which allows to use a ﬁrst order stochastic dominance criterion of rationality, and
limiting trade to two periods only, which allows to partly separate gains from good
news and losses from bad news.6
Our benchmark allows us to compare the proportion of gains realized to the
proportion of gains that should be realized (PGSR), as well as the proportion of
losses realized to the proportion of losses that should be realized (PLSR). Thereby,
we can test for the disposition eﬀect in gains and losses separately. Or put diﬀer-
ently, we can test the two original conjectures of holding losers too long and selling
winners too early individually.
Prediction 1 (Disposition Eﬀect in Gains). DEG := PGR− PGSR > 0.
Prediction 2 (Disposition Eﬀect in Losses). DEL := PLSR− PLR > 0.
However, these domain speciﬁc disposition eﬀects are still not fully informative
as error measures. Suppose PGSR was 50%, and PGR as well. Then, the disposi-
tion eﬀect in gains would be zero, but still every individual investment choice may
be mistaken. Even when the exact right number of winning assets is sold, it may
comprise exactly those assets that should have been kept, while the kept assets
5Allegedly, most real-world trade occurs precisely because market participants disagree about
the prospects of an asset.
6Which is not to say that our experiment was simpler than others overall.
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are the ones that should have been sold.7
As our rational benchmark is choice speciﬁc, we are able to delve deeper and
distinguish four independent disposition errors, based on violations of ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance: First, keep violations in gains (KVG) refer to keeping the
own asset when it is in gains but should be sold. Second, switch violations in
gains (SVG) refer to switching to the other asset when the own one is in gains
and should be kept. Third, keep violations in losses (KVL) refer to keeping the
own asset when it is in losses and should be sold. And fourth, switch violations
in losses (SVL) refer to switching to the other asset when the own one is in losses
but should be kept.
According to its original deﬁnition, the disposition eﬀect refers to SVG and KVL
errors only. Moreover, these errors are the drivers of our domain-speciﬁc disposi-
tion eﬀects as well, as SVG implies gain realizations, and KVL non-realizations of
losses. In fact, the other two errors point in the opposite directions and, hence,
reduce the domain speciﬁc disposition eﬀects as well as the usual empirical mea-
sure. Consequentially, both our domain-speciﬁc disposition eﬀects as well as the
usual empirical one are suitable measures of decision errors only if KVG and SVL
are small compared to SVG and KVL.
The speciﬁc pattern of these four individual disposition errors is particularly
informative for the theory as well. Due to its robust identiﬁcation, the disposition
eﬀect received a lot of attention, so that several behavioral models were proposed
as explanations. These models utilize either of two channels: non-standard prefer-
ences, or non-standard beliefs. This distinction, however, is not merely technical,
but gives rise to diﬀerent welfare judgments of the disposition eﬀect. If preferences
drove the eﬀect, investors would be aware of, and willing to bear, the instrumental
costs of their trading behavior. If non-standard beliefs drove the eﬀect, investors
would be unaware of, and probably unwilling to bear, these instrumental costs. In
the latter case, investors would exhibit disposition errors due to a lack of under-
standing of the consequences of their choices, and could potentially be de-biased
by information or education, and would appreciate it.
While models of both types were designed to explain the aggregate disposi-
7Clearly, the 50% case is the uninformative extreme. For all other values of PGSR, DEG carries
at least some information.
44
3.2. Benchmark and Predictions
tion eﬀect and, hence, predict it, they diﬀer in their predictions with respect to
the above introduced individual disposition errors. Moreover, the models speak
to individual decision making. Hence, their predictions refer to individual error
propensities, i.e. to conditional probabilities of making an error, conditional on
the possibility of the error. Therefore, the short-hand notations KVG, SVG, KVL,
SVL refer in the following predictions to population averages of the individual
error propensities.
The leading preference-based explanation combines reference dependent risk
preferences with mental accounting and realization utility (Barberis & Xiong 2009,
Barberis & Xiong 2012). The reference point is assumed to be the original pur-
chase price, so that gains and losses carry the utility. However, this utility is felt
only when its respective mental account is closed, which is assumed to be asset-
speciﬁc. Hence, the pleasure of a gain is only enjoyed when the gain is realized,
and the pain from a loss is only suﬀered when the loss is realized. By its ﬁnite
nature, our experiment enforces realization at its end, but subjects can opt for
an interim realization in their second trading period by switching to the other
asset. If the reference dependent value function exhibits diminishing sensitivity
as usually assumed (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), tradeoﬀs between maximizing
interim realization utility and maximizing ﬁnal realization utility can arise. When
holding a loser that should be sold according to the rational benchmark, it may be
worthwhile to keep it even if its prospects are stochastically dominated, as keeping
it allows to avoid the dis-utility from interim realization, while diminishing sen-
sitivity induces an asymmetry in the perceived up and downsides of keeping for
the ﬁnal realization. Analogously, when holding a winner that should be kept for
instrumental reasons, reaping the interim realization utility may be worth the cost
of switching to a worse asset for the remaining periods.
Hence, realization utility systematically allows for SVG and KVL mistakes, but
not for KVG and SVL mistakes, because the instrumental costs of the former
may be worthwhile to bear in order to enjoy interim realization utility or avoid
interim realization dis-utility, while the latter mistakes would go along with avoid-
ing interim realization utility or bearing interim realization dis-utility. Allowing
for uniform noise, the following prediction obtains.
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Prediction 3 (Preference Based Disposition Eﬀect).
KVG = SV L < SV G and KVG = SV L < KV L.
A common belief-based explanation for the disposition eﬀect assumes an irra-
tional belief in mean reversion, i.e. the belief that losers will recover and winners
will come down again. In our experiment, price increases relative to the other
asset are positive signals of asset quality. Hence, belief in mean reversion can be
modeled as inverse (Bayesian) updating in our setup. While the Bayesian posterior
for an asset adhering to the higher return process increases if the asset's price in-
creases relative to the other asset's price, the distorted belief of the mean reverter
decreases. Hence, mean reverters' decisions are guided by the ﬂip-side of the ra-
tional benchmark, as they perceive ﬁrst-order dominated assets to be dominant,
and ﬁrst-order dominant assets to be dominated. This predicts all four disposition
errors with 100% or, when accounting for uniform noise, with equal propensity.
Prediction 4 (Mean Reversion Based Disposition Eﬀect).
KVG = SV G = KV L = SV L > 0.
Beyond these classic preference-based and belief-based explanations, it was
noted in the literature that the two could interact. Speciﬁcally, investors could
have motivated beliefs, either because they derive anticipatory utility from the
beliefs themselves (Brunnermeier & Parker 2005), or because their asset ownership
induces them to under-react especially to unfavorable news (König & Maier 2017).
Either way, this induces investors to view their assets overly rosy after bad news.
Therefore, motivated beliefs decision makers only exhibit KVG and KVL mistakes,
but no SVG or SVL mistakes, as they sometimes keep their asset when they should
not, but always keep it when they should. When controlling for informativeness
in gain and loss states, KVG and KVL should be equally likely, so that under
uniform noise the following prediction obtains.
Prediction 5 (Motivated Beliefs Based Disposition Eﬀect).
KVG = KV L > SV G = SV L.
It is important to note that this prediction is perfectly consistent not only with
the above introduced disposition eﬀect in the loss domain, but also with the usual
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empirical measure of the disposition eﬀect, PGR-PLR>0. Moreover, this is not
a peculiarity of our experimental design, but holds true in general. Intuitively,
when prices carry at least some information about asset quality, the likelihood
that keeping a loser is a mistake is systematically higher than the likelihood that
switching is a mistake. And vice versa, switching is more likely a mistake for
winners. Hence, the same propensity in gains and losses of making a keep mistake
translates into a bigger share of losers that are mistakenly kept than of winners
that are mistakenly kept.
While the disposition eﬀect refers to selling decisions of own assets, behavioral
models speak to the original purchase decisions as well. The above described non-
standard preferences of the realization utility model clearly aﬀect risk preferences
at initial purchase if decision makers are foresighted, but do not allow for irra-
tionality. Hence, realization utility types do not exhibit ﬁrst-order violations at
the initial purchase. As motivated belief types' belief distortion depends on their
asset ownership, they also behave according to the standard model and do not
exhibit ﬁrst-order violations at the initial purchase. By contrast, an irrational be-
lief in mean reversion does not depend on asset ownership and aﬀects the initial
asset purchase the same way as later selling decisions. Hence, a mean reverter
exhibits all ﬁrst-order violations already at the initial purchase. Moreover, initial
purchase decisions allow to identify information unresponsive behaviors as well,
i.e. heuristics that imply the purchase of a speciﬁc asset regardless of information.
The most prominent heuristics in this context are price heuristics, i.e consistently
choosing the more or less expensive asset. Since we calibrated our experiment
such that prices never cross, we can identify heuristic types as those who always
choose the same asset, which is precluded for all other types. Taken together, the
following predictions for the initial asset purchase obtain under the usual uniform
noise assumption.
Prediction 6 (Rational Purchase).
Choice frequency of an asset increases in its Bayesian posterior of adhering to the
higher return process.
Prediction 7 (Mean Reversion Purchase).
Choice frequency of an asset decreases in its Bayesian posterior.
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Prediction 8 (Heuristic Purchase).
Choice frequency of an asset is ﬂat across its Bayesian posteriors.
Our experiment is designed for testing all above predictions.
3.3. Experimental Design
In our experiment, subjects faced a series of investment decisions between two risky
assets or not investing. The prices of the risky assets were determined exogenously
by independent binomial processes with known distributions. However, it was
unknown to the subjects which of the assets adhered to which of the processes. The
subjects received an initial endowment for investing and informed their decisions
by observing price realizations of the processes.
Asset Prices
The prices of the two risky assets A and B were simulated for 10 periods t ∈
{1, ..., 10} according to independent binomial processes H and L (high and low).
Which asset adhered to which process was randomly assigned on a per subject
level at the start of the experiment, but subjects learned the outcome of this
randomization only at the end.
From period to period, each process either appreciated 30% or depreciated 20%
of its current value. Process H appreciated with 55% probability, process L with
45%, and they depreciated with the respective counter-probabilities. Figure 3.3.1
illustrates the binomial tree of the price lottery of asset A for one period from
the perspective of t = 0.
Our participants received an initial endowment of 20,000 EMU for their invest-
ment decisions at an exchange rate of 2,500 EMU =̂ EUR 1. The asset prices were
initiated in period t = 0 at p0A = 200 EMU and p
0
B = 5 EMU.
All subjects were informed that they could not avoid observing the asset prices
for all 10 periods as well as learning which asset adhered to which process eventu-
ally, regardless of their investment decisions.
We used relative instead of absolute price changes in order to make sure that
the asset that followed process H was always the more attractive one for a rational
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Asset A
Low
Process
Price −20%55%
Price +30%45%
50%
High
Process
Price −20%45%
Price +30%55%
50%
Figure 3.3.1.: Binomial tree of lottery A for one period at t = 0.
investor, regardless of the absolute price level.8 Moreover, relative price changes
guaranteed that asset prices always remained positive, regardless of the realizations
of the processes and regardless of the number of periods.
The choice of appreciation and depreciation probabilities close to 50% guaran-
teed that Bayesian updating with respect to incoming information was moderate
and almost linear for the ﬁrst couple of periods. Furthermore, it corresponded
to the medium calibration (i.e., + and -) of the seminal experiment by Weber &
Camerer (1998).
The high percentage price changes, on the other hand, made sure that invest-
ment outcomes represented a substantial fraction of our subjects' earnings, so that
picking the right asset was of considerable relevance for them. Even though the
diﬀerence between process H and process L may seem faint at ﬁrst, it is in fact
substantial: The high process yielded three times the expected return of the low
one per round, and compounding ampliﬁed this eﬀect in the course of time. In or-
der to make this diﬀerence clear to our subjects, they had to compute the expected
returns of both processes themselves in a control question.9
8With absolute price increments, the asset following the low process would be more attractive if
it was only cheap enough. For example, assume the assets would appreciate 30 EMU instead
of 30% and depreciate 20 EMU instead of 20%. If the high asset traded at p = 400 EMU
and the low one at p = 100 EMU, investing 400 EMU in the former would yield an expected
return of 7.5 EMU per round, whereas the latter would yield 10 EMU.
9Precisely, the better process yielded an expected return of 0.55 × 0.30 − 0.45 × 0.20 = 7.5%
per round, whereas the worse process yielded only 0.45× 0.30− 0.55× 0.20 = 2.5%. Most of
the subjects managed to calculate these returns, the others got some hints by the instructors
until they came up with the correct solutions.
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The asymmetry of gains and losses warranted attractiveness of risky investments
also for risk averse participants and for uninformative priors, which was important
for our experiment as only asset holders could exhibit a disposition eﬀect.10
The substantial diﬀerence in initial prices p0A and p
0
B made sure that our subjects
reﬂected on the (ir-)relevance of absolute prices. Moreover, it guaranteed that
ptA > p
t
B for all t ≤ 6 in all possible price realizations, which allowed to test for
irrational price heuristics.
Investment Choices
Our participants could invest only in periods t = 2 (Choice I) and t = 6 (Choice
II). Both choices were all or nothing, i.e., subjects had to invest their entire
wealth either in asset A, in asset B, or not at all, but could not build a portfolio.
To inform their decisions, they observed asset prices for two pre-periods before
Choice I and another four interim-periods before Choice II. Their earnings from
the experiment were determined by another four end-periods as the value of their
investments at t = 10. Figure 3.3.2 depicts the time-line of investment choices.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Pre-Periods Interim-Periods End-Periods
Start Choice I Choice II Payoﬀs
Figure 3.3.2.: Timing of investment choices
When subjects decided not to invest, they kept their current wealth at zero
interest. Allowing them not to invest came at the cost of losing some observations
for the disposition eﬀect, but improved comparability with the literature as well
as realism. Furthermore, it probably reduced noise as subjects who did not want
to invest would most likely have behaved in a more random, less systematic way
if they were forced to than subjects who actually wanted to invest.
Demanding all or nothing decisions precluded diversiﬁcation motives and al-
lowed us to use ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance arguments in the analysis of the
experiment. As a side-eﬀect, it also simpliﬁed the decisions.
10Almost 90% of our subjects ended up holding a risky asset at their second choice.
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Strategy Method
Even though there were only two trading periods, our subjects were not done with
merely two decisions. Instead, they were asked for Choice I and Choice II multiple
times via a strategy method. That is, they had to make their investment decisions
conditional on various possible contingencies of the choice environment. Only after
they decided, one contingency was randomly drawn and their respective choice was
implemented.
The possible contingencies of our investment choices were the realizations of
price paths that could be observed when making a decision. For each asset, there
were 2t possible price paths within t periods and, hence, 2t × 2t = 22t price paths
combinations for both assets. In particular, there were 22 = 4 possible price paths
per asset at t = 2 and, hence, 16 possible price paths combinations for both assets
in Choice I. Similarly, there were 26 = 64 possible price paths per asset at t = 6
and, hence, 4,096 possible price paths combinations for both assets in Choice II.11
For the disposition eﬀect, however, only prices at times of trade were relevant, as
they determined whether and by how much an investment was in gains or losses,
and what the outside options of the investors were. Fortunately, multiple price
paths could result in the same ﬁnal price, which signiﬁcantly reduced the number
of relevant contingencies. In general, the number of ups and downs uniquely
determined an asset's ﬁnal price, regardless of the order of ups and downs.12 In
particular, there were t + 1 possible ﬁnal prices per asset after t periods and,
therefore, (t+ 1)× (t+ 1) price combinations, or states. Speciﬁcally, there were
3× 3 = 9 possible states in Choice I and 7× 7 = 49 possible states in Choice II.13
Furthermore, multiple states could result in the same Bayesian posterior with
respect to which asset adhered to which process. In fact, the Bayesian posterior
depended solely on the diﬀerence in the number of ups between asset A and asset
B, which we call ∆. In particular, if both assets had the same number of ups, i.e., if
11As initial prices were ﬁxed, each price path can be expresses as an ordered sequence of ups U
and downs D of the price. So for example, the 4 possible price paths per asset in Choice I
were UU, UD, DU, and DD.
12Due to commutativity of the multiplication. For example, UD and DU both result in a ﬁnal
price that is 1.3× 0.8− 1 = 0.8× 1.3− 1 = 4% above the initial price.
13For a ﬁxed number of periods t, each state can be expressed as a tuple of ups per asset, e.g.
(2U,1U) for the state where asset A appreciated twice and B once.
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∆ = 0, the Bayesian posterior was equal to the prior of 50%. Tables 3.3.1 and 3.3.2
depict the state matrix of Choice I, the former with the Bayesian posteriors for
asset A adhering to the better process, the latter with the equivalent ∆′s. Notice
that states on the same diagonal have the same Bayesian posterior, respectively
∆.
Table 3.3.1.: Bayesian posteriors per
state, Choice I.
Asset B
2U 1U 0U
A
ss
et
A 2U 50% 60% 69%
1U 40% 50% 60%
0U 31% 40% 50%
Table 3.3.2.: ∆ per state, Choice I.
Asset B
2U 1U 0U
A
ss
et
A 2U 0 1 2
1U -1 0 1
0U -2 -1 0
Each subject had to report their investment decisions for 5 contingencies (i.e.,
price paths combinations) in Choice I and up to 13 contingencies in Choice II.
In Choice I, they faced one contingency for each possible posterior, i.e., for each
diagonal of the state matrix. The exact price paths combination that was presented
for a speciﬁc diagonal was randomly determined according to the true (conditional)
distribution. The diagonals were asked in the order ∆ = 0, -1, -2, 1, 2.
After reporting all 5 decisions of Choice I and before proceeding to Choice II, one
of the 5 diagonals was randomly drawn for each subject individually according to
the true (unconditional) distribution. Then, each subject was informed about the
outcome of this draw, and their respective investment decision was implemented
on their behalf.
Therefore, only those contingencies at t = 6 that were consistent with a subject's
Choice I realization could still materialize in Choice II. These were 24 × 24 = 256
price paths combinations and (4+1)×(4+1) = 25 states with a total of 2×4+1 = 9
diﬀerent Bayesian posteriors. Due to our calibration, an asset was in gains when it
increased at least twice within four periods. Hence, there were 15 gain states with 7
diﬀerent Bayesian posteriors and 10 loss states with 6 diﬀerent Bayesian posteriors
among these 25 states for an asset holder at t = 6.14 Table 3.3.3 illustrates the
14Clearly, there are no gains or losses for non-asset holders.
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Choice II state matrix of a subject for whom state (2U,1U) was realized in Choice
I and who held asset A according to their ﬁrst choice. The percentage numbers
in the matrix refer to the Bayesian posteriors again and the double line separates
gain states from loss states.
Table 3.3.3.: Bayesian posteriors per state in Choice II for Choice I realization of
(2U,1U) and holding asset A.
Asset B
5U 4U 3U 2U 1U
A
ss
et
A
6U 60% 69% 77% 83% 88%
 GainStates5U 50% 60% 69% 77% 83%
4U 40% 50% 60% 69% 77%
3U 31% 40% 50% 60% 69%
}
Loss
States2U 23% 31% 40% 50% 60%
A couple of remarks is in order. First, the bottom right cell of the Choice II state
matrix is precisely the state that was realized in Choice I. Clearly, the number of
ups per asset could remain constant if no asset would appreciate any further, but
it could never decrease. Second, the uninformative diagonal (i.e., with a Bayesian
posterior of 50%) is not the main diagonal of the state matrix, because ∆ in Choice
I was not zero. Third, for subjects who held asset B, the split in gain and loss
states would be vertical, not horizontal, but the number of gain and loss states
and the variation in posteriors would remain the same.
In Choice II, subjects were asked for a contingency per ∆ again, but separately
for a gain and a loss state whenever applicable.15 Again, the uninformative diag-
onal ∆ = 0 was asked ﬁrst, followed by the negative ∆'s in descending order and,
then, the positive ∆'s in ascending order. If both gain and loss states existed on a
diagonal, a contingency of a gain state was asked ﬁrst. As in Choice I, the exact
price paths combination that was presented for a speciﬁc diagonal was randomly
determined according to the true (conditional) distribution.
In order to reduce the number of decisions per subject, we applied stopping
15A separation of gain and loss states only existed for asset holders, and some diagonals are
completely in either the gain or loss domain, see Table 3.3.3.
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rules. Speciﬁcally, as soon as a subject chose a ﬁrst-order stochastically dominant
asset in a contingency, no further contingencies with more extreme posteriors were
asked within that domain (i.e., within gains or losses). For example, if the decision
maker in Table 3.3.3 switched to asset B at state (3U,4U), the bottom left corner
of the state matrix was not explored any further. That is, no loss states on the
diagonals ∆ = −2 and ∆ = −3 were asked.
In order not to discriminate in Choice II between mean reversion and heuristic
types versus subjects that were rational in Choice I, we applied history speciﬁc
stopping rules. Subjects who revealed to be mean reverters in Choice I faced the
exact opposite stopping rule as subjects who were rational in Choice I. Speciﬁcally,
as soon as such a subject chose a ﬁrst-order stochastically dominated asset in a
contingency, no further contingencies with more extreme posteriors were asked
within that domain. Subjects who revealed to be heuristic types in Choice I were
stopped at informative posteriors as soon as they picked the asset of their Choice
I heuristic.
After reporting all Choice II decisions (however many), one of the actually asked
contingencies was randomly drawn for each subject according to the true (condi-
tional) distribution of their respective (half-)diagonals. Each subject was informed
about the outcome of their draw, and the respective investment decision was im-
plemented on their behalf. Then, another four periods of the price processes were
simulated and ﬁnal wealth at t = 10 determined the subjects' payoﬀs from the
experiment.
The realizations of Choice I and Choice II according to the true distributions of
the diagonals guarantees incentive compatibility. Even though the better asset
was randomly pre-speciﬁed for each subject before the experiment, it made sense
to respond to the information that was contained in a contingency's price history,
because more likely histories were drawn with higher probabilities.
There were several reasons to use a strategy method instead of letting subjects
trade in each period. First, it increased comparability between subjects as they
faced more similar decisions despite an individual level outcome randomization.
Second, it gave us more control over the type of states that subjects faced. In
particular, it made sure that we could observe investment decisions in the states
that were relevant in our disposition error analysis for each subject. Third, the
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fact that subjects observed price paths that span several periods instead of only
one whenever they made a decision allowed us to disentangle good news from
gains. For example, a subject's own asset could have experienced two ups and
two downs between periods t = 2 and t = 6 and, therefore, be in gains. At the
same time, the other asset could have had four ups, which is bad news in the
sense that the Bayesian posterior with respect to how good one's own asset is must
have declined. Fourth, observing decisions for various states allowed us to calculate
an empirical disposition eﬀect per subject by weighting these states with their
respective probabilities of occurrence. Furthermore, this weighting allowed us to
distinguish empirical error frequencies from individual error propensities.
As the choices per contingency diﬀered only in their respective price histories,
they must have looked very similar to our subjects. Hence, we faced a tradeoﬀ
between the number of choices per subject and the amount of concentration and
eﬀort our subjects would put into each. Our stopping rules were designed to
reduce the number of decisions per subject without losing relevant observations
by eliminating only those contingencies where there was little doubt about how a
subject would have behaved, given their Choice I.
Using an interim realization of Choice I before proceeding to Choice II instead
of a strategy method with only one realization at the very end guaranteed that
each subject knew for sure which asset they held when it came to Choice II, and
that each subject held an asset that they picked for themselves deliberately. Both
features are crucial properties of real world situations where disposition eﬀects are
observed and are, therefore, incorporated in our experiment. Moreover, it had the
practical advantage of substantially reducing the number of possible contingencies
in Choice II.
Belief Treatments
In our two belief treatments, the baseline experiment was augmented with a be-
lief elicitation. At each investment decision, subjects had to report a probability
estimate of which asset was following which process. More precisely, they had to
report a probability estimate of how likely it was that asset A adhered to process
H. One belief treatment was incentivized, the other one not.
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The incentivization of the belief elicitation was conducted according to the
method of Karni (2009), which is a revelation mechanism for subjective beliefs.
Each participant had to report their subjective probability estimate µ ∈ [0, 1] for
asset A adhering to process H. Then, a random number r was drawn according to
a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. If µ ≥ r, the decision maker received a positive
price P > 0 if A did in fact adhere to process H, and no price otherwise. If instead
µ < r, the decision maker was awarded a lottery with chance r to win P and
chance 1−r to win nothing. We set P = EUR 2 and elicited probabilities on a 5%
grid. The non-incentivized belief elicitation allowed us to control for cross-hedging
between investment choices and probability estimates.
Experimental Conduct
Participants received detailed instructions (see appendix), could start a test-run
of the experiment only after carefully reading the instructions16, and had to com-
plete 9 control questions that were individually checked by the instructors before
the actual experiment was started simultaneously for all participants. After the
experiment, a questionnaire asked for basic demographics, a self-assessment of
risk-preferences, and a simple probability calculation to test for understanding of
Bayes' Rule.
The experiment was conducted in the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Eco-
nomic and Social Sciences (MELESSA) in July 2017. We did 10 sessions with
218 subjects in total: 6 sessions of the baseline treatment with 137 subjects, 2
sessions of the incentivized belief treatment with 40 subjects, and 2 sessions of the
non-incentivized belief treatment with 41 subjects. Most participants were univer-
sity students of various backgrounds, 62.8% were female. Each session took 50 to
60 minutes and our subjects earned EUR 14.69 on average, including a show-up
fee of EUR 4.00. The experiment was programmed in oTree (Chen, Schonger &
Wickens 2016) and organized via ORSEE (Greiner 2015).
16A code was hidden in the instructions which was required by the program-interface for pro-
ceeding to the test-run.
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3.4. Results
3.4.1. First Choice - Initial Asset Purchase
As the disposition eﬀect refers to selling decisions with respect to own assets, it
requires holding an asset in the ﬁrst place. Moreover, as it refers to winning and
losing assets, it requires that own assets have a reference value. Since own assets
are typically acquired by a previous purchase, the purchase price usually serves as
reference value. Our experiment conforms to this convention by letting subjects
purchase an asset in Choice I of the experiment, and allowing them to sell it oﬀ
again in Choice II.
Besides being a prerequisite for the Choice II analysis, Choice I decisions are
interesting to investigate by themselves. As subjects do not yet hold an asset in
Choice I, they should not have any motivated attitudes with respect to any of the
assets. This allows us to test for an irrational belief in mean reversion. Moreover,
Choice I decisions allow for identiﬁcation of price heuristic types, as asset A was
more expensive for all possible histories until t = 2. Table 3.4.1 reports the buying
frequency of each asset in Choice I per Bayesian posterior of asset A adhering to
the high return process, respectively per ∆.
Table 3.4.1.: Buying decisions per Bayesian posterior in Choice I.
Bayesian 30.9% 40.1% 50.0% 59.9% 69.1%
∆ -2 -1 0 1 2
Asset A 29.8% 34.9% 45.9% 63.8% 72.9%
Asset B 66.5% 58.7% 38.5% 28.4% 22.0%
No Asset 3.7% 6.4% 15.6% 7.8% 5.0%
Notes: Percentage share of subjects per asset choice, 218 subjects in total;
∆ as diﬀerence of ups between assets A and B, Bayesian posterior for
asset A adhering to the higher return process.
Table 3.4.1 shows that buying decisions in Choice I closely track the Bayesian
posterior. The percentage shares of subjects investing in asset A resemble the
Bayesian posteriors of asset A being the good asset. Thus, when starting with an
uninformative prior, subjects invest more in an asset if its signal to be the good
asset becomes stronger. This shows that subjects buy the asset that has seen more
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ups (the more so, the larger the diﬀerence in ups). The decision not to invest is
most frequent when the signal, and hence the Bayesian posterior, is uninformative.
As expected, these frequencies decrease with the informativeness of the signal.
Table 3.4.2 reports the buying frequency of each asset in Choice I per Bayesian
posterior, conditional on realization. Realization frequencies per ∆ are reported
as well. When looking only at realized decisions (which are exactly the Choice I
decisions our Choice II analysis is based on), the qualitative pattern remains the
same. In fact, picking the wrong asset is even less common when we only consider
realized (instead of all) decisions.
Table 3.4.2.: Realized asset choices per Bayesian posterior, Choice I.
Bayesian 30.9% 40.1% 50.0% 59.9% 69.1%
∆ -2 -1 0 1 2
Asset A 28.1% 28.6% 48.0% 70.6% 72.4%
Asset B 68.8% 60.7% 38.0% 17.6% 20.7%
No Asset 3.1% 10.7% 14.0% 11.8% 6.9%
Rlz. Frq. 14.7% 25.7% 22.9% 23.4% 13.3%
Notes: Percentage share of subjects per realized asset choice, conditional
on ∆, for 218 subjects in total; Realization frequencies per ∆; ∆ as dif-
ference of ups between assets A and B, Bayesian posterior for asset A
adhering to the higher return process.
Conditional on investing in an asset, a binomial test per ∆ reveals that subjects
systematically buy the asset that has seen more ups for any informative posterior
(∆ = −2: p = 0.0000, ∆ = −1: p = 0.0004, ∆ = 1: p = 0.0000, ∆ = 2:
p = 0.0000). Moreover, buying behavior cannot be distinguished from random
choice when the Bayesian posterior is uninformative (∆ = 0: p = 0.2688).
Result 1 (Rational Behavior in Choice I). If signals are informative, subjects buy
the asset that is more likely to adhere to the higher return process, according to the
Bayesian posterior. The frequency of subjects buying a given asset monotonically
increases in its Bayesian posterior of being the good one. The frequency of subjects
not investing is highest when the Bayesian posterior is uninformative and decreases
with the informativeness of the Bayesian posterior. If signals (i.e. the Bayesian
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posteriors) are uninformative, subjects' buying decisions cannot be distinguished
from random choice.
Result 1 shows that Choice I behavior is mostly rational, i.e. in line with Predic-
tion 6. Per reverse conclusion, it is inconsistent with two potential other explana-
tions. First, Result 1 is inconsistent with a price heuristic, which would predict a
ﬂat relationship between investments in a given asset and the Bayesian posteriors
(Prediction 8). Second, Result 1 is inconsistent with an irrational belief in mean
reversion, which would predict that subjects buy the asset that has seen more
downs, and the more so the larger the diﬀerence in downs (Prediction 7). As this
is the exact opposite of the Bayesian prediction, it is inconsistent with our Choice
I ﬁnding.
Notice that Result 1 rejects an irrational belief in mean reversion as a potential
explanation solely based on behavior. So far, the literature has mostly tried to
disentangle this prominent belief-based explanation through stated beliefs, despite
the frequently discussed problems that are associated with belief elicitation. An
exception is Weber & Camerer (1998), who also try to identify it by investigating
buying decisions. However, as they look at averages of buying decisions over all
investment periods (and because their investments do not have a binary nature),
their measure is confounded by subjects' motivated attitudes towards assets they
already hold. In contrast, by considering the ﬁrst investment decision only, we iso-
late buying decisions that are not yet motivated by previous behavior. This feature
allows us to cleanly reject a belief in mean reversion as potential explanation.
3.4.2. Second Choice - Keep or Switch
The analysis of this section is based on all subjects who invested in one of the
risky assets in their realized Choice I contingency, and thus n = 196. Table 3.4.3
presents the empirical distribution of subjects' Choice II decisions conditional on
whether these choices violate the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance property. For
instance, aG expresses the average subject's probability that a gain state realizes,
where she keeps her asset and keeping it is ﬁrst-order stochastically dominated.
Table 3.4.3 shows that subjects typically invest in one of the assets: across both
domains, the proportion of no investments taking place is only 4.93%. Table 3.4.3
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Table 3.4.3.: Empirical distribution of asset choices per benchmark
Gains (G) First-order First-order No ﬁrst-order
Losses (L) violation if keep violation if switch violation
Choice: aG = 0.0705 bG = 0.3870 cG = 0.0636
keep asset aL = 0.0673 bL = 0.0553 cL = 0.0351
Choice: dG = 0.0437 eG = 0.0534 fG = 0.0369
switch asset dL = 0.0999 eL = 0.0101 fL = 0.0279
Choice: gG = 0.0061 hG = 0.0152 iG = 0.0141
don't invest gL = 0.0024 hL = 0.0059 iL = 0.0056
Notes: The stated proportions approximate the empirical distribution when ab-
stracting away from the strategy method, meaning they incorporate the frequency
with which certain events happen. For example, aG expresses the average subject's
probability that a gain state realizes, where she keeps her asset when keeping it
violates the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance property. Likewise, bL measures the
average subject's probability that a loss state realizes, where she keeps her asset
and keeping it does not violate ﬁrst-order dominance. The fourth column (No
ﬁrst-order violation) represents all choices made for uninformative Bayesian pos-
teriors, where ﬁrst-order dominance violations do not exist. The table excludes all
subjects who did not invest in their ﬁrst choice realization, so that n = 196. Let
domain i ∈ {G,L}, then ∑i ai + bi + ci + di + ei + fi + gi + hi + ii = 1.
also shows that across both domains, the proportion of states in which ﬁrst-order
violations are not possible is 21.28%. These are all the states in which the Bayesian
posterior is uninformative (∆ = 0). While these states will become important for
the discrimination of subjects' underlying motives, states in which no action is
erroneous cannot contribute to our error analysis of this section. Similarly, the
action of not investing is never a ﬁrst-order violation, and cannot contribute to
our error analysis. Therefore, we exclude the last column and the last row of Table
3.4.3 from the subsequent analysis.
Table 3.4.4 normalizes the proportions of Table 3.4.3 separately for gains and
losses. In each domain, assets are either realized (i.e., switched) or not realized
(i.e., kept). Whether or not these assets should be realized is fully determined
by the property of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. Thus, whenever an action
contradicts what should be done, we identify it as erroneous behavior. Notice that
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such erroneous behavior constitutes the lower bound of possible mistakes that can
be made as it only requires monotonicity and allows for any risk attitudes.
Table 3.4.4.: Asset choice per benchmark, normal-
ized in gains and losses
Gains (G)
Asset should Asset should not
be realized be realized
Asset is
αG = 0.0788 βG = 0.0963
realized
Asset is not
γG = 0.1271 δG = 0.6978
realized
Losses (L)
Asset should Asset should not
be realized be realized
Asset is
αL = 0.4295 βL = 0.0434
realized
Asset is not
γL = 0.2893 δG = 0.2378
realized
Notes: Table 3.4.4 normalizes the proportions of Ta-
ble 3.4.3 separately for gains and losses and without
uninformative states or riskless choices.
There are two ways to interpret the deﬁnition of the disposition eﬀect. First,
an asset based view that refers to the disposition of winning assets to be sold too
early and of losing assets to be held too long. Second, an investor based view that
refers to the disposition of investors to sell their winning assets too early and to
hold their losing assets too long. The following analysis considers both.
In order to determine the erroneous disposition eﬀect, we ﬁrst need to look
at what should be done, i.e., the rational benchmark. Under the asset based
interpretation, the proportions of gains and losses that should be realized can be
directly inferred from Table 3.4.4:
PGSR = αG + γG = 0.2059 and PLSR = αL + γL = 0.7188.
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As stated in Predictions 1 and 2, erroneous disposition-prone behavior in both
domains requires PGR to be larger than PGSR and PLR to be lower than PLSR.
However, we ﬁnd that
PGR = αG + βG = 0.1751 and PLR = αL + βL = 0.4729.
Under the investor based interpretation, we cannot use Table 3.4.4 as it already
shows averages. Here, we need to construct Tables 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 separately for
each subject in order to calculate individual-speciﬁc measures of PGSR/PLSR and
PGR/PLR. When doing so, we ﬁnd that the average subject's proportions of gains
and losses that should be realized are
PGSR = 0.2534 and PLSR = 0.6570,
whereas the average subject's proportions of gains and losses that are realized are
PGR = 0.1946 and PLR = 0.4691.
The corresponding diﬀerences are in line with the asset based interpretation: We
ﬁnd that DEL = PLSR−PLR = 0.1879 still represents a substantial and highly
signiﬁcant diﬀerence (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.0000), while DEG =
PGR − PGSR = −0.0588 becomes slightly more negative and is signiﬁcant as
well (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.0277).17 Thus, using the average of each
subject's individual-speciﬁc disposition eﬀect allows us to draw the same conclusion
as under the asset based interpretation.
Result 2 (Disposition Eﬀect within Domains). At an aggregate level, the disposi-
tion eﬀect exists in losses, but not in gains, i.e. DEL > 0 and DEG < 0.
Interestingly, we observe the disposition eﬀect only in losses. That is, Prediction
2 is conﬁrmed, but Prediction 1 is neglected. However, since Result 2 is derived at
an aggregate level, we can neither conclude that subjects have a larger propensity
17By the commutative and distributive law, it becomes irrelevant whether we ﬁrst calculate each
subject's disposition eﬀect and then take the average over all subjects or whether we ﬁrst
average over all subjects' PGSR/PLSR and PGR/PLR and then calculate the disposition
eﬀect.
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for keep than switch violations in losses, nor can we say that subjects make less
violations in gains. The reason is that keep (switch) violations contribute to the
disposition eﬀect in losses (gains), whereas switch (keep) violations counteract it.
Hence, the aggregate level is too crude to draw conclusions on individual error
propensities. However, our individual choice data allows us to derive these indi-
vidual errors, which we do next. They will inform us about underlying mechanisms
of the disposition eﬀect.
For each subject, we can calculate an individual propensity to make a speciﬁc
error in a given domain. In doing so, we draw on each subject's individual Table
3.4.4 entries again, and denote these entries correspondingly by αiG,L, β
i
G,L, γ
i
G,L,
and δiG,L for subject i = 1, 2, . . . , n. In the gain domain, we ﬁnd that the average
subject's propensity for switch violations is 19.13% ( 1
n
∑
i
βiG
βiG+δ
i
G
), whereas the
propensity for keep violations is 46.34% ( 1
n
∑
i
γiG
γiG+α
i
G
). This diﬀerence is highly
signiﬁcant (Mann-Whitney-U test, p = 0.0000). With respect to losses, a similar
picture emerges. Here, the propensity for switch violations is 16.44% ( 1
n
∑
i
βiL
βiL+δ
i
L
)
and that for keep violations 34.66% ( 1
n
∑
i
γiL
γiL+α
i
L
), again a diﬀerence that is highly
signiﬁcant (Mann-Whitney-U test, p = 0.00002).18
Result 3 (Error Propensities within Domains). Subjects' propensity not to realize
when they should (keep violations) is substantially higher than their propensity
to realize when they should not (switch violations), both in gains and losses, i.e.
KVG > SV G and KV L > SV L.
Result 3 is consistent with Prediction 5, i.e. with a motivated beliefs explanation.
It rejects Prediction 4, i.e. a mechanical belief in mean reversion. Moreover, it is
only partly consistent with Prediction 3, i.e. with realization utility. Precisely, it
is consistent with SV L < KV L, but not with KVG < SV G.
18Rather than looking at subjects' error propensities, we can also investigate the empirical
likelihood of certain errors in a given domain. Table 3.4.4 shows that in gains the likelihood
for switch violations is 12.13% ( βGβG+δG ), whereas the likelihood for keep violations is 61.73%
( γGγG+αG ). With respect to losses, Table 3.4.4 shows that the likelihood for switch violations
is 15.43% ( βLβL+δL ) and that for keep violations 40.25% (
γL
γL+αL
). While this ﬁnding shows
the robustness of Result 3, it cannot inform us about underlying mechanisms of why subjects
behave this way. Therefore, we restrict our attention to subjects' error propensities in the
following analysis.
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Result 3 is surprising. It shows that holding the asset for too long (rather
than realizing too soon) is the predominant error subjects make in both domains.
Notice, however, that there is a subtle property of our experimental design that
mechanically increases the propensity of keep violations versus switch violations
in gains, and of switch violations versus keep violations in losses. This mechanical
eﬀect ampliﬁed the observed diﬀerence of Result 3 in gains, but attenuated it in
losses. The reason is the following: There are more loss than gain states where
holding on to the asset violates ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. Since these ad-
ditional states are more informative, holding on implies a more severe violation
than in the other states. As a result, even if a subject's bias for keep violations
was the same across gains and losses (when holding informativeness constant), we
would observe a larger propensity for keep violations in gains than losses. The re-
verse argument can be made for switch violations, since there are more gain than
loss states where realizing the asset violates ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. The
fact that switch violations are more severe in these states dampens the propensity
measure in gains compared to losses. These mechanical forces may explain why,
contrary to intuition, we observe a somewhat larger propensity for keep violations
in gains than losses.
In order to control for these mechanical forces, we need to compare states with
the same informativeness. On that behalf, we restrict attention to a sub-sample of
subjects that invested in one of the assets in both gain and loss states that have
an informativeness of |∆| = 1. This sub-sample consists of 98 subjects. Using
this sub-sample, we ﬁnd that in gains, subjects' propensity for switch violations
is 22.45% and for keep violations 38.78%. In losses, the propensity for switch
violations is 18.37% and the propensity for keep violations is 34.69%. Notice
ﬁrst that Result 3 still holds: In gains, the propensity for keep violations is 1.70
times larger than the propensity for switch violations, which is a signiﬁcant dif-
ference (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.0048). In losses, keep violations have a
propensity that is 1.88 times larger than the propensity of switch violations. This
diﬀerence is again signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.0063). The factor
with which the propensity for keep violations exceeds that for switch violations is
similar in gains and losses. Therefore, Result 3 is not due to a mechanical design
feature of our experiment. Second, notice that we can neither ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
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diﬀerence between keep violations in gains and losses (Wilcoxon signed rank test,
p = 0.4236), nor between switch violations in gains and losses (Wilcoxon signed
rank test, p = 0.2669).
Result 4 (Domain Parity of Error Propensities). The propensity neither of keep
nor of switch violations is diﬀerent between gains and losses, i.e. KVG = KV L
and SV G = SV L.
Result 4 is consistent with Prediction 5, i.e. with a motivated beliefs explanation,
as well as with Prediction 4, i.e. a mechanical belief in mean reversion. However,
it is inconsistent with Prediction 3, i.e. with realization utility. Precisely, it is
inconsistent with SV L < SV G and with KVG < KV L.
Results 3 and 4 show that the propensity for keep violations is larger than
the propensity for switch violations and that these propensities are equal across
domains. This poses the question of how this pattern in propensities is consistent
with Result 2, which identiﬁed a sizable disposition eﬀect in losses, but a much
smaller negative disposition eﬀect in gains. However, as mentioned above, the
aggregate disposition eﬀect is not only driven by subjects' propensities to make
certain errors in given domains, but also by the frequencies with which these errors
are possible. These frequencies have the potential to generate a disposition eﬀect
even without subjects' propensity for disposition-prone behavior.
In our experiment, keeping the asset is often a violation in losses, but rarely in
gains. Switching is often a violation in gains, but rarely in losses.19 This reﬂects
the fact that gains and good news respectively losses and bad news are not fully
orthogonal, i.e. that asset prices carry at least some information. Regardless of the
fact that error propensities are indistinguishable across domains, these frequency
diﬀerences promote keep violations in losses relative to gains and switch violations
in gains relative to losses. And as keep violations have a larger propensity than
switch violations, Result 2 is in fact consistent with Results 3 and 4.
19In our experiment, keeping the asset is a violation in 20.59% (αG + γG) of the gains and in
71.88% (αL + γL) of the losses. By contrast, switching is a violation in 79.41% (βG + δG) of
the gains and in 28.12% (βL + δL) of the losses. The same results obtain using our subject-
rather than state-based measure. Here, keep violations occur in 25.34% ( 1n
∑
i α
i
G + γ
i
G) of
the gains and in 65.70% ( 1n
∑
i α
i
L + γ
i
L) of the losses, and switch violations occur in 74.66%
( 1n
∑
i β
i
G + δ
i
G) of the gains and 34.30% (
1
n
∑
i β
i
L + δ
i
L) of the losses.
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This becomes even more apparent by two other observations. First, the like-
lihood that an error of any type is made is higher in losses (33.28% = βL + γL)
than in gains (22.34% = βG + γG).
20 This reﬂects the fact that keep violations
have a higher propensity than switch violations, while they are possible more of-
ten in losses than in gains. Second, conditional on making an error, it is likely to
contribute to the disposition eﬀect in losses, because keep violations contribute to
the disposition eﬀect in losses and are frequently possible. In contrast, we would
expect a more balanced picture in gains, as keep violations contradict the dis-
position eﬀect, but are rarely possible. This is exactly what we ﬁnd: In losses,
86.95% ( γL
βL+γL
) of all errors contribute to the disposition eﬀect and only 13.05%
( βL
βL+γL
) counteract it, whereas in gains, 43.1% ( βG
βG+γG
) of all errors contribute to
the disposition eﬀect and 56.9% ( γG
βG+γG
) counteract it.21
3.4.3. Robustness Treatment - Belief Elicitation
Our beliefs treatment serves as a robustness check for our conjecture that the
disposition errors are more consistent with a biased beliefs explanation than with
non-standard preferences. We show that our participants' subjective beliefs de-
viated from the Bayesian benchmark, and that actual investment decisions were
mostly in line with these distorted beliefs. In particular, we ﬁnd that most dispo-
sition errors were not perceived as such.
Choice I Beliefs and Decisions
All participants were informed in the instructions that the assignment of processes
H and L to assets A and B was randomly determined by the toss of a fair coin.
Therefore, we assume that they had a prior belief of 50% for asset A to adhere to
process H in period t = 0. In Choice I, i.e. after observing price paths for two
20The population average of the overall error propensity per investor is 29.24% in gains and
25.55% in losses. However, this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant according to a Mann-Whitney-U
test (p = 0.4916).
21The investor based interpretation of the disposition eﬀect is in line with these ﬁndings: The
population average of the share in errors that contribute to the disposition eﬀect is 33.83% in
gains and 79.75% in losses. Both are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 50% (Wilcoxon signed rank
test, p = 0.0024 respectively p = 0.0063).
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periods, each subject had to report their beliefs for all 5 Bayesian posteriors that
could possibly materialize after these two periods.
The average of all subjective beliefs was less than 1% below the average of all
Bayesian posteriors, so that the subjective beliefs seem to be almost accurate at
ﬁrst glance. However, a closer look reveals that information was under-appreciated
on average, i.e. subjective beliefs were tilted towards 50% relative to the Bayesian
benchmark. This implies that our subjects under-estimated the better asset and
overestimated the worse asset on average. Table 3.4.5 summarizes the average
subjective beliefs per Bayesian posterior (for asset A adhering to process H). The
big standard deviations illustrate that individual beliefs were often far oﬀ, even
though the averages were reasonably close to the Bayesian benchmark.
Table 3.4.5.: Average subjective belief per Bayesian posterior in Choice I.
Bayesian posterior (in %) 30.9 40.1 50.0 59.9 69.1 Any
∅ Subjective belief (in %) 34.4 41.9 49.9 55.9 63.6 49.1
(Std. Deviation) 19.6 16.4 14.5 15.6 17.2 19.6
Notes: 405 observations from 81 subjects
Investment decisions in Choice I were mostly aligned with subjective beliefs: only
15.4% of the decisions for a risky asset in contingencies with non-50% subjective
belief were contradicting the belief.22 On the contrary, 30.1% of the decisions for a
risky asset in contingencies with informative Bayesian posterior were contradicting
the Bayesian.
A regression analysis conﬁrms that subjective beliefs explain the observed de-
cisions very well, whereas the Bayesian posteriors do less so. We estimated a
linear probability model for the likelihood to choose asset A instead of B based on
the subjective beliefs and Bayesian posteriors, and we ﬁnd that the former had a
highly signiﬁcant eﬀect, whereas the latter did not.23 Hence, it suﬃces to restrict
the analysis to subjective beliefs alone, which neither aﬀects the marginal eﬀects
22A risky asset was chosen in 376 of 405 observed Choice I decisions in the beliefs treatment,
subjects had non-50% beliefs in 311 thereof, and chose the asset they perceived as better in
263 of these.
23Surprisingly, multi-collinearity is not an issue by usual VIF tests.
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nor the explanatory power of the model.24 Table 3.4.6 summarizes the regression
results.
Table 3.4.6.: Regression: choice of asset A (likelihood) on
subjective beliefs dummies
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept 16.3399 3.1078 5.26 0.0000
Belief > 50% 69.1032 4.3602 15.85 0.0000
Belief = 50% 49.8140 5.6915 8.75 0.0000
Notes: Belief smaller 50% is the omitted category.
The omitted category of this estimation are subjective beliefs smaller 50%.
Hence, when subjective beliefs for asset A to be the better one were smaller 50%,
subjects chose asset A with only 16.3% probability; when subjective beliefs were
equal 50%, they chose asset A with 16.3%+49.8%=66.1% probability; and when
beliefs were higher than 50%, they chose asset A with 16.3%+69.1%=85.4% prob-
ability. That is, they chose the subjectively worse asset in 16.3% of the situations
where A was subjectively worse, and in 14.6% of the situations where asset B was
subjectively worse. A Wald test shows that these are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
(p-value 0.56).
On average, our subjects overestimated the asset they chose by 6.3%. This is
surprising at ﬁrst, as conservatism implies that they underestimated the better
asset on average, and alignment of choices and beliefs implies that they typically
chose the asset that they regarded higher. However, in 60 out of 324 informative
states, our subjects updated their beliefs in the wrong direction and it is mostly
these decisions that drove this counter-intuitive ﬁnding.25
Subjective beliefs in Choice I were not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by whether they were
incentivized or not (p-value Kolmogorov Smirnov test 0.16, p-value Wilcoxon rank
24The opposite restriction on Bayesian posteriors alone establishes signiﬁcant coeﬃcients as well,
but has a much lower explanatory power: The R2 of the beliefs regression is 0.4067, the R2
of the Bayesian posteriors regression is 0.1284.
25The subjects who updated in the wrong direction and then chose the subjectively better asset
overestimated their asset a lot (approximately twice the information), whereas the usual
conservative subjects underestimated their asset only a little bit (approximately one quarter
the information).
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sum test 0.50), and neither were the investment decisions (p-value Kolmogorov
Smirnov test 1.00, p-value Wilcoxon rank sum test 0.90). Restricting the sample
to the actually realized decisions does not qualitatively aﬀect any of the above
ﬁndings.
Choice II Beliefs and Decisions
In our analysis of Choice II beliefs, we restrict the sample to the subjects who
actually held a risky asset after the Choice I realization. These were 75 of 81
subjects in the beliefs treatment. Moreover, we re-normalize our subjects' beliefs
from asset A to their own asset adhering to process H.
As in Choice I, the average of all subjective beliefs was less than 1% below the
average of all Bayesian beliefs in Choice II. However, this is only coincidental as
Choice II beliefs resulted both from biased priors and mistaken updating. Ta-
ble 3.4.7 summarizes the average self-reported subjective beliefs per (objective)
Bayesian posterior in Choice II as well as the average subjective Bayesian poste-
riors (for the own asset adhering to process H) that were derived by Bayesian
updating of the subjective priors. The latter are considerably above the true pos-
teriors, which reﬂects the fact that the subjective priors were upward-biased on
average. Moreover, they substantially deviate from the subjective beliefs, which
shows that information was not processed correctly. The big standard deviations
illustrate that individual beliefs were often far oﬀ, even though the averages were
reasonably close to the Bayesian benchmark.
Investment decisions in Choice II were mostly aligned with subjective beliefs,
but less so than in Choice I: 23.0% of the decisions for a risky asset in contingencies
with non-50% subjective belief were contradicting the belief.26 On the contrary,
35.1% of the decisions for a risky asset in contingencies with informative Bayesian
posterior were contradicting the Bayesian.
A regression analysis conﬁrms that subjective beliefs explain the observed deci-
sions very well, whereas the Bayesian posteriors do less so. We estimated a linear
probability model for the likelihood to keep one's own asset instead of switching
26A risky asset was chosen in 484 of 526 observed Choice II decisions of asset holders in the beliefs
treatment, subjects had non-50% beliefs in 396 thereof, and chose the asset they perceived
as better in 305 of these.
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Table 3.4.7.: Average subjective belief and subjective Bayesian posterior
per objective Bayesian posterior in Choice II.
Bayesian posterior (in %) <23 30.9 40.1 50.0 59.9 >69 Any
∅ Subjective belief (in %) 24.1 39.9 39.8 48.4 57.0 65.9 47.2
(Std. Deviation) 23.1 23.1 19.0 15.1 16.5 18.1 20.6
∅ Subjective Bayesian (in %) 33.4 45.3 50.2 57.7 65.4 75.3 56.2
(Std. Deviation) 24.4 19.9 16.4 14.9 13.7 9.9 18.8
# Observations 35 45 135 144 132 35 526
Notes: 526 observations from 75 subjects.
to the other based on the information in the subjective beliefs and Bayesian
posteriors, and we ﬁnd that the former had a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect, whereas
the latter did not.27 Hence, it suﬃces to restrict the analysis to subjective beliefs
alone, which neither aﬀects the marginal eﬀects nor the explanatory power of the
model.28 Table 3.4.8 summarizes the regression results.
Table 3.4.8.: Regression: choice of own asset (likelihood)
on subjective beliefs dummies for own asset
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept 33.1839 2.7833 11.92 0.0000
Belief > 50% 56.9896 4.2109 13.53 0.0000
Belief = 50% 37.2707 5.2323 7.12 0.0000
Notes: Belief smaller 50% is the omitted category.
The omitted category of this estimation are subjective beliefs smaller 50%.
Hence, when subjective beliefs for the own asset to be the better one were smaller
50%, subjects chose asset A with 33.2% probability; when subjective beliefs were
equal 50%, they chose asset A with 33.2%+37.3%=70.5% probability; and when
27Again, multi-collinearity is not an issue by usual VIF tests.
28The opposite restriction on Bayesian posteriors alone establishes signiﬁcant coeﬃcients as well,
but has a much lower explanatory power: The R2 of the beliefs regression is 0.2797, the R2
of the Bayesian posteriors regression is 0.0840.
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beliefs were higher than 50%, they chose asset A with 33.2%+57.0%=90.2% prob-
ability. That is, they kept their own asset in 33.2% of the situations where they
perceived it to be the worse one, and switched to the other asset in 9.8% of the
situations where they perceived their own asset to be the better one. A Wald test
shows that the former likelihood is signiﬁcantly bigger than the latter (p-value
0.00).
Again, subjective beliefs were not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by whether they were
incentivized or not (p-value Kolmogorov Smirnov test 0.38, p-value Wilcoxon rank
sum test 0.26), and neither were the investment decisions (p-value Kolmogorov
Smirnov test 0.68, p-value Wilcoxon rank sum test 0.14).
Last but not least, we investigate those decisions that entailed disposition er-
rors, i.e. ﬁrst-order violations. In order to do so, we distinguish actual ﬁrst-order
violation, i.e. choices that contradicted the Bayesian, from perceived ﬁrst-order
violations, i.e. choices that contradicted the subjective belief. Table 3.4.9 summa-
rizes the actual and perceived ﬁrst-order violations for keep and switch errors in
gains and losses.
Table 3.4.9.: Actual, perceived, and both actual and perceived disposition errors.
Actual Perceived Both Both/Actual
Keep Violation in Gains 52 27 18 34.6%
Keep Violation in Losses 72 40 29 40.3%
Switch Violation in Gains 38 15 4 10.5%
Switch Violation in Losses 28 9 5 17.9%
Any Violation 190 91 56 29.5%
Overall, we observed 190 actual ﬁrst-order violations among the 526 decisions in
Choice II of the beliefs treatment, but only 91 perceived violations. Moreover, only
56 violations were both perceived and actual, i.e. only 29.5% of all actual violations
were perceived as such. This means that our subjects were mostly unaware of
their disposition errors, which suggests that these were driven by distorted beliefs
rather than non-standard preferences. Speciﬁcally, only 33 of the 56 perceived
actual violations were keep errors in losses or switch errors in gains, which are the
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violations that are consistent with realization utility. On the other hand, 77 of the
non-perceived actual violations were keep violations in gains or losses, which are
the violations that are consistent with motivated beliefs. Hence, more than twice
as many violations can be rationalized by motivated beliefs than by realization
utility. (40.5% respectively 17.4% of all observed violations.)
3.5. Conclusion
This paper uses a novel experimental design to decompose the disposition eﬀect
along two dimensions. The ﬁrst decomposition allows us to identify an erroneous
disposition eﬀect separately for gains and losses. Here, we ﬁnd that a disposition
eﬀect exists in losses but not in gains. However, this aggregate measure is still
too crude to inform us about subjects' propensities to make certain errors. And
because these error propensities are crucial for the identiﬁcation of the underlying
mechanisms at work, we further decompose the erroneous disposition eﬀect in its
two opposing error types (i.e. switch and keep violations). Here, we ﬁnd that
subjects have a larger propensity for keep than switch violations in both gains
and losses. Moreover, subjects' propensity for a given violation is the same across
domains.
These ﬁndings are consistent with models of motivated beliefs, but inconsistent
with either a model of realization utility or an irrational belief in mean reversion.
Our theoretical conclusions are further supported when investigating assets' initial
purchase decision as well as by a robustness treatment that additionally elicits
subjects' beliefs.
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A. Appendix to Chapter 1:
Motivation by Naïveté
A.1. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
The implicit function theorem yields
gˆx(x) =
−uy,x(x, gˆ(x))
uy,y(x, gˆ(x))
.
By strict concavity of u(., .) (in its second component), the denominator is always
strictly negative. Hence, sgn(gˆx) = sgn(ux,y).
Proof of Lemma 2.
(i) Follows from gˆ = g for βˆ = β and (ii).
(ii) Diﬀerentiating (1.1) with respect to βˆ yields
uy(x, gˆ(x)) + βˆuy,y(x, gˆ(x))gˆβˆ(x) = 0.
Rearranging yields
gˆβˆ(x) =
−uy(x, gˆ(x))
βˆuy,y(x, gˆ(x))
.
Assumption 1 implies gˆβˆ(x) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.
By the second order condition (1.3), perceived marginal utility of stage one in-
vestment x is decreasing in x. Hence, for an increase in the degree of naïveté βˆ,
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the ﬁrst order condition (1.2) is balanced by an increase/decrease in x if and only
if perceived marginal utility of stage one investment x is increasing/decreasing in
naïveté βˆ.
∂
∂βˆ
[−1− βgˆx(x) + βux(x, gˆ(x)) + βuy(x, gˆ(x))gˆx(x)]
=− βgˆx,βˆ(x) + βux,y(x, gˆ(x))gˆβˆ(x) + βuy,y(x, gˆ(x))gˆβˆ(x)gˆx(x)
+ βuy(x, gˆ(x))gˆx,βˆ(x)
=β
[(
1
βˆ
− 1
)
gˆx,βˆ(x) + ux,y(x, gˆ(x))gˆβˆ(x) + uy,y(x, gˆ(x))gˆβˆ(x)gˆx(x)
]
=β
(
1
βˆ
− 1
)
gˆx,βˆ(x)
The last equality uses gˆx(x) =
−uy,x(x,gˆ(x))
uy,y(x,gˆ(x))
.
Proof of Corollary 1.
We can calculate gˆx,βˆ as follows.
gˆx,βˆ(x) =
∂
∂βˆ
gˆx(x)
=
uy,x(x, gˆ(x))uy,y,y(x, gˆ(x))gˆβˆ(x)− uy,x,y(x, gˆ(x))gˆβˆ(x)uy,y(x, gˆ(x))
uy,y(x, gˆ(x))2
Lemma 2 and Assumption 1, immediately imply sgn(gˆx,βˆ) = sgn(uy,y,yuy,x −
uy,x,yuy,y). Rearranging the expression yields the result.
Proof of Proposition 2.
∂
∂βˆ
W =
∂
∂βˆ
β [−x− g(x) + u(x, g(x))]
= β
[
−xβˆ − gx(x)xβˆ + ux(x, g(x))xβˆ + uy(x, g(x))gx(x)xβˆ
]
= βxβˆ [−1− gx(x) + ux(x, g(x)) + uy(x, g(x))gx(x)]
= xβˆ {(1− β) + [−1 + (1− β)gx(x) + βux(x, g(x))]} (A.1)
As the term in square brackets denotes the ﬁrst order condition of the fully so-
phisticated individual, it vanishes for x = xFS and the remaining term (1 − β) is
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strictly larger than zero for β < 1. The result obtains.
A.2. Cross-Validation of the Example
(Cobb-Douglas Functions)
Let u(x, y) := αxµyν be a Cobb-Douglas utility function of homogeneity smaller
one, i.e. α, µ, ν > 0 and µ + ν < 1. First, we check Assumption 1. As u(x, y) is
a power-function both in x and y, it is inﬁnitely often continuously diﬀerentiable
with respect to x and y for all x, y > 0. Also, it is non-negative for all x, y ≥ 0,
because α > 0.
The partial derivatives of u(x, y) are strictly positive for all x, y > 0. In fact,
ux(x, y) = αµx
µ−1yν > 0 and uy(x, y) = ανxµyν−1 > 0 for all x, y > 0. Hence,
all directional derivatives (in positive directions) in the interior of the positive
quadrant are strictly positive as well. In particular, for v := (a, b), the directional
derivative at (x, y) with x, y > 0 in the direction of v is
d
dv
u(x, y) =
d
dt
u(x+ ta, y + tb)
||(a, b)||
∣∣∣∣
t=0
=
aux(x+ ta, y + tb)|t=0 + buy(x+ ta, y + tb)|t=0√
a2 + b2
=
aux(x, y) + buy(x, y)√
a2 + b2
= αxµ−1yν−1
aµy + bνx√
a2 + b2
,
which is larger zero for all a, b > 0, i.e. in all positive directions. Here, it is easy
to see why u(x, y) for µ + ν = 1 is linear. In fact, when taking the derivative at
(x, y) in the direction of v := (x, y), i.e. when taking a cut of u(., .) across the
origin, and denoting λ := y
x
, we get
d
dv
u(x, y) = αxµ−1yν−1
xµy + yνx√
x2 + y2
= αxµyν
µ+ ν√
x2 + y2
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= αλνxµ+ν
µ+ ν
x
√
1 + λ2
=
αλν√
1 + λ2
,
which is independent of x (and, hence, of y), i.e. constant, and depends solely on
the angle of the cut and the function parameters. Notice that for µ = ν = 1
2
, the
slope of the curve in direction of (x, y) is equal to the slope in direction of (y, x),
i.e., that the above expression remains unchanged when λ is replaced by 1
λ
. That
is, u(., ) is symmetric with respect to the bisection line of the positive quadrant
for µ = ν = 1
2
. Further, notice that d
dv
u(1, 1) = α√
2
for all µ, ν > 0 with µ+ ν = 1.
To see strict concavity of u(x, y), we need the second partial derivatives.
ux,x(x, y) = αµ(µ− 1)xµ−2yν < 0
ux,y(x, y) = uy,x(x, y) = αµνx
µ−1yν−1 > 0
uy,y(x, y) = αν(ν − 1)xµyν−2 < 0
Notice that ux,y = uy,x always holds by equality of mixed partials (Schwarz' Theo-
rem). By deﬁnition, u(x, y) is strictly concave when its Hessian is negative deﬁnite,
i.e. its ﬁrst minor ux,x(x, y) is negative, and its second minor, the determinant, is
positive. The former is already checked. For the latter, see the following.
detHu =
∣∣∣∣∣u1,1(x, y) u1,2(x, y)u2,1(x, y) u2,2(x, y)
∣∣∣∣∣
= u1,1(x, y)u2,2(x, y)− u1,2(x, y)u2,1(x, y)
= α2µνx2µ−2y2ν−2 [(µ− 1)(ν − 1)− µν]
= α2µνx2µ−2y2ν−2 [1− µ− ν] > 0
To explicitly calculate the perceived reaction function gˆ(x) of stage two investment
conditional on stage one investment x, we have to solve the stage two optimization
problem.
max
y
Uˆ2 = max
y
−y + βˆu(x, y) = max
y
−y + βˆαxµyν
76
A.2. Cross-Validation of the Example
FOC : −1 + βˆανxµyν−1 != 0
⇔ gˆ(x) := y =
(
βˆανxµ
) 1
1−ν
The partial derivatives with respect to x and βˆ as well as the cross-derivative gˆx,βˆ
readily obtain. In order to calculate the actual stage one investment x, we have to
solve the stage one optimization problem.
max
x
U1 = max
x
−x− βgˆ(x) + βu(x, gˆ(x))
= max
x
−x− β
(
βˆανxµ
) 1
1−ν
+ βαxµ
(
βˆανxµ
) ν
1−ν
= max
x
−x+ β
(
βˆν
) ν
1−ν
α
1
1−ν x
µ
1−ν
(
1− βˆν
)
FOC : 1
!
= β
(
βˆν
) ν
1−ν
α
1
1−ν
µ
1− ν x
µ+ν−1
1−ν
(
1− βˆν
)
⇔ x =
(
βˆ
ν
1−ν
1− βˆν
1− ν
) 1−ν
1−ν−µ
µ
1−ν
1−ν−µα
1
1−ν−µν
ν
1−ν−µβ
1−ν
1−ν−µ
To see that x is increasing in βˆ, we could calculate the partial derivative xβˆ. In
fact, it suﬃces to calculate the partial derivative of the left bracket alone, as the
right terms are only constant, positive multipliers, i.e. independent of βˆ, and its
exponent is positive. Therefore, I denote f(βˆ) := βˆ
ν
1−ν 1−βˆν
1−ν .
∂
∂βˆ
f(βˆ) =
∂
∂βˆ
βˆ
ν
1−ν
1− βˆν
1− ν
=
ν
1− ν βˆ
2ν−1
1−ν
1− βˆν
1− ν + βˆ
ν
1−ν
−ν
1− ν
=
ν
1− ν βˆ
ν
1−ν
(
1− βˆν
βˆ − βˆν − 1
)
> 0 ∀ βˆ < 1
For βˆ = 1, fβˆ(βˆ) = 0 holds. Hence, stage one investment x is strictly increasing
in naïveté βˆ up until full naïveté.
To calculate the decision maker's welfare, we plug in x and g(x) in the deﬁnition
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of W := U0.
W = (αµµνν)
1
1−ν−µ β
(1−ν)(ν+µ)−µν
(1−ν)(1−ν−µ) ·(
βˆ
ν
1−ν
1− βˆν
1− ν
) µ
1−ν−µ
[
1− µβ 1−2ν1−ν
(
βˆ
ν
1−ν
1− βˆν
1− ν
)
− νβ
]
= (αµµνν)
1
1−ν−µ β
(1−ν)(ν+µ)−µν
(1−ν)(1−ν−µ) f(βˆ)
µ
1−ν−µ
[
1− µβ 1−2ν1−ν f(βˆ)− νβ
]
Again, the ﬁrst multipliers are strictly positive and can be ignored in determining
the sign of the partial derivative.
∂
∂βˆ
f(βˆ)
µ
1−ν−µ
[
1− µβ 1−2ν1−ν f(βˆ)− νβ
]
=
µ
1− ν − µf(βˆ)
µ
1−ν−µfβˆ(βˆ)
[
1− νβ
f(βˆ)
− (1− ν)β 1−2ν1−ν
]
!
> 0
⇔ 1− νβ
f(βˆ)
− (1− ν)β 1−2ν1−ν !> 0
⇔ 1− νβ
1− ν
!
> β
1−2ν
1−ν f(βˆ) = β
1−2ν
1−ν βˆ
ν
1−ν
1− βˆν
1− ν
As β
1−2ν
1−ν βˆ
ν
1−ν ≤ βˆ ≤ 1 with at least one strict inequality (as β < 1), and 1−βˆν
1−ν ≤
1−βν
1−ν hold, the partial derivative is strictly positive for all βˆ < 1 and zero for βˆ = 1.
Hence, starting at βˆ = β, self-zero welfare strictly increases in naïveté βˆ up until
full naïveté.
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Anticipation of Prospect
Theory Preferences
B.1. Tables
Table B.1.1.: Lotteries for Prospect Theory parameter elicitation
Lottery Payoﬀ x Payoﬀ y Week
G1 1.20 0.00 1
G2 2.20 0.00 2
G3 2.80 0.00 1
G4 4.40 0.00 1
G5 7.80 0.00 2
G6 7.80 2.80 2
G7 2.80 1.20 1
L1 −1.20 0.00 1
L2 −2.20 0.00 2
L3 −2.80 0.00 1
L4 −4.40 0.00 1
L5 −7.80 0.00 2
L6 −7.80 −2.80 2
L7 −2.80 −1.20 1
M1 −1.20 1.20 1
M2 −2.20 2.20 2
M3 −2.80 2.80 1 & 2
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M4 −4.40 4.40 1
M5 −7.80 7.80 2
Notes: Payoﬀs x and y in EUR, all
lotteries are 50:50.
Table B.1.2.: Individual Prospect Theory parameter estimates
Both Weeks Jointly Week 1 Week 2
α β λ α1 β1 λ1 α2 β2 λ2
1 0.83 0.87 10.43 1.21 1.38 71.99 0.72 0.74 6.68
(0.18) (0.19) (11.48) (0.52) (0.64) (377.74) (0.18) (0.18) (6.46)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.38] [0.04] [0.05] [0.85] [0.00] [0.00] [0.32]
2 0.67 1.16 1.24 0.58 0.78 0.85 0.90 1.08 4.15
(0.15) (0.29) (0.45) (0.15) (0.20) (0.22) (0.17) (0.21) (1.99)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.06]
3 0.84 0.87 1.39 0.74 1.27 0.91 0.85 0.78 1.59
(0.08) (0.09) (0.21) (0.14) (0.26) (0.25) (0.09) (0.09) (0.29)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
4 0.89 0.99 0.85 0.70 1.28 0.53 0.91 0.98 0.86
(0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.35) (0.22) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
5 0.90 1.05 0.71 0.87 1.18 0.51 0.97 0.95 1.03
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.22) (0.31) (0.20) (0.15) (0.15) (0.26)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
6 0.92 0.98 0.65 1.06 1.18 0.56 0.87 0.92 0.67
(0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.25) (0.28) (0.20) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
7 1.56 2.02 1.06 1.19 2.30 0.40 1.83 1.86 2.49
(0.25) (0.35) (0.48) (0.34) (0.83) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) (1.60)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.02] [0.26] [0.00] [0.00] [0.14]
8 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
9 0.78 0.93 2.06 0.96 1.03 2.09 0.74 0.86 2.19
(0.08) (0.09) (0.34) (0.18) (0.20) (0.59) (0.09) (0.10) (0.45)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
10 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.02 1.02 1.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
80
B.1. Tables
Table B.1.2.: Individual Prospect Theory parameter estimates
Both Weeks Jointly Week 1 Week 2
α β λ α1 β1 λ1 α2 β2 λ2
11 1.27 0.74 6.95 0.68 1.07 1.33 2.91 0.49 286.10
(0.42) (0.22) (5.97) (0.34) (0.57) (0.84) (1.60) (0.18) (945.50)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.26] [0.06] [0.08] [0.13] [0.09] [0.02] [0.77]
12 1.15 0.88 1.83 1.02 0.98 2.25 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.14) (0.10) (0.37) (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
13 1.05 1.39 0.96 1.20 0.96 1.25 1.17 1.31 1.90
(0.22) (0.30) (0.40) (0.30) (0.23) (0.46) (0.21) (0.24) (0.83)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04]
14 3.66 0.30 1.8E + 03 1.13 0.42 6.55 6.94 0.25 1.5E + 06
(1.55) (0.11) (5.8E + 03) (0.44) (0.17) (5.18) (4.81) (0.12) (1.5E + 07)
[0.03] [0.01] [0.76] [0.02] [0.03] [0.23] [0.17] [0.06] [0.92]
15 0.77 1.10 0.77 1.17 1.14 1.29 0.64 1.09 0.60
(0.13) (0.20) (0.21) (0.41) (0.40) (0.74) (0.14) (0.24) (0.22)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.10] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
16 1.07 0.99 1.06 1.10 1.33 0.57 1.15 0.82 1.85
(0.23) (0.21) (0.32) (0.46) (0.57) (0.41) (0.30) (0.20) (0.87)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.04] [0.19] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05]
17 0.61 1.11 0.73 0.86 1.95 0.51 0.51 0.93 0.74
(0.14) (0.27) (0.25) (0.39) (1.18) (0.57) (0.15) (0.27) (0.29)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.05] [0.12] [0.39] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
18 0.62 0.83 1.44 0.54 1.26 2.22 0.60 0.77 1.24
(0.14) (0.18) (0.41) (0.23) (0.61) (1.75) (0.15) (0.19) (0.41)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.06] [0.23] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
19 0.67 1.08 0.81 0.73 0.82 0.88 0.74 1.05 1.16
(0.14) (0.23) (0.25) (0.24) (0.28) (0.33) (0.17) (0.26) (0.48)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03]
20 0.82 0.98 0.74 0.78 0.88 0.72 0.89 0.95 0.95
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.15)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
21 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
22 1.74 1.41 1.81 2.79 1.53 5.92 1.57 1.29 1.71
(0.41) (0.33) (0.90) (1.64) (0.80) (10.72) (0.46) (0.36) (1.15)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.06] [0.11] [0.08] [0.59] [0.00] [0.00] [0.16]
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Table B.1.2.: Individual Prospect Theory parameter estimates
Both Weeks Jointly Week 1 Week 2
α β λ α1 β1 λ1 α2 β2 λ2
23 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
24 1.11 1.12 0.89 1.52 1.47 0.84 1.02 0.98 1.02
(0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.39) (0.38) (0.40) (0.14) (0.14) (0.24)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
25 1.08 0.93 2.20 1.22 0.74 2.81 1.08 0.97 2.22
(0.31) (0.26) (1.20) (0.77) (0.43) (3.02) (0.42) (0.37) (1.82)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.08] [0.14] [0.11] [0.37] [0.02] [0.02] [0.24]
26 0.62 1.03 1.57 1.01 1.30 2.11 0.51 0.94 1.43
(0.09) (0.16) (0.34) (0.26) (0.36) (0.93) (0.09) (0.16) (0.34)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
27 0.93 0.85 0.84 1.13 1.46 0.44 0.83 0.74 0.88
(0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.36) (0.49) (0.27) (0.15) (0.13) (0.17)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.13] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
28 0.80 1.34 0.62 0.96 1.37 0.65 0.77 1.27 0.67
(0.11) (0.19) (0.16) (0.25) (0.39) (0.31) (0.13) (0.23) (0.23)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
29 0.79 1.04 0.74 0.88 1.04 0.71 0.82 0.96 0.96
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.08) (0.10) (0.16)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
30 0.87 0.91 0.92 0.60 0.80 0.78 0.98 1.00 0.99
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
31 1.16 0.81 1.93 0.71 0.82 1.28 1.21 0.94 1.56
(0.15) (0.10) (0.41) (0.15) (0.18) (0.31) (0.16) (0.12) (0.36)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
32 1.11 1.39 1.57 1.21 1.70 2.00 1.02 1.36 1.23
(0.09) (0.12) (0.27) (0.17) (0.27) (0.57) (0.08) (0.12) (0.22)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
33 0.90 0.95 0.94 0.79 0.95 0.83 0.94 0.96 0.98
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
34 0.85 1.11 0.93 1.09 0.73 1.63 0.84 1.19 0.94
(0.14) (0.19) (0.25) (0.24) (0.15) (0.49) (0.13) (0.19) (0.27)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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Table B.1.2.: Individual Prospect Theory parameter estimates
Both Weeks Jointly Week 1 Week 2
α β λ α1 β1 λ1 α2 β2 λ2
35 0.78 1.22 1.50 0.90 1.43 1.28 0.76 1.11 1.75
(0.08) (0.13) (0.26) (0.16) (0.29) (0.38) (0.09) (0.14) (0.38)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
36 0.93 0.95 1.20 0.83 0.93 1.22 0.93 1.02 1.00
(0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.28) (0.10) (0.11) (0.19)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
37 1.05 0.94 1.26 1.29 0.81 2.11 0.98 1.00 0.97
(0.08) (0.07) (0.14) (0.16) (0.09) (0.42) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
38 0.94 0.99 1.12 0.73 1.03 0.90 0.98 1.03 1.10
(0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.07) (0.08) (0.15)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
39 0.57 1.06 0.92 0.55 1.36 0.79 0.57 0.98 0.96
(0.08) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.42) (0.30) (0.10) (0.17) (0.23)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
40 1.10 1.17 4.89 1.34 1.92 2.67 1.10 0.93 7.64
(0.19) (0.21) (2.17) (0.41) (0.68) (1.85) (0.20) (0.17) (4.08)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.01] [0.01] [0.17] [0.00] [0.00] [0.08]
41 0.82 0.60 1.50 1.03 0.61 1.77 0.83 0.53 1.81
(0.18) (0.13) (0.37) (0.48) (0.28) (1.06) (0.24) (0.16) (0.73)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.05] [0.12] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03]
42 0.77 0.97 0.94 0.84 0.94 0.98 0.77 0.95 1.02
(0.11) (0.14) (0.19) (0.23) (0.27) (0.36) (0.14) (0.17) (0.30)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
43 1.29 1.25 0.92 1.47 0.85 1.75 1.42 1.20 1.46
(0.38) (0.36) (0.44) (0.81) (0.44) (1.45) (0.51) (0.42) (1.10)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.09] [0.07] [0.25] [0.02] [0.01] [0.21]
44 1.03 0.93 1.08 0.73 1.62 0.40 1.01 0.90 1.04
(0.19) (0.17) (0.27) (0.24) (0.65) (0.29) (0.19) (0.17) (0.29)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.03] [0.19] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
45 0.80 0.71 1.94 0.75 1.16 1.57 0.79 0.61 2.09
(0.14) (0.12) (0.51) (0.27) (0.46) (0.79) (0.17) (0.13) (0.71)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
46 0.84 1.29 0.93 0.97 1.26 1.11 0.79 1.30 0.85
(0.05) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.23) (0.06) (0.11) (0.14)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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Table B.1.2.: Individual Prospect Theory parameter estimates
Both Weeks Jointly Week 1 Week 2
α β λ α1 β1 λ1 α2 β2 λ2
47 1.25 1.10 1.11 0.86 1.59 0.55 1.19 1.17 0.77
(0.27) (0.23) (0.36) (0.33) (0.72) (0.43) (0.27) (0.26) (0.30)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.04] [0.22] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
48 0.93 1.08 1.28 1.02 1.37 0.74 1.01 0.89 2.25
(0.17) (0.20) (0.40) (0.33) (0.47) (0.42) (0.21) (0.18) (0.94)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.10] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03]
49 1.31 0.66 6.92 0.48 0.57 1.53 3.99 0.54 2.1E + 03
(0.44) (0.20) (6.11) (0.26) (0.29) (0.66) (2.65) (0.19) (1.2E + 04)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.27] [0.08] [0.07] [0.04] [0.15] [0.01] [0.86]
50 0.80 0.95 1.42 0.99 0.94 2.49 0.69 1.02 0.95
(0.07) (0.09) (0.20) (0.12) (0.11) (0.46) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
51 1.21 1.08 5.75 0.81 1.13 1.59 1.81 0.88 37.63
(0.35) (0.31) (4.34) (0.38) (0.57) (1.07) (0.74) (0.29) (63.84)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.20] [0.05] [0.07] [0.16] [0.03] [0.01] [0.56]
52 0.77 1.22 0.88 0.74 0.93 0.97 0.81 1.29 0.95
(0.12) (0.21) (0.25) (0.23) (0.29) (0.36) (0.17) (0.29) (0.40)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03]
53 0.96 1.04 1.21 0.70 0.98 0.85 1.12 1.04 1.64
(0.11) (0.12) (0.23) (0.14) (0.21) (0.22) (0.15) (0.14) (0.45)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
54 1.06 1.05 1.03 1.64 1.65 1.15 0.87 0.92 0.89
(0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.29) (0.29) (0.43) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
55 0.96 0.70 1.40 0.91 0.59 1.49 1.01 0.73 1.44
(0.19) (0.14) (0.33) (0.39) (0.25) (0.71) (0.27) (0.19) (0.56)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.03] [0.06] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
56 1.05 0.96 2.87 1.26 1.19 3.01 1.01 0.87 3.01
(0.11) (0.10) (0.61) (0.27) (0.25) (1.23) (0.13) (0.11) (0.80)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
57 0.84 0.68 0.87 0.72 0.66 0.77 0.88 0.71 0.88
(0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
58 0.96 0.97 0.98 1.02 1.01 1.02 0.94 0.96 0.96
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.09) (0.09) (0.15)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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Table B.1.2.: Individual Prospect Theory parameter estimates
Both Weeks Jointly Week 1 Week 2
α β λ α1 β1 λ1 α2 β2 λ2
59 0.92 0.94 0.97 0.99 0.99 1.01 0.89 0.93 0.94
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
60 1.50 0.77 6.96 1.96 0.81 9.56 2.92 0.48 210.69
(0.36) (0.16) (4.73) (1.07) (0.33) (14.70) (1.34) (0.15) (581.38)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.16] [0.09] [0.03] [0.53] [0.05] [0.01] [0.72]
61 0.83 1.08 1.46 1.43 1.75 1.77 0.69 0.90 1.42
(0.10) (0.13) (0.29) (0.24) (0.32) (0.64) (0.06) (0.08) (0.20)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
62 1.70 1.87 2.71 2.36 3.03 3.34 1.50 1.59 2.53
(0.21) (0.24) (0.98) (0.65) (0.94) (3.03) (0.19) (0.21) (0.97)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.29] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
63 1.09 0.89 2.01 1.38 1.58 2.06 0.94 0.77 1.72
(0.16) (0.13) (0.52) (0.42) (0.51) (1.30) (0.15) (0.12) (0.46)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.14] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
64 1.05 1.03 1.81 1.28 0.96 2.28 1.01 1.01 1.85
(0.15) (0.14) (0.47) (0.37) (0.26) (1.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.65)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
Notes: Standard errors in parantheses, p-values in square brackets.
Table B.1.3.: Probability weight within stability band per PT parameter
α1 β1 λ1 α2 β2 λ2 Min Stable
1 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.19 0.01 0.00 0
2 0.25 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.20 0.02 0.02 0
3 0.25 0.06 0.07 0.45 0.32 0.25 0.06 1
4 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.33 0.32 0.43 0.10 1
5 0.20 0.14 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.17 0.14 1
6 0.15 0.13 0.39 0.32 0.31 0.61 0.13 1
7 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.04 0
8 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1
9 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.44 0.35 0.19 0.15 1
10 0.62 0.68 0.84 0.85 0.89 0.93 0.62 1
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Table B.1.3.: Probability weight within stability band per PT parameter
α1 β1 λ1 α2 β2 λ2 Min Stable
11 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.00 0
12 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
13 0.13 0.04 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.06 0.04 0
14 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.01 0.34 0.00 0.00 0
15 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.21 0.19 0.31 0.07 1
16 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.07 0.07 1
17 0.09 0.03 0.15 0.24 0.14 0.30 0.03 0
18 0.18 0.06 0.05 0.29 0.23 0.20 0.05 0
19 0.18 0.11 0.26 0.24 0.18 0.14 0.11 1
20 0.35 0.27 0.62 0.36 0.45 0.26 0.26 1
21 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1
22 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.01 0
23 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1
24 0.07 0.08 0.22 0.25 0.20 0.32 0.07 1
25 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.03 0
26 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.06 1
27 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.24 0.25 0.48 0.04 0
28 0.14 0.12 0.29 0.32 0.19 0.37 0.12 1
29 0.27 0.28 0.53 0.48 0.34 0.24 0.24 1
30 0.00 0.24 0.34 0.15 0.35 0.64 0.00 0
31 0.00 0.26 0.03 0.27 0.23 0.15 0.00 0
32 0.22 0.09 0.12 0.30 0.38 0.14 0.09 1
33 0.23 0.49 0.50 0.59 0.70 0.73 0.23 1
34 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.34 0.22 0.32 0.02 0
35 0.21 0.13 0.20 0.47 0.25 0.19 0.13 1
36 0.23 0.27 0.32 0.42 0.34 0.28 0.23 1
37 0.09 0.21 0.03 0.39 0.45 0.06 0.03 0
38 0.05 0.33 0.23 0.47 0.48 0.55 0.05 0
39 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.44 0.25 0.37 0.09 1
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Table B.1.3.: Probability weight within stability band per PT parameter
α1 β1 λ1 α2 β2 λ2 Min Stable
40 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.22 0.10 0.02 0.02 0
41 0.08 0.17 0.08 0.18 0.27 0.11 0.08 1
42 0.18 0.17 0.25 0.31 0.26 0.29 0.17 1
43 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.05 1
44 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.02 0
45 0.16 0.06 0.10 0.26 0.27 0.12 0.06 1
46 0.20 0.26 0.28 0.51 0.39 0.52 0.20 1
47 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.05 1
48 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.20 0.15 0.06 0.06 1
49 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.00 0
50 0.10 0.41 0.01 0.13 0.40 0.00 0.00 0
51 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.00 0.00 0
52 0.20 0.10 0.24 0.26 0.15 0.22 0.10 1
53 0.06 0.21 0.12 0.18 0.33 0.13 0.06 1
54 0.02 0.02 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.39 0.02 0
55 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.24 0.16 0.11 1
56 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.32 0.29 0.11 0.07 1
57 0.19 0.26 0.41 0.29 0.37 0.57 0.19 1
58 0.25 0.28 0.38 0.45 0.47 0.56 0.25 1
59 0.40 0.64 0.92 0.90 0.98 0.99 0.40 1
60 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0
61 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.42 0.01 0
62 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.02 0
63 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.17 0.25 0.16 0.04 0
64 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.24 0.26 0.14 0.07 1
Notes: Stability band deﬁned as +/-1.96 standard errors of the pooled
estimation of the respective parameter around the participant's indi-
vidual joint estimate. See Subsection 2.4.2 for further details.
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Table B.1.4.: Plan and commitment quality per subject
Plan Commit Commit
CE Plan Decent WTP-CE Decent
1 −3.83 0 0.05 1
2 −3.43 0 0.80 1
3 −0.19 0 −0.60 0
4 0.46 1 0.00 1
5 0.24 1 0.50 1
6 0.76 1 −1.55 0
7 1.55 1 0.60 1
8 0.96 1 4.85 1
9 −1.74 0 −1.45 0
10 0.96 1 4.95 1
11 3.06 1 5.35 1
12 0.49 1 4.85 1
13 −1.55 0 0.70 1
14 10.88 1 7.15 1
15 0.07 1 −0.25 0
16 0.65 1 −1.10 0
17 0.00 1 −1.90 0
18 −0.28 0 0.05 1
19 −0.48 0 0.00 1
20 0.43 1 −2.65 0
21 1.03 1 4.75 1
22 3.65 1 4.75 1
23 1.05 1 4.75 1
24 1.29 1 −3.65 0
25 −1.47 0 0.00 1
26 −0.87 0 0.60 1
27 0.55 1 −1.90 0
28 0.16 1 −1.10 0
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Table B.1.4.: Plan and commitment quality per subject
Plan Commit Commit
CE Plan Decent WTP-CE Decent
29 0.04 1 −4.75 0
30 0.46 1 0.35 1
31 0.58 1 0.00 1
32 −1.47 0 0.00 1
33 0.23 1 1.75 1
34 −1.23 0 4.75 1
35 −1.26 0 5.05 1
36 0.26 1 −0.15 0
37 0.13 1 4.95 1
38 0.21 1 −1.50 0
39 −0.13 0 −0.05 0
40 −5.97 0 1.10 1
41 0.00 0 0.60 1
42 −0.01 0 0.00 1
43 0.79 1 4.80 1
44 1.26 1 −0.15 0
45 −0.41 0 0.00 1
46 0.12 1 −0.05 0
47 2.30 1 −0.55 0
48 −1.05 0 1.90 1
49 8.94 1 −0.50 0
50 −0.36 0 0.00 1
51 −122.64 0 −2.15 0
52 −1.28 0 0.90 1
53 −0.07 0 −1.15 0
54 0.22 1 −1.75 0
55 0.60 1 3.10 1
56 −2.07 0 0.20 1
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Table B.1.4.: Plan and commitment quality per subject
Plan Commit Commit
CE Plan Decent WTP-CE Decent
57 0.71 1 2.50 1
58 0.45 1 −4.80 0
59 0.57 1 0.00 1
60 −23131.44 0 0.15 1
61 −0.53 0 3.05 1
62 −0.13 0 0.00 1
63 −0.13 0 −3.50 0
64 −0.72 0 0.05 1
Notes: Certainty equivalent plan is relative to never in-
vesting, plan is decent if CE > 0; CE commit is plan
relative to play, commitment is decent if WTP > CE.
B.2. Replication Realization Treatment
The design of our investment game over four rounds is borrowed from Imas (2016).
In particular, we replicated his realization treatment. That is, we have both a pa-
per and a realization group among our subjects and can estimate the realization
treatment eﬀect. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences relative to Imas (2016) and discuss
them in the following.
Imas compares the diﬀerence of round 4 and round 3 investments between the
treatment and control groups by means of a t-test. If a subject invests more
in round 4 than in round 3, the diﬀerence is positive. Therefore, positive signs
correspond to an increase in risk taking, while negative signs indicate a reduction
of risk taking.
As Imas (2016) makes predictions only for the loss domain, he restricts the
analysis to those subjects who were in losses after the third round.
In Table B.2.1, we report the investment change between rounds 4 and 3 of the
realization and control groups. The ﬁrst column reports the estimates of Imas
(2016) for comparison, the second column reports our replication analysis based
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on his data, and the third column reports the respective analysis of our data.
Table B.2.1.: Comparing realization eﬀects
Imas (2016) Replication Our Data
Paper Treatment +0.23*** 0.28*** 0.16
Realization Treatment −0.15*** −0.15*** 0.01
Total Eﬀect −0.38*** −0.42*** −0.18
N (Paper/Realized) 53 54(28/26) 41(13/30)
*** 1% signiﬁcance level; ** 5% signiﬁcance level; * 10% signiﬁ-
cance level;
In the fourth row we display the number of observations and distinguish between
subjects in the paper and the realization group. The ﬁrst number in brackets
denotes the observations in the paper group, the second the observations in the
realization group.
Although our control group, i.e. the paper treatment, has only 13 observations,
the eﬀect has a p-value of 0.13 and, therefore, barely misses the 10% signiﬁcance
level. Compared to the results of Imas (2016), our eﬀect is of same sign and also
of same magnitude when taking the relation of endowments into account (USD
2 vs. EUR 1.60). Therefore, the eﬀect of paper losses is robust between both
experiments. Subjects invest more in round four than in round three if they only
experienced losses so far.
However, when we compare the results of the realization treatment, we ﬁnd huge
diﬀerences between Imas (2016) and our experiment. Imas has a strong negative
eﬀect, that is signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level, whereas we have a null eﬀect.
It is important to note that our result is not driven by lack of statistical power, as
our realization treatment has more observations than Imas. Our results strongly
suggest that there is no eﬀect in our data at all.
Our experiment diﬀered to Imas (2016) in two dimensions. First, our subjects
were asked beforehand to make a complete contingent plan. The plan forced them
to anticipate how they would feel when they experience losses. Perhaps this an-
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ticipation on its own made them aware on how to close the mental frame, thereby
reducing the eﬀect of realization. Although this explanation is appealing, it can-
not account for the fact that we still ﬁnd a strong eﬀect of the paper treatment.
Additionally, it is far fetched to assume that the plan is able to inﬂuence the men-
tal frame of decisions made one week later. Second, our subjects had to do the
Prospect Theory elicitation task, before they could actually choose their invest-
ments. The elicitation task could have interfered with the investment decisions as
both entailed decisions in the loss domain. However, one would expect that all
investment decisions becomes noisier and not only the realization treatment.
Thus, it remains unclear as to why the results of Imas (2016) and our experiment
diﬀer signiﬁcantly in the realization treatment.
In order to discuss how robust the results of Imas (2016) are without the inclusion
of covariables, we can take a look if his predictions are backed by his own data.
Although it is not explicitly stated, in all rounds of the investment game previous
to the fourth round decision makers are in the paper loss control group. Since their
losses are not realized subjects who experience losses according to Imas' theory
are supposed to increase their invested shares.
We test this hypothesis for each round separately in columns (1) and (3). In
columns (2) and (4) we condition the results in the subject being in the treatment
group. Being in the treatment group should not inﬂuence investment decisions
in previous rounds, because Imas hypothesized that only the act of taking away
money closes the mental account. Table B.2.2 presents our results.
Although conditioning on the realization treatment results in diﬀerent eﬀect
signs in round 2, all eﬀects remain insigniﬁcant. Therefore, we know that ran-
domization in treatment and control group worked. However, while the eﬀect of
being in the losses should lead to increased risk taking in the subsequent round,
the eﬀects in Imas' data set are insigniﬁcant at best. It is important to note, that
almost all eﬀects point in the opposite direction. The eﬀect in column (1) has a
p-value of 0.13, barely missing the 10% signiﬁcance. With an eﬀect size of −0.134
it indicates that subjects reduced their investment after a loss in the second round
by USD 0.13.
The missing eﬀects in the previous rounds are troubling for the theory of Imas.
Although his treatment eﬀect is signiﬁcant and goes in the predicted direction,
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Table B.2.2.: Eﬀect of losses on risk taking in previ-
ous rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆3,2 ∆3,2|real ∆2,1 ∆2,1|real
Loss -0.134 -0.0666 0.0111 -0.0666
(0.0878) (0.111) (0.0949) (0.129)
Constant 0.0741 -0.0227 -0.0926 -0.0227
(0.0717) (0.0938) (0.0775) (0.109)
Observations 81 39 81 39
R2 0.029 0.010 0.000 0.007
*** 1% signiﬁcance level; ** 5% signiﬁcance level; *
10% signiﬁcance level;
theory also has clear predictions for the previous investment rounds. That there
are null results at best, that point in the opposite direction casts serious doubt if
the results for the treatment eﬀect could have a diﬀerent cause than loss aversion
and mental accounts. Therefore it is inevitable for further research to also establish
a link between investment decisions and Prospect Theory parameters of subjects.
Only through this link it can be unambiguously established that increasing risk
seeking is driven by Prospect Theory behavior.
B.3. Instructions
In the following, I provide the original instructions (in German language) as used
in the experiment. The typeset closely mimics the one of the actual printouts, but
page-breaks were skipped and ﬁgures are labeled and numbered according to this
dissertation.
B.3.1. Week 1
Herzlich willkommen im Regensburg Economic Science Lab RESL und
vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme am Experiment!
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Bitte sprechen Sie ab jetzt nicht mehr mit anderen Teilnehmern und schalten Sie
Ihr Mobiltelefon aus. Verhalten Sie sich während des gesamten Experiments ruhig.
Allgemeines zum Ablauf
Dieses Experiment dient der Untersuchung ökonomischen Entscheidungsverhal-
tens. Sie können dabei Geld verdienen, das Ihnen im Anschluss an das Experiment
privat in bar ausbezahlt wird.
Das gesamte Experiment besteht aus zwei zeitlich getrennten Sitzungen. Die erste
Sitzung wird etwa 100 Minuten dauern und besteht aus drei Teilen. Die zweite
Sitzung wird etwa 80 Minuten dauern und besteht aus zwei Teilen. Zu Beginn
jedes Teils erhalten Sie detaillierte Instruktionen. Die Summe Ihres Verdienstes
aus allen Teilen ergibt Ihren Gesamtverdienst aus dem Experiment. Dieser wird
Ihnen nach Abschluss des zweiten Teils mitgeteilt und am Ende des Experiments
einzeln und in bar ausbezahlt.
Während des Experiments werden Sie darum gebeten, Entscheidungen zu tref-
fen. Ihre Entscheidungen haben keinen Einﬂuss auf die Auszahlungen der anderen
Teilnehmer, nur auf Ihre eigene Auszahlung.
Sie erhalten in der ersten Sitzung eine Platzkarte, damit Sie in der zweiten Sitzung
denselben Platz einnehmen können. Bringen Sie diese Karte unbedingt zur zweiten
Sitzung mit!
Bezahlung
Während des Experiments berechnen sich Verdienste direkt in Euro. Zusätzlich
zu dem Einkommen, das Sie während des Experiments verdienen können, erhalten
Sie 5 Euro für Ihr pünktliches Erscheinen je Sitzung. Bitte berücksichtigen Sie,
dass der Gesamtbetrag erst nach der zweiten Sitzung ausgezahlt wird. Daher ist
es unbedingt notwendig, dass Sie auch zur zweiten Sitzung erscheinen und Ihre
Platzkarte mitbringen.
Anonymität
Keiner der anderen Teilnehmer wird Ihre Entscheidungen im Experiment nachvoll-
ziehen können. Darüber hinaus werden die Daten aus dem Experiment ausschließ-
lich anonym ausgewertet. Am Ende des Experiments müssen Sie eine Quittung
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über den Erhalt des Verdienstes unterschreiben. Diese dient nur der Abrechnung
und wird nicht dazu verwendet, Ihre persönlichen Daten mit Ihren Entscheidun-
gen zu verknüpfen. Ihr Name wird zu keinem Zeitpunkt mit Ihrem Verhalten im
Experiment kombiniert. Die verteilten Platzkarten enthalten Ihren Namen, um
sicherzustellen, dass auch tatsächlich Sie und niemand anderes an der zweiten Sit-
zung teilnehmen. Die Platzkarten verbleiben sowohl während, als auch nach dem
Experiment, in Ihrem Besitz.
Hilfsmittel
An Ihrem Platz ﬁnden Sie einen Kugelschreiber und einen Taschenrechner. Bitte
lassen Sie beide nach dem Experiment auf dem Tisch liegen. Bitte lassen Sie auch
Ihre Notizen auf dem Tisch liegen, diese werden direkt im Anschluss vernichtet.
Sollten Sie nach den Instruktionen oder während des Experiments Fragen haben,
heben Sie bitte die Hand. Einer der Experimentleiter wird dann zu Ihnen kommen
und Ihre Fragen unter vier Augen beantworten.
Sonstiges
Bitte verwenden Sie als Trennzeichen bei Kommazahlen einen Punkt anstelle des
Kommas. Beispielsweise verwende Sie 6.40 für den Betrag 6 Euro und 40 Cent.
Teil 1
Ablauf
Nächste Woche werden Sie hintereinander vier voneinander unabhängige Inves-
titionsentscheidungen treﬀen. Sie bekommen für jede der vier Runden ein Startka-
pital von je 1,60 Euro. Das Geld wird Ihnen zu Beginn des Experiments nächste
Woche in einem Umschlag in bar ausgehändigt.
In jeder Runde müssen Sie entscheiden, welchen Teilbetrag (in 20-Cent-Schritten)
Ihres Startkapitals Sie investieren möchten. Der nichtinvestierte Teil Ihres Start-
kapitals wird Ihrem Vermögen eins-zu-eins gutgeschrieben.
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Die Auszahlung Ihres Investments ist im Durchschnitt höher, hängt allerdings
vom Zufall ab: Sie wählen in jeder Runde Ihre Erfolgszahl zwischen 1 und 6. Ein
zufällig bestimmter Teilnehmer würfelt dann die gültige Erfolgszahl aus. Stimmt
Ihre selbstgewählte Erfolgszahl mit der anschließend ausgewürfelten Erfolgszahl
überein (dies geschieht mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 16,67%), wird Ihnen der
siebenfache Investitionsbetrag gutgeschrieben; andernfalls erhalten Sie den Inves-
titionsbetrag nicht zurück.
Die Eingabemaske der Investitionsentscheidungen sieht dabei wie folgt aus:
Abbildung B.3.1.: Investitionsentscheidung mit Glückszahl
Beispiel:
Sie investieren 80 Cent und entscheiden sich für die 4 als Erfolgszahl. Wenn der
zufällig bestimmte Teilnehmer die 4 würfelt, erhalten Sie 5,60 Euro aus dem
Investment zurück. Zusätzlich erhalten Sie den nichtinvestierten Betrag von 80
Cent. Insgesamt werden Ihnen also 6,40 Euro für diese Runde gutgeschrieben.
Würfelt der Teilnehmer eine andere Zahl, erhalten Sie lediglich den nichtinvestier-
ten Betrag von 80 Cent zurück.
Sie treﬀen diese Entscheidung für jede der vier Runden neu und können maximal
Ihr jeweiliges Startkapital investieren.
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Heute sollen Sie planen, welche Entscheidungen Sie in der kommenden Woche
treﬀen möchten.
In der Planungsphase können Sie für jede Runde eingeben, wieviel Sie investieren
sollten. Sie ﬁnden jeweils links auf Ihrem Bildschirm die Auszahlung im Gewinnfall
und rechts für den Verlustfall. Für jeden der Fälle können Sie dann individuell
weiterplanen.
Ihr Bildschirm sieht dabei wie folgt aus:
Abbildung B.3.2.: Beispiel für Ihre Vorhersage
Sie treﬀen die Investitionsentscheidungen also zweimal: Einmal heute als Plan und
einmal nächste Woche tatsächlich.
Es wird allerdings nur entweder ihr heutiger Plan oder ihre Investitionsentschei-
dungen von nächster Woche umgesetzt.
Sie entscheiden 45-mal, ob Sie die Umsetzung Ihres heutigen Planes und einen
Geldbetrag möchten, oder die Umsetzung Ihrer Investitionsentscheidungen von
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nächster Woche. Die 45 Entscheidungen variieren im Geldbetrag, der sowohl posi-
tiv (Gutschrift, +), als auch negativ (Abzug vom Guthaben, -) sein kann.
Eine dieser Entscheidungen wird nächste Woche ganz zum Schluss zufällig ausge-
wählt und umgesetzt. Unabhängig davon, wie Sie sich bei diesen 45 Entscheidungen
entscheiden, müssen Sie nächste Woche in jedem Fall die tatsächlichen Investiti-
onsentscheidungen treﬀen.
Ihr Bildschirm sieht dabei aus wie folgt:
Abbildung B.3.3.: Soll Ihre Vorhersage umgesetzt werden?
Sobald Sie diese Informationen gelesen und verstanden haben, können Sie auf
Weiter klicken.
Teil 2
Ablauf
In diesem Teil bekommen Sie zwei Aufgaben gestellt.
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Als erstes sollen Sie drei Rechenaufgaben lösen. Für jede richtig gelöste Aufgabe
werden Ihnen 0,50 Euro gutgeschrieben.
Als zweites bitten wir Sie, einen kurzen Fragebogen auszufüllen. Dieser enthält
Aussagen zu Ihrer Person, die Sie auf einer Sieben-Punkte-Skala von triﬀt nicht
auf mich zu bis triﬀt sehr auf mich zu qualiﬁzieren sollen. Wir bitten Sie, diese
wahrheitsgemäß zu beantworten. Für das Ausfüllen des Fragebogens schreiben wir
Ihrem Vermögen 2 Euro gut. Ihr Bildschirm sieht dabei aus wie folgt:
Abbildung B.3.4.: Fragebogen
Teil 3
Ablauf
In diesem Teil treﬀen Sie eine Reihe an Entscheidungen zwischen einem sicheren
Geldbetrag (links) und einer Lotterie (rechts). Die Lotterie führt zu einer zufälligen
Auszahlung von einem von zwei Beträgen, die sowohl positiv als auch negativ sein
können. Jeder Betrag kommt mit 50% Wahrscheinlichkeit zur Auszahlung.
Ihr Bildschirm sieht dabei aus wie folgt:
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Abbildung B.3.5.: Beispiel Sichere Option vs. Lotterie
Nächste Woche werden Sie u.a. eine Reihe ähnlicher Entscheidungen treﬀen. Am
Ende des Experiments werden wir eine Ihrer Entscheidungen (aus beiden Wochen)
zufällig ermitteln und ausführen. Positive Beträge werden Ihrem Einkommen gut-
geschrieben, negative davon abgezogen.
Ende dieser Sitzung
Die Auszahlung für die Teilnahme gibt es erst nach der Teilnahme an der zweiten
Sitzung. Dennoch bitten wir Sie, auf Ihrem Platz sitzen zu bleiben, bis ein Ex-
perimentator Bescheid gibt, dass das Labor verlassen werden kann. Vergessen Sie
nicht, Ihre Platzkarte in einer Woche wieder mitzubringen!
B.3.2. Week 2
Herzlich willkommen im Regensburg Economic Science Lab RESL und
vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme am Experiment!
Bitte sprechen Sie ab jetzt nicht mehr mit anderen Teilnehmern und schalten Sie
Ihr Mobiltelefon aus. Verhalten Sie sich während des gesamten Experiments ruhig.
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Allgemeines zum Ablauf
Diese Sitzung ist der zweite Teil des in der vergangenen Woche gestarteten Expe-
riments. Bitte stellen Sie sicher, dass Sie an dem Rechner derselben Platznummer
sitzen, wie auf Ihrer Platzkarte vermerkt ist. Diese Sitzung dauert voraussichtlich
80 Minuten und besteht aus zwei Teilen.
Bezahlung
Am Ende dieser Sitzung wird Ihnen Ihr Verdienst aus beiden Sitzungen in bar
ausbezahlt. Wir kommen dazu zu Ihnen an den Platz. Um die Anonymität zu
wahren, bitten wir Sie, während der Auszahlung weiter an Ihrem Platz zu bleiben.
Sobald Sie Ihren Verdienst erhalten und quittiert haben, bitten wir Sie, den Raum
leise zu verlassen.
Hilfsmittel
An Ihrem Platz ﬁnden Sie einen Kugelschreiber und einen Taschenrechner. Bitte
lassen Sie beide nach dem Experiment auf dem Tisch liegen. Bitte lassen Sie auch
Ihre Notizen auf dem Tisch liegen, diese werden direkt im Anschluss vernichtet.
Sollten Sie nach den Instruktionen oder während des Experiments Fragen haben,
heben Sie bitte die Hand. Einer der Experimentleiter wird dann zu Ihnen kommen
und Ihre Fragen unter vier Augen beantworten.
Sonstiges
Bitte verwenden Sie als Trennzeichen bei Kommazahlen einen Punkt anstelle des
Kommas. Beispielsweise verwenden Sie 6.40 für den Betrag 6 Euro und 40 Cent.
Teil 1
Ablauf
In diesem Teil treﬀen Sie eine Reihe von Entscheidungen zwischen einem sicheren
Geldbetrag (links) und einer Lotterie (rechts). Die Lotterie führt zu einer zufälligen
Auszahlung von einem von zwei Beträgen, die sowohl positiv als auch negativ sein
können. Jeder Betrag kommt mit 50% Wahrscheinlichkeit zur Auszahlung.
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Ihr Bildschirm sieht dabei aus wie folgt:
Abbildung B.3.6.: Beispiel Sichere Option vs. Lotterie
Am Ende dieser Sitzung werden wir eine Ihrer Entscheidungen (aus beiden Wo-
chen) ermitteln und ausführen. Positive Beträge werden Ihrem Einkommen gutge-
schrieben, negative davon abgezogen.
Teil 2
Ablauf
In diesem Teil treﬀen Sie die Investitionsentscheidungen, die Sie vergangene Woche
geplant haben. Die Wahrscheinlichkeiten und Auszahlungen sind dabei dieselben
wie letzte Woche. Der wesentliche Unterschied gegenüber letzter Woche besteht
darin, dass Sie diesmal nach jeder der vier Investitionsentscheidungen direkt er-
fahren, ob Ihre Investition erfolgreich gewesen ist oder nicht. Sie müssen daher
nicht mehr für jede Kombination aus Gewinnen und Verlusten entscheiden, son-
dern nur noch für Ihren tatsächlichen Verlauf.
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Ihnen wurde ein Umschlag mit 6,40 Euro ausgehändigt; dies ist Ihr gesamtes Start-
kapital (jeweils 1,60 Euro für jede Investitionsrunde). Die Stückelung beträgt 2 Eu-
ro, 2 Euro, 1 Euro, 50 Cent, 50 Cent, 20 Cent, 10 Cent, 10 Cent. Bitte öﬀnen Sie
den Umschlag und vergewissern Sie sich, dass er die genannten Münzen enthält.
Belassen Sie das Geld im Umschlag.
In jeder Runde müssen Sie entscheiden, welchen Teilbetrag (in 20-Cent-Schritten)
Ihres Startkapitals Sie investieren möchten. Der nichtinvestierte Teil Ihres Start-
kapitals wird Ihrem Vermögen eins-zu-eins gutgeschrieben.
Die Auszahlung Ihres Investments ist im Durchschnitt höher, hängt allerdings
vom Zufall ab: Sie wählen in jeder Runde Ihre Erfolgszahl zwischen 1 und 6. Ein
zufällig bestimmter Teilnehmer würfelt dann die gültige Erfolgszahl aus. Stimmt
Ihre selbstgewählte Erfolgszahl mit der anschließend ausgewürfelten Erfolgszahl
überein (dies geschieht mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 16,67%), wird Ihnen der
siebenfache Investitionsbetrag gutgeschrieben; andernfalls erhalten Sie den Inves-
titionsbetrag nicht zurück.
Ihr Bildschirm sieht dabei aus wie folgt:
Beispiel:
Sie investieren 80 Cent und entscheiden sich für die 4 als Erfolgszahl. Wenn der
zufällig bestimmte Teilnehmer die 4 würfelt, erhalten Sie 5,60 Euro aus dem In-
vestment zurück. Zusätzlich erhalten Sie den nichtinvestierten Betrag von 80 Cent.
Insgesamt werden Ihnen also 6,40 Euro für diese Runde gutgeschrieben. Würfelt
der Teilnehmer eine andere Zahl, erhalten Sie lediglich den nichtinvestierten Betrag
von 80 Cent zurück.
Sie treﬀen diese Entscheidung für jede der vier Runden neu und können maximal
Ihr jeweiliges Startkapital investieren.
Bezahlung
Während wir die Auszahlung vorbereiten, bitten wir Sie, noch einen Fragebogen
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Abbildung B.3.7.: Investitionsentscheidung mit Erfolgszahl
auszufüllen. Sobald alle Teilnehmer diesen abgeschlossen haben, werden wir zu
Ihnen an den Platz kommen. Sie erhalten Ihr Einkommen aus beiden Sitzungen
ausbezahlt. Um die Anonymität zu wahren, bitten wir Sie, während der Auszah-
lung weiter an Ihrem Platz zu bleiben. Sobald Sie Ihr Verdienst erhalten und
quittiert haben, bitten wir Sie, den Raum leise zu verlassen.
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C.1. Instructions
In the following, I provide the original instructions (in German language) as used
in the experiment. The typeset closely mimics the one of the actual printouts,
but page-breaks were skipped and ﬁgures are labeled and number according to
this dissertation. I provide the instructions of the robustness treatment with in-
centivized beliefs elicitation, as the other instructions are subsets of these, either
without incentives for beliefs, or without beliefs altogether.
Herzlich Willkommen im MELESSA, dem Munich Experimental
Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences, und vielen Dank für
Ihre Teilnahme am Experiment!
Bitte sprechen Sie ab jetzt nicht mehr mit anderen Teilnehmern und schalten Sie
Ihr Mobiltelefon aus. Verhalten Sie sich während des gesamten Experiments
ruhig.
Allgemeines zum Ablauf
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Dieses Experiment dient der Untersuchung ökonomischen Entscheidungsverhal-
tens. Sie können dabei Geld verdienen, das Ihnen im Anschluss an das Experiment
privat in bar ausbezahlt wird.
Während des Experiments werden Sie eine Reihe von Entscheidungen treﬀen. Diese
beeinﬂussen ausschließlich Ihre eigene Auszahlung, nicht die Auszahlung der an-
deren Teilnehmer. Im Folgenden erhalten Sie detaillierte Instruktionen über diese
Entscheidungen und auf welche Weise sie Ihre Auszahlung beeinﬂussen.
Bezahlung
Während des Experiments berechnen sich Verdienste in experimentellen Geldein-
heiten (EG), die sich im Verhältnis 2.500 EG = 1 EUR umrechnen. Zusätzlich
zu dem Einkommen, das Sie während des Experiments verdienen, erhalten Sie
10.000 EG (also 4 EUR) für das Ausfüllen eines Fragebogens am Ende des Experi-
ments. Sie können keinesfalls weniger als 5 EUR in diesem Experiment verdienen.
Abhängig von Ihren Entscheidungen und dem Zufall kann Ihr Einkommen aber
auch auf über 73 EUR steigen. Daher sollten Sie sich Ihre Entscheidungen genau
überlegen!
Anonymität
Keiner der anderen Teilnehmer wird Ihre Entscheidungen im Experiment nach-
vollziehen können. Darüber hinaus werden die Daten aus dem Experiment aus-
schließlich anonym ausgewertet. Ihr Name wird zu keinem Zeitpunkt mit Ihrem
Verhalten im Experiment in Verbindung gebracht.
Hilfsmittel
An Ihrem Platz ﬁnden Sie einen Kugelschreiber und einen Taschenrechner. Bitte
lassen Sie beide nach dem Experiment auf dem Tisch liegen. Bitte lassen Sie auch
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Ihre Instruktionen auf dem Tisch liegen, diese werden direkt im Anschluss an das
Experiment vernichtet.
Sollten Sie zu irgendeiner Zeit Fragen haben, drücken Sie bitte die rote Taste (F11)
auf Ihrer Tastatur. Einer der Experimentleiter wird dann zu Ihnen kommen und
Ihre Fragen unter vier Augen beantworten.
Instruktionen
In diesem Experiment sollen Sie eine Reihe von Anlageentscheidungen treﬀen.
Dazu wird Ihrem Experimentalkonto ein Startkapital in Höhe von 20.000 EG
gutgeschrieben.
In jeder der nun folgenden Anlageentscheidungen haben Sie die Möglichkeit, Ihr
gesamtes Kapital entweder in Anlage A, Anlage B, oder gar nicht zu investieren.
Unabhängig von Ihren Anlageentscheidungen werden Preisverläufe beider Anlagen
für 10 Perioden simuliert und Sie erfahren in jedem Fall, wie sich die beiden Anla-
gen entwickeln. Hier sehen Sie den zeitlichen Ablauf, der nachfolgend ausführlicher
beschrieben wird:
Preisentwicklung
Anlage A startet in Periode 0 bei einem Preis von 200 EG, Anlage B bei einem
Preis von 5 EG. Danach verändern sich die Preise beider Anlagen von Periode zu
Periode. Dabei steigt der Preis einer Anlage entweder um 30%, oder er fällt um
20%, jeweils gegenüber dem Preis der vorherigen Periode.
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Ob der Preis einer Anlage in einer Periode steigt oder fällt hängt ausschließlich
von den folgenden Wahrscheinlichkeiten ab: Die bessere der beiden Anlagen steigt
mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 55% und fällt mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von
45%. Die schlechtere der beiden Anlagen steigt mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von
45% und fällt mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 55%. Welche der beiden Anlagen
die bessere und welche die schlechtere ist, wurde bereits vor Beginn des Experi-
ments (und zufällig für Ihre Teilnehmernummer) festgelegt und bleibt während
des gesamten Experiments gleich. Erst ganz am Ende des Experiments werden Sie
erfahren, welche Anlage tatsächlich die bessere war.
Somit wissen Sie, dass die bessere der beiden Anlagen eine höhere zu erwartende
Preisentwicklung aufweist. Sie wissen jedoch nicht, welche der beiden Anlagen die
bessere ist. Sie können aber im Laufe des Experiments anhand der beobachteten
Preisverläufe Rückschlüsse darauf ziehen welche Anlage wahrscheinlich die bessere
ist.
Beachten Sie, dass die Preisentwicklung jeder Anlage unabhängig ist, sowohl von
der Preisentwicklung der jeweils anderen Anlage, als auch von Ihren Entscheidun-
gen (sowie denen anderer Teilnehmer).
Beide Anlagen haben eine positive zu erwartende Rendite gegenüber dem unver-
zinsten Experimentalkonto, können aber im Einzelfall  je nach Realisierung des
Zufallsgenerators  auch zu einer geringeren Auszahlung führen. Die Wahl der tat-
sächlich besseren Anlage führt zu einer 3,5 mal so großen, also mehr als 250%
größeren, erwarteten Rendite als die Wahl der tatsächlich schlechteren Anlage.
Daher sollten Sie sich Ihre Anlageentscheidungen sehr genau überlegen!
Im Folgenden wird die Preisentwicklung nochmal mit anderen Worten und mit
Hilfe eines Diagramms erläutert:
Preisveränderungen werden dadurch bestimmt, dass in jeder Periode aus zwei Ur-
nen (eine für Anlage A, eine für Anlage B) jeweils ein Ball zufällig gezogen wird.
Sie beobachten also in jeder Periode entweder
für jede Anlage.
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Sie wissen jedoch nicht, ob aus den beiden linken oder aus den beiden rechten Ur-
nen gezogen wird. Dies wurde vorab für Ihre Teilnehmernummer zufällig bestimmt
und bleibt über alle Perioden hinweg gleich.
Anhand der Preisverläufe erhalten Sie also Signale darüber, welche der beiden
Anlagen die bessere ist, also ob die Bälle aus den beiden linken oder aus den beiden
rechten Urnen gezogen werden. Diese Signale sind natürlich nicht präzise, sondern
mit Unsicherheit behaftet. Sie können aber anhand der Preisverläufe Rückschlüsse
darauf ziehen, welche Anlage wahrscheinlich die bessere ist und wie hoch diese
Wahrscheinlichkeit ist.
Erste Anlageentscheidung
In Ihrer ersten Anlageentscheidung müssen Sie wählen, ob Sie Ihr Startkapital in
Höhe von 20.000 EG entweder in Anlage A, in Anlage B, oder gar nicht investie-
ren möchten. Außerdem werden Sie nach Ihrer Einschätzung der Wahrscheinlich-
keit gefragt, welche Anlage die tatsächlich bessere ist. Sie sollten sich jede Ihrer
Wahrscheinlichkeitseinschätzungen genau überlegen, denn Sie werden für deren
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Richtigkeit mit bis zu 4 EUR zusätzlich entlohnt (wie genau, wird am Ende der
Instruktionen erklärt). Erst ganz am Ende des Experiments werden sie erfahren,
welche der beiden Anlagen tatsächlich die bessere war.
Wenn Sie sich für eine der beiden Anlagen entscheiden, wird Ihr gesamtes Start-
kapital unabhängig von den aktuellen Preisen vollständig in die gewählte Anlage
investiert. Sie erhalten somit  abhängig von den Preisen  mehr oder weniger An-
teile einer Anlage (da der Preis einer Anlage immer den Preis eines Anteils dieser
Anlage wiederspiegelt). Anteilige Investitionen in eine oder mehrere Anlagen sind
nicht möglich.
Entscheiden Sie sich für eine der beiden Anlagen, so entwickelt sich der Wert Ihrer
Investition bis zur nächsten Anlageentscheidung mit dem Preis dieser Anlage mit.
Dadurch steigt oder fällt Ihr Vermögen mit dem gleichen Prozentsatz wie der Preis
der Anlage, in die Sie investiert haben. Der absolute Preis einer Anlage spielt al-
so keine Rolle für Ihr Vermögen, sondern nur dessen prozentuale Veränderungen.
Entscheiden Sie sich gegen eine Investition, so verbleibt Ihr Startkapital bis zur
nächsten Anlageentscheidung auf Ihrem Experimentalkonto und wird zwischen-
zeitlich nicht verzinst.
Sie treﬀen Ihre erste Anlageentscheidung nicht für die Startperiode 0, sondern für
Periode 2. Allerdings müssen Sie Ihre Entscheidung bereits vorab treﬀen, bevor
Sie erfahren, wie sich die beiden Anlagen bis zur Periode 2 entwickelt haben.
Um Ihnen dennoch die Möglichkeit zu geben, Ihre Entscheidung von den Preisver-
läufen der Anlagen bis Periode 2 abhängig zu machen, werden 5 mögliche Preisver-
läufe der beiden Anlagen zufällig für Sie gezogen und Ihnen nacheinander separat
zur Entscheidung vorgelegt.
Nachdem Sie für jeden dieser 5 Preisverläufe eine Anlageentscheidung getroﬀen so-
wie alle dazugehörigen Wahrscheinlichkeitseinschätzungen abgegeben haben, wird
anschließend ein Preisverlauf zufällig gemäß den tatsächlichen Wahrscheinlich-
keiten gezogen. Sie werden über den Ausgang dieser Ziehung informiert und Ihre
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entsprechende Entscheidung wird umgesetzt.
Sie wissen nicht, welche Ihrer 5 Entscheidungen umgesetzt wird. Treﬀen Sie also
jede dieser Entscheidungen so sorgfältig, als würde sie mit Sicherheit umgesetzt
werden. Mit anderen Worten, betrachten Sie jede Ihrer Entscheidungen so,
als ob sich der dargestellte Preisverlauf bereits realisiert hätte.
Beispiel 1
In folgendem Screenshot sehen Sie einen der möglichen Preisverläufe bis Periode
2, der für Sie abgefragt und realisiert werden könnte.
In diesem Beispiel hat Anlage A in Periode 2 einen Preis von 338,00 EG und Anlage
B einen Preis von 5,20 EG. Die Diagramme zeigen den kompletten Preisverlauf
bis Periode 2 je Anlage. Darüber hinaus sehen Sie in der Tabelle die prozentuale
Preisveränderung jeder Anlage gegenüber Periode 0.
Unabhängig davon, für welche der Anlagen Sie sich entscheiden, wird immer Ihr
gesamtes Startkapital vollständig in die gewählte Anlage investiert. Anteilige In-
vestitionen sind nicht möglich.
Wie in Beispiel 1 zu sehen, müssen Sie für jeden Preisverlauf eine Wahrschein-
lichkeitseinschätzung abgeben. Bei dieser Wahrscheinlichkeitsabfrage werden Sie
immer nach der Wahrscheinlichkeit gefragt, mit der Sie glauben, dass Anlage A
die bessere Anlage ist. Wenn Sie also glauben würden, dass Anlage B die bessere
ist, z.B. mit 70% Wahrscheinlichkeit, müssten Sie aus dem Dropdown-Menü die
Gegenwahrscheinlichkeit 30% auswählen (denn dann wäre Anlage A mit Wahr-
scheinlichkeit 100% - 70% = 30% die bessere Anlage).
Zweite Anlageentscheidung
In Ihrer zweiten (und letzten) Anlageentscheidung müssen Sie erneut wählen, ob
Sie Ihr aktuelles Vermögen entweder in Anlage A, in Anlage B, oder gar nicht
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investieren möchten. Außerdem müssen Sie wieder Ihre Einschätzung der Wahr-
scheinlichkeit abgeben, mit der Sie glauben, dass Anlage A die bessere Anlage
ist. Auch hier sollten Sie sich jede Ihrer Wahrscheinlichkeitseinschätzungen genau
überlegen, da Sie für deren Richtigkeit mit bis zu 4 EUR zusätzlich entlohnt werden
(wie genau, wird am Ende der Instruktionen erklärt).
Ihre zweite Anlageentscheidung treﬀen Sie für Periode 6. Wiederum müssen Sie
Ihre Entscheidung vorab treﬀen, bevor Sie erfahren, wie sich die beiden Anlagen
zwischen Periode 2 und Periode 6 entwickelt haben.
Wie bei Ihrer ersten Anlageentscheidung besteht auch hier die Möglichkeit, Ih-
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re Entscheidung von den Preisverläufen der Anlagen abhängig zu machen. Dazu
werden wieder einige mögliche Preisverläufe der beiden Anlagen zufällig für Sie
gezogen (diesmal 3 bis 13) und Ihnen nacheinander separat zur Entscheidung vor-
gelegt.
Auch hier wissen Sie nicht, welche Ihrer Entscheidungen umgesetzt wird. Treﬀen
Sie also jede der Entscheidungen so sorgfältig, als würde sie mit Sicherheit umge-
setzt werden. Mit anderen Worten, betrachten Sie jede Ihrer Entscheidungen
so, als ob sich der dargestellte Preisverlauf bereits realisiert hätte.
Sobald Sie alle Anlageentscheidungen getroﬀen sowie alle dazugehörigen Wahr-
scheinlichkeitseinschätzungen abgegeben haben, wird anschließend einer der ab-
gefragten Preisverläufe zufällig gemäß den tatsächlichen Wahrscheinlichkeiten
gezogen, Sie werden über den Ausgang dieser Ziehung informiert und Ihre entspre-
chende Entscheidung wird umgesetzt.
Der Wert Ihrer Investition entwickelt sich dann bis zur letzten Periode (Periode 10)
mit dem Preis der gewählten Anlage mit. Erst in Periode 10 werden automatisch
alle Anteile in Ihrem Besitz zu den in Periode 10 geltenden Preisen verkauft und
der Erlös wird Ihrem Experimentalkonto gutgeschrieben.
Beachten Sie, dass Sie nach Periode 6 keine weiteren Anlageentscheidungen mehr
treﬀen können, sich die Preise der Anlagen aber bis Periode 10 weiter verändern.
Daher ist es wichtig zu überlegen, wie sich die Preise der beiden Anlagen für den
jeweils gegebenen Preisverlauf weiter entwickeln können.
Beispiel 2
In folgendem Screenshot sehen Sie einen der möglichen Preisverläufe bis Periode
6, der für Sie abgefragt und realisiert werden könnte.
In diesem Beispiel hat sich der Preisverlauf von Beispiel 1 nach Periode 2 realisiert.
Die Preise der beiden Anlagen in Periode 6 betragen 224,97 EG für Anlage A
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und 9,14 EG für Anlage B. Die Diagramme zeigen den kompletten Preisverlauf
bis Periode 6 je Anlage. Darüber hinaus sehen Sie in der Tabelle prozentuale
Preisveränderungen.
Hätten Sie in Ihrer ersten Anlageentscheidung Anlage A gewählt, so würde sich Ihr
aktuelles Vermögen in Periode 6 auf 13.312 EG belaufen (Startkapital 33,44%). In
Beispiel 2 ist genau dieser Fall abgebildet. Hätten Sie dagegen Anlage B gewählt,
betrüge Ihr aktuelles Vermögen 35.152 EG (Startkapital +75,76%). Ihr aktuelles
Vermögen kann entweder in der bisherigen Anlage belassen, in die andere Anlage
umgeschichtet, oder auf das zinslose Experimentalkonto eingezahlt werden. Sie
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haben also wieder die Wahl zwischen Anlage A, Anlage B und dem unverzinsten
Experimentalkonto.
Wenn Sie sich in Ihrer ersten Anlageentscheidung für Anlage A entschieden hät-
ten (wie in Beispiel 2 dargestellt) und nun bei Anlage A bleiben würden, würden
Sie alle zuvor erworbenen Anteile von Anlage A behalten, d.h. Sie würden weder
Anteile kaufen noch verkaufen. Wenn Sie dagegen nun Anlage B oder keine In-
vestition wählen würden, würden Sie alle zuvor erworbenen Anteile von Anlage A
zuerst verkaufen, bevor Ihre neue Investitionsentscheidung umgesetzt würde.
Entlohnung Ihrer Wahrscheinlichkeitsschätzungen
Eine Ihrer getroﬀenen Wahrscheinlichkeitseinschätzungen wird mit bis zu 4 EUR
entlohnt. Ein Münzwurf wird entscheiden, ob es die Einschätzung des realisierten
Preisverlaufs aus Ihrer ersten oder zweiten Anlageentscheidung ist.
Sie sollten sich jede Ihrer Wahrscheinlichkeitseinschätzungen genau überlegen,
denn Sie werden für deren Richtigkeit entlohnt. Im Folgenden sehen Sie ein Bei-
spiel, wie diese Entlohnung genau funktioniert: Nehmen Sie an, Sie würden bei
dem auszahlungsrelevanten Preisverlauf glauben, dass Anlage B mit 60% Wahr-
scheinlichkeit die bessere ist (also dass dementsprechend Anlage A mit 40% Wahr-
scheinlichkeit die bessere ist). Wenn Sie nun 40% bei diesem Preisverlauf eingeben,
wird in der folgenden Tabelle in den ersten 8 Zeilen Alternative L (Links) und in
den letzten 12 Zeilen Alternative R (Rechts) automatisch ausgewählt. Eine der Zei-
len wird dann zufällig gezogen (alle Zeilen sind gleich wahrscheinlich) und gemäß
der ausgewählten Alternative umgesetzt (bzw. ausgespielt). Bei diesem Anreizsys-
tem wird garantiert, dass Sie Ihre Gewinnwahrscheinlichkeit für die 4 EUR
Entlohnung maximieren, wenn Sie exakt Ihre wahre Einschätzung von 40%
auswählen (Würden Sie z.B. stattdessen 20% eingeben, dann würde Alternative L
in den ersten 4 Zeilen und Alternative R in den letzten 16 Zeilen ausgewählt. Sie
würden aber besser gestellt, wenn Alternative L in den Zeilen 5 bis 8 ebenfalls aus-
gewählt würde, da es Ihnen eine höhere Gewinnwahrscheinlichkeit für die 4 EUR
Entlohnung garantiert).
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Zeile Alternative L (Links) Alternative R (Rechts) Ihre Wahl
1
4 efalls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 5%,
L
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 95%,
2
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 10%,
L
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 90%,
3
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 15%,
L
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 85%,
4
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 20%,
L
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 80%,
5
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 25%,
L
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 75%,
6
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 30%,
L
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 70%,
7
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 35%,
L
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 65%,
8
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 40%,
R
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 60%,
9
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 45%,
R
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 55%,
10
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 50%,
R
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 50%,
11
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 55%,
R
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 45%,
12
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 60%,
R
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 40%,
13
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 65%,
R
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 35%,
14
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 70%,
R
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 30%,
15
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 75%,
R
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 25%,
16
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 80%,
R
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 20%,
17
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 85%,
R
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 15%,
18
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 90%,
R
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 10%,
19
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 95%,
R
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 5%,
20
4 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 100%,
R
0 e falls Anlage A besser ist, 4 e mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 0%,
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Testlauf
Um Sie mit dem Computer-Interface und dem Ablauf des Experiments noch besser
vertraut zu machen, führen wir nun vor Beginn des eigentlichen Experiments einen
Testlauf durch. Dieser Testlauf hat keinen Einﬂuss auf Ihre Auszahlung aus
dem Experiment und soll lediglich dazu beitragen, mögliche Missverständnisse zu
erkennen und zu klären.
Im Testlauf wird nicht das eigentliche Experiment durchgespielt, sondern lediglich
eine vereinfachte und verkürzte Version davon. Anders als im eigentlichen Ex-
periment, treﬀen Sie im Testlauf beide Anlageentscheidungen für lediglich 2 von
den Experimentleitern ausgewählte (und nicht zufällig gezogene) Preisverläufe, von
denen jeder mit 50% Wahrscheinlichkeit eintritt.
Beachten Sie, dass die Preisverläufe und Realisierungen des Testlaufs
keinerlei Rückschlüsse auf das eigentliche Experiment erlauben!
Falls nach dem Testlauf noch Unklarheiten über den Ablauf des Experiments be-
stehen sollten, drücken Sie bitte die rote Taste (F11) auf Ihrer Tastatur und ein
Experimentleiter wird zu Ihnen an den Platz kommen und Ihre Fragen beantwor-
ten.
Bitte wenden Sie sich nun dem Computer zu und geben Sie den Code 1234 in das
Feld ein.
Kontrollfragen
Bevor als nächstes das eigentliche Experiment beginnt, möchten wir Sie bitten,
noch kurz die folgenden Verständnisfragen zu beantworten um jegliche Missver-
ständnisse auszuschließen. Ihre Antworten haben keinen Einﬂuss auf Ihre Aus-
zahlung aus dem Experiment.
Sobald Sie die Fragen beantwortet haben, heben Sie bitte Ihre Hand und ein Ex-
perimentleiter wird zu Ihnen an den Platz kommen um Ihre Antworten zu kon-
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trollieren. Das Experiment startet erst, wenn alle Teilnehmer die Kontrollfragen
beantwortet haben. Bei Unklarheiten heben Sie bitte ebenfalls Ihre Hand.
1. Können Sie durch einen Kauf oder Verkauf die Preise beeinﬂussen?
 Ja
 Nein
2. Sind die Preise der beiden Anlagen voneinander abhängig?
 Ja
 Nein
3. Mit welcher Wahrscheinlichkeit steigt der Preis der besseren Anlage?
%
4. Mit welcher Wahrscheinlichkeit sinkt der Preis der schlechteren Anlage?
%
5. Um wieviel Prozent steigt der Preis einer Anlage in einer Periode, wenn er
steigt?
%
6. Um wieviel Prozent sinkt der Preis einer Anlage in einer Periode, wenn er
sinkt?
%
7. Wie hoch ist die zu erwartende Wertveränderung der besseren Anlage inner-
halb einer Periode?
 0,45 * 0,30 - 0,55*0,20 = +2,5 %
 0,55*0,30  0,45*0,20 = + 7,5%
 0,45*0,20  0,55*0,30 = - 7,5%
 0,55*0,20  0,45*0,30 = - 2,5%
8. Wie hoch ist die zu erwartende Wertveränderung der schlechteren Anlage
innerhalb einer Periode?
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C.1. Instructions
 0,45*0,30  0,55*0,20 = + 2,5%
 0,55*0,30  0,45*0,20 = + 7,5%
 0,45*0,20  0,55*0,30 = - 7,5%
 0,55*0,20  0,45*0,30 = - 2,5%
9. Werden Sie während des Experiments aufgefordert Anlageentscheidungen zu
treﬀen, deren Realisierung von vornherein ausgeschlossen ist?
 Ja
 Nein
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